Oral Argument: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 Link to Docket: HereConsolidated with: Robinson v. Callais | Case No. 24-110 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: HereCase Preview: HereBackground: Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin , 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin , 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.Question Presented: Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8? Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny? Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions? Is this action non-justiciable?Oral Advocates:For Petitioner Press Robinson: Janai Nelson, New YorkFor Petitioner Louisiana: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, LouisianaFor Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Missouri For United States, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellees: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of JusticeLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD. Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps: [00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:00] Argument Begins[00:01:09] Appellant Press Robinson Opening Statement[00:03:32] Appellant Press Robinson Free for All Questions[00:26:15] Appellant Press Robinson Sequential Questions[00:47:32] Appellant Louisiana Opening Statement[00:49:02] Appellant Louisiana Free for All Questions[00:57:59]  Appellant Louisiana Sequential Questions[01:20:21] Callais Appellees Opening Statement[01:21:47] Callais Appellees Free for All Questions[01:31:11] Callais Appellees Sequential Questions[01:40:35] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement[01:41:42]  United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions[01:51:08] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions[02:25:32] Appellant Press Robinson Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereQuestion Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los AngelesFor Respondent: Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, MontanaUnited States as Amicus Curiae: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Episode Preview[00:00:50] Argument Begins[00:01:02] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:12] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:27:25] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:39:50] Respondent Opening Statement[00:41:41] Respondent Free for All Questions[00:55:44] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:00:52] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement[01:02:01]  United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions[01:09:15] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions[01:10:40] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25 Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereQuestion Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner. For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur. For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:00:58] Argument Begins[00:01:06] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:14] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:14:04] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:18:36] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Opening Statement[00:19:45]  Respondent in Support of Vacatur Free for All Questions[00:33:22]  Respondent in Support of Vacatur Sequential Questions[00:34:41] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Opening Statement[00:37:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Free for All Questions[01:01:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Sequential Questions[01:02:09] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Bowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25 Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereBackground: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[ a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. ” (emphasis added).Question Presented:Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. * * * Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), “[ t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari. ” (emphasis added).Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below as to Question 1: Kasdin M. Mitchell, Dallas, Tex. Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:00:47] Argument Begins[00:00:55] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:23:01] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:36:49] Respondent Opening Statement[00:39:09] Respondent Free for All Questions[01:03:04] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:14:14] Court-Appointed Amicus Opening Statement[01:16:15]  Court-Appointed Amicus Free for All Questions[01:27:23]  Court-Appointed Amicus Sequential Questions[01:28:11] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereBackground: The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq .), generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an employee of the federal government "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The FTCA, however, excepts from that waiver of immunity "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Easha Anand, Menlo Park, Ca.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD. Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/upcoming-oral-argument-bost-v-illinois-ballot-box-bout-when-can-candidates-challenge-election-rules/Background: Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.Question Presented: Whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; United States, as Amicus Curiae: Michael Talent, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jane E. Notz, Solicitor General, Chicago, Ill.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD. Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: Here Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.For United States as Amicus Curiae: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor GeneralLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Case Preview[00:00:50] Argument Begins[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:27:48] United States Opening Statement[00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions[00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement[01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Barrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereQuestion Presented:Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c) (3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor , 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Matthew B. Larsen, Assistant Federal Defender, New York, N. Y. For Respondent in Support of Petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C. Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Case Preview[00:01:00] Argument Begins[00:01:07] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:02:51] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:14:24] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:30:00] United States Opening Statement[00:31:10] United States Free for All Questions[00:41:24] United States Sequential Questions[00:45:49] Court-Appointed Amicus Opening Statement[00:47:41] Court-Appointed Amicus Free for All Questions[01:00:45] Court-Appointed Amicus Sequential Questions[01:00:57] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 Link to Docket: HereEpisode Preview: HereBackground: Question Presented: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, CO.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Argument Intro[00:00:33] Argument Begins[00:00:39] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:02:57] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:31:36] Respondent Opening Statement[00:33:52] Respondent Free For All Questions[00:59:19] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:00:05] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument: Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 Link to Docket: HerePreview Episode: HereQuestion Presented: Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, Cal. For Respondent: Andrew N. Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, Tex.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)TimestampsTable of Contents[00:00:00] Episode Intro[00:00:41] Argument Begins[00:00:48] Petitioner Opening Statement [00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:40:29] Respondent Opening Statement[01:02:00] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:02:38] United States Opening Statement[01:13:14] United States Sequential Questions[01:16:15] Petitioner Rebuttal

Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the State's intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.Other Referenced Episodes:• August 19th – Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny | HereOverviewThis episode examines Louisiana v. Callais, a potentially transformative voting rights case that could reshape Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and minority representation nationwide. After ordering reargument and supplemental briefing, the Supreme Court confronts whether race-conscious redistricting to create majority-minority districts violates the very constitutional amendments the VRA was designed to enforce, creating a fundamental paradox at the intersection of civil rights law and equal protection doctrine.Episode RoadmapOpening: A Constitutional Paradox• Supreme Court's unusual reargument order and supplemental question• From routine redistricting challenge to existential VRA question• Constitutional paradox: using civil rights laws to potentially strike down civil rights protectionsConstitutional Framework: The Reconstruction Amendments• Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement clauses• Congressional power versus Equal Protection constraints• Strict scrutiny as constitutional roadblock for race-conscious government actionBackground: From Robinson to Callais• 2022 Robinson v. Ardoin litigation establishing Section 2 violation• Complex procedural ping-pong through federal courts• Louisiana's creation of SB8-6 with second majority-Black district• March 2025 oral argument leading to reargument orderSection 2 Framework: The Gingles Test• Effects test versus intent requirement• Three-part analysis for Section 2 violations• Majority-minority districts as remedial toolLegal Arguments: Competing Constitutional VisionsAppellants' Defense (Louisiana & Robinson Intervenors):• Congressional authority under Reconstruction Amendments• Section 2 compliance as compelling governmental interest• Narrow tailoring through built-in Gingles limitationsAppellees' Challenge (Callais):• Section 2 fails congruence and proportionality review• Students for Fair Admissions requires specific discrimination evidence• "Good reasons" test provides insufficient constitutional protectionOral Argument Preview: Key Questions for Reargument• Temporal scope of congressional enforcement power• SFFA's impact on voting rights doctrine• Practical consequences for existing majority-minority districts• Federalism tensions in electoral oversightEpisode HighlightsConstitutional Tension: The same Reconstruction Amendments used to justify the VRA in 1965 now being invoked to potentially strike it down in 2025Procedural Drama: Court's unusual reargument order signals fundamental doctrinal questions about VRA's constitutional foundationsPractical Stakes: Could eliminate dozens of majority-minority congressional districts and significantly reduce minority representationHistorical Evolution: From 1982 Section 2 effects test designed to combat discrimination to 2025 argument that it perpetuates discriminationSFFA Integration: How 2023 affirmative action ruling's anti-classification principle

Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.Other Referenced Episodes:August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its Origins | HereOverviewThis episode examines Case v. Montana, a Fourth Amendment case that has drawn unprecedented attention with 35 states weighing in, challenging the established emergency-aid exception by asking the Supreme Court to require probable cause rather than the current "objectively reasonable belief" standard for warrantless home entries during emergencies. The case could fundamentally reshape how police respond to suicide calls, medical emergencies, and welfare checks nationwide.Episode RoadmapOpening: Unprecedented Stakes and AttentionOctober 15th, 2025 oral argument date35 states weighing in, with 34 opposing the petitioner's positionPotential nationwide impact on emergency response proceduresNovel aspect: Petitioner seeking to restrict, not expand, police authorityConstitutional Framework: The Fourth Amendment Text"The right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable searches and seizures"Two-clause structure: Reasonableness Clause vs. Warrant ClauseNo textual emergency-aid exception - entirely judge-made doctrineCourt's recent skepticism toward expansive judge-made constitutional doctrinesBackground: The Tragic Facts in Anaconda, MontanaSeptember 2021: William Trevor Case's suicide threat to ex-girlfriend J.H.Escalating call: drinking, gun cocking sounds, "pop" followed by dead airJ.H.'s 9-1-1 call reporting believed suicide attemptOfficers' prior knowledge of Case's history with suicide attempts and violenceThe Police Response and Corroborating Evidence18-minute preparation period with protective equipmentWindow observations: keys on table, empty beer cans, empty gun holster, apparent suicide noteEntry through unlocked door during protective sweepCase emerges from closet pointing handgun at Sergeant PashaOfficer shoots Case in abdomen; medical aid renderedProcedural History: The Court JourneyTrial court denies suppression motion, finds "exigent circumstance"Case convicted of assaulting peace officer, sentenced to 60 yearsMontana Supreme Court affirms 4-3 with vigorous dissentSupreme Court grants certiorari to resolve deep circuit splitThe Circuit Split Crisis"Reasonable Belief" Courts:First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits plus Montana and three other statesStandard: "Objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect citizen needs help""Probable Cause" Courts:D.C., Second, and Eleventh Circuits plus Nebraska and ColoradoStandard: "Probable cause to believe person is seriously injured or threatened with such injury"Case's Three Main Arguments (Seeking Higher

Bowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestions Presented:Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.OverviewThis episode examines Bowe v. United States, where the government concedes error but argues the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to correct it. The case explores whether the "do-over bar" in AEDPA applies to federal prisoners and whether an acknowledged legal error will go unremedied due to jurisdictional barriers.Episode RoadmapOpening: An Acknowledged Error Without a RemedyGovernment's unusual position: conceding error but claiming the Court can't fix itMichael Bowe's years-long struggle to challenge his convictionConstitutional context: Ex Post Facto Clause and retroactive application of Davis and TaylorThe Two Questions PresentedQuestion One: Does the do-over bar (§ 2244(b)(1)) apply to federal prisoners even though it references only state prisoner applications under § 2254?Question Two: Does § 2244(b)(3)(E) bar Supreme Court certiorari review of authorization decisions for federal prisoners?Background: Michael Bowe's Journey2008: Pled guilty including Section 924(c) conviction (using firearm during crime of violence)2019: Davis strikes down residual clause; Bowe seeks authorization but Eleventh Circuit denies based on circuit precedent2022: Taylor abrogates that precedent; Bowe seeks authorization again2022: Eleventh Circuit dismisses under do-over bar in In re Baptiste2024: Third authorization request denied; all alternatives rejected2025: Supreme Court grants certiorari; government switches positionLegal FrameworkSection 2255: Federal prisoner post-conviction relief vehicleSection 2244: Originally for state prisoners; contains:(b)(1): Do-over bar—bars claims "presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254"(b)(3): Authorization procedures, including (b)(3)(E)'s certiorari barSection 2255(h): "Second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244"—key question is what this incorporatesCircuit Split: Six circuits apply do-over bar to federal prisoners; three reject itPetitioner's Main ArgumentsArgument One: Plain Text Excludes Federal PrisonersDo-over bar explicitly references "section 2254" (state prisoners only)Federal prisoners use § 2255 motions, not § 2254 applicationsSection 2255(h) incorporates certification procedures only, not substantive barsEven Eleventh Circuit admits § 2255(h) doesn't incorporate § 2244(b)(2)—can't incorporate (b)(1) either since both use identical "section 2254" languageArgument Two: Federalism Explains Differential TreatmentAEDPA repeatedly subjects state prisoners to stricter requirementsState prisoner habeas implicates federalism and comity concernsFederal prisoners challenging federal convictions raise no federalism...

Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.OverviewThis episode examines Ellingburg v. United States, one of the most procedurally unusual Supreme Court cases in recent memory. After the Court granted certiorari, the government switched positions following a change in presidential Administration, now agreeing with the criminal defendant that the Eighth Circuit erred. The Court appointed an outside attorney as amicus curiae to defend the lower court's judgment, creating a rare scenario where both named parties argue for the same outcome. At its core, the case asks whether mandatory criminal restitution constitutes punishment subject to the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause—a question with profound implications for thousands of federal defendants and the government's authority to retroactively enforce criminal restitution obligations.Episode RoadmapOpening: A Procedural RarityGovernment switches sides after Administration changeCourt appoints amicus curiae to defend Eighth Circuit's judgmentUnusual three-way legal battle over fundamental constitutional questionImplications for thousands convicted of federal crimes before 1996Background: Ellingburg's Story1995: Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. robs bank in St. Louis, Missouri1996: Sentenced to 322 months imprisonment, ordered to pay $7,567 restitution under pre-MVRA law (VWPA)Under original law, restitution obligation expired November 2016 (20-year limit)2022: Released from prison, rebuilding life on minimum wage2023: Government demands $13,476 using MVRA's extended collection period and mandatory interestPro se motion challenges retroactive application as Ex Post Facto violationThe Central Legal QuestionIs MVRA restitution criminal punishment or civil remedy?If criminal: Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive applicationIf civil: Government can apply new collection rules to old offensesStatutory construction as threshold issue: What did Congress intend?Procedural Journey Through the CourtsDistrict Court: Denied motion, held MVRA application merely "procedural"Eighth Circuit: Affirmed on different ground—restitution is civil remedy, not criminal punishmentCircuit relied on Carruth precedent despite Pasquantino and Paroline developmentsTwo concurring judges questioned binding precedent's continued validitySupreme Court grants certiorari to resolve circuit splitConstitutional Framework: The Ex Post Facto ClauseArticle I, Section 9, Clause 3: "No ex post facto Law shall be passed"Prohibits retroactively increasing punishment for criminal actsOnly applies to criminal laws, not civil remediesConstitutional protection against arbitrary government powerThe Statutory Text BattleSection 3663A: Restitution ordered "when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense""In addition to, or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law"Codification in Title 18 criminal code, Chapter 227 "Sentences"Criminal procedures govern: presentence reports, probation officers, appellate reviewEnforcement through threat of imprisonment for nonpaymentPetitioner's Three Main ArgumentsArgument 1: Text and Structure Prove Criminal IntentStatutory language integrates restitution into criminal sentencingGrouped with fines and...

Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Docket Link: HereOverviewThis episode examines Bost v. Illinois, a Supreme Court case that could reshape how candidates challenge election laws in federal court. Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican presidential elector nominees are challenging Illinois's law allowing mail-in ballots to be counted up to 14 days after Election Day, creating a fundamental test of Article III standing doctrine in the election law context. The case sits at the intersection of constitutional standing requirements and the unique competitive dynamics of electoral politics, with implications for whether candidates should receive special treatment to challenge election rules or must meet the same concrete injury standards as all other plaintiffs.Episode RoadmapOpening: A Fundamental Question About Federal Courts• October 8, 2025 oral argument date• Standing doctrine meets election law in crucial constitutional test• Circuit split on candidate challenges to election rules• Implications for flood of pre-election litigation vs. orderly dispute resolutionBackground: Illinois's Ballot-Receipt Extension• 2005 Illinois law change allowing 14-day post-Election Day counting window• Historical roots in Civil War soldier voting accommodations• About half of states now allow similar extended receipt deadlines• Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican presidential elector nominees challenge lawConstitutional Framework: Article III's Case-or-Controversy Requirement• "Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity"• Standing doctrine requires concrete, particularized, traceable injury• Tension between candidate investment in election rules and generalized grievances• Elections Clause and Electors Clause federal frameworkProcedural Journey Through the Courts• May 2022: Pre-enforcement challenge filed• July 2023: District court dismisses for lack of standing• Seventh Circuit affirmed in split decision with Judge Scudder's influential partial dissent• Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve candidate standing questionThe Three-Way Legal Battle• Petitioners' blanket candidate standing rule vs. concrete injury requirements• Electoral harm theory: competitive disadvantage vs. speculative injury• Pocketbook injury claims: campaign extension costs vs. manufactured standingClapper Doctrine and Mitigation Expenditures• When spending money to avoid harm creates standing vs. speculative preparation• Illinois's challenge to factual basis of extended campaign operations• "Near certainty" of ballot counting vs. substantial risk standardOral Argument Preview: Key Tensions to Watch• Justices' reaction to special candidate standing exception• Factual record problems and thin allegations• Floodgates concerns vs. orderly pre-election resolution• Purcell principle timing considerationsBroader Constitutional Stakes• Article III's role in limiting federal court jurisdiction• Election law's unique challenges for traditional standing doctrine• Federalism questions about state election rule authority• Volume and intensity of modern election litigation trendsReferenced CasesClapper v. Amnesty International | 568 U.S. 398 (2013)Question Presented: Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge FISA Amendments Act surveillance...

Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Docket Link: HereEpisode OverviewThis episode examines United States Postal Service v. Lebene Konan, a Supreme Court case that asks whether the federal government has immunity when postal employees intentionally refuse to deliver mail as part of a campaign of racial harassment. The case centers on the interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act's "postal exception" and whether terms like "loss" and "miscarriage" cover intentional wrongdoing or only negligent acts.Episode RoadmapOpening: A Deceptively Simple QuestionCan you sue the federal government when postal workers intentionally withhold your mail?The answer hinges on the Federal Tort Claims Act's postal exceptionCore tension between remedy for wrongs vs. government immunityLegal Framework: The Federal Tort Claims Act28 U.S.C. § 2680(b): Exception for claims arising from "loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of mailKey interpretive battle: Does "negligent" modify only "transmission" or all three terms?Government argues broad immunity; plaintiff argues narrow exceptionThe Facts: Alleged Racial Harassment CampaignLebene Konan: Black realtor and landlady in Euless, TexasTwo-year campaign by USPS employees Raymond Rojas and Jason DrakeAllegations: Changed postal records, changed mailbox locks, refused mail deliveryOver 50 administrative complaints filed; Inspector General investigation ordered deliveryProcedural JourneyDistrict court: Dismissed under postal exceptionFifth Circuit: Reversed, held "loss" and "miscarriage" imply unintentional actsSupreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit splitGovernment's Arguments"Miscarriage" = broad failure to arrive (Webster's 1940s definition)"Loss" = deprivation, regardless of intentStructural argument: FTCA uses "loss" to cover intentional acts elsewherePolicy concern: Flood of litigation if intent mattersKonan's Counter-Arguments"Miscarriage" = mail mistakenly delivered to wrong place"Loss" = destruction or misplacement, both inherently accidentalStatutory structure shows Congress concerned only with negligence"Negligent transmission" proves Congress knew how to limit scope when intendedBattle of the DictionariesGovernment relies on neutral 1940s definitions from Webster's SecondKonan cites specific legal definitions and Oxford English DictionaryCompeting interpretations of what "loss" and "miscarriage" historically meantLooking Ahead to Oral ArgumentsHow will Justices react to competing dictionary definitions?Will practical consequences (floodgates) persuade the Court?Strange incentive structure if government immune for intentional but not negligent actsReferenced CasesDolan v. USPS | 546 U.S. 481 (2006) | Docket LinkQuestion Presented: Interpretation of FTCA postal exception termsOverview: Supreme Court precedent that both parties cite for their competing interpretations of "miscarriage" in the postal exception context.Key Legal Concepts ExplainedFederal Tort Claims Act...

Barrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits punishment under both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) for one act that violates each statuteOther Referenced Episodes:September 10th: A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of PowersOverviewThis episode explores Barrett v. United States, a fascinating Double Jeopardy case where the federal government unusually sides with a criminal defendant against its own prosecution. The Supreme Court must determine whether convicting someone under both federal gun statutes—one for using a firearm during a violent crime and another for causing a death with that firearm—violates the Fifth Amendment's protection against being punished twice for the same offense. With no one defending the lower court's judgment, the Court appointed an outside attorney to argue that sentence stacking should be permitted, creating a rare three-way legal battle over fundamental constitutional protections and congressional intent in criminal sentencing.Episode RoadmapOpening: A Constitutional TwistOctober 6th Supreme Court term preview continuationFourth case in opening week after Berm v. Choy, Villarreal v. Texas, and Chiles v. SalazarUnusual scenario: Government sides with criminal defendantNovember 5th Trump Tariffs Case announcementThe Core QuestionCan government punish someone twice for single criminal act--using a firearm while trafficking drugs?Federal gun statutes create potential double jeopardy violationSection 924(c): Using gun during violent crime (5-year minimum, up to life)Section 924(j): Killing someone with that gun (death penalty or life for murder)The Barrett Facts2011 New York robbery crew caseDwayne Barrett as getaway driver during minivan robberyCo-conspirator shot and killed Gamar Dafalla during robberyGovernment charged Barrett under both gun statutes for single actLegal Journey Through the CourtsInitial district court: Merged sentences, avoided double punishmentSecond Circuit flip: Required stacking both sentences after Supreme Court's Lora decisionCircuit split on handling these overlapping prosecutionsGovernment "confessed error" - switched sides under Trump administrationConstitutional Framework: Double Jeopardy ProtectionFifth Amendment: "No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy"Blockburger test: Same-elements analysis for determining "same offense"Presumption against double punishment unless Congress clearly authorizes itCourt-appointed amicus ensures adversarial presentation when government switches sidesBarrett and Government ArgumentsSection 924(c) is lesser-included offense of Section 924(j)Cannot violate fatal results statute without first violating gun use statuteCongress knew how to authorize stacking: Section 924(c)(5) armor-piercing provisionOmission of stacking language in Section 924(j) proves contrary intentCourt-Appointed Amicus ArgumentsConsecutive-sentence mandate in Section 924(c): "any other term of imprisonment"Two statutes punish different evils: danger of gun vs. harm of deathAbsurd results hypothetical: Machinegun manslaughter (15-year max) vs. machinegun...

Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.Other Referenced Episodes:August 19 – Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny | HereOverviewThis episode examines one of the most anticipated cases of the October 2025 Supreme Court term - a First Amendment challenge to Colorado's "conversion therapy" ban that has generated over 50 amicus briefs and sits at the intersection of free speech, parental rights, LGBTQ issues, and professional regulation.RoadmapOpening: A Constitutional Perfect StormOctober 7th, 2025 oral argument dateOver 50 amicus briefs filed (compared to 7 for most cases)Intersection of hot-button topics: parental rights, LGBTQ issues, religious freedom, professional regulationBackground: The Players and the LawKaley Chiles: Licensed counselor in Colorado Springs at Deeper Stories CounselingChristian counselor using "client-directed" approach with speech-only methodsColorado's 2019 law banning "conversion therapy" for minorsPenalties: fines up to $5,000, license suspension or revocationConstitutional Framework: The First Amendment Text"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech"Extension to state governments through Fourteenth AmendmentThe simplicity of "no law" languageProcedural History: The Court Journey2022: Chiles filed pre-enforcement challengeDistrict court denied preliminary injunction using rational basis reviewTenth Circuit affirmed in divided panel decisionJudge Hartz's "scathing dissent" calling majority approach "remarkable" and "contrary" to precedentThe Central Constitutional QuestionSpeech versus conduct: When does professional speech become conduct that can be regulated?Level of scrutiny determines case outcomeThree-tiered analysis: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutinyUnderstanding Scrutiny Levels: The Road AnalogyRational basis: Highway with minimal obstaclesIntermediate scrutiny: Busy road with stop signs and traffic lightsStrict scrutiny: Road closure - "fatal in fact" for governmentCompeting Legal FrameworksChiles's Arguments (Strict Scrutiny)Content-based discrimination: "You can help with binge eating, but not sexual orientation behaviors"Viewpoint-based discrimination: "Support gender transition but forbid comfort with biological body"Speech-only counseling deserves full First Amendment protectionColorado's Arguments (Rational Basis)Professional healthcare treatment regulation, not speech restrictionTraditional state authority over professional standards"Professional healthcare treatment that happens to involve words"Key Supreme Court Precedents BattleNational Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA) (2018)Chiles...

Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.OverviewThis episode examines Villareal v. Texas, a case that addresses a fundamental question affecting every criminal trial where a defendant takes the stand: what happens when testimony gets interrupted by an overnight recess? The case explores the intersection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and trial courts' authority to prevent witness coaching during extended breaks in testimony.Episode RoadmapOpening: The Constitutional DilemmaDavid Villareal's murder trial and self-defense claimThe overnight recess that created a constitutional questionThe judge's "qualified conferral order" - a middle-ground approachWhy this affects every criminal trial with testifying defendantsThe Trial Court's Balancing ActJudge's concern about overnight "coaching" of defendant's testimonyThe court's solution: prohibit testimony discussions, allow everything elseDefense counsel's understanding and preserved Sixth Amendment objectionConviction and 60-year sentence outcomeConstitutional Territory: Competing PrecedentsSixth Amendment's broad language: "assistance of counsel for his defence"Geders v. United States (1976): overnight recesses require full consultationPerry v. Leeke (1989): 15-minute recesses allow complete prohibitionThe gap: what about partial restrictions during long recesses?Split in Lower CourtsFederal circuits generally reject qualified orders during overnight recessesState supreme courts (including Texas) embrace the middle-ground approachTexas Court of Criminal Appeals: "type of communication" controls, not recess lengthThe constitutional question that prompted Supreme Court reviewVillareal's Three-Pronged AttackPerry already resolved this: "unrestricted access" during overnight recessesThe rule is unworkable: testimony and strategy discussions are "inextricably intertwined"Practical impossibilities: plea negotiations, perjury prevention, attorney-client privilegeTexas's Constitutional DefensePerry endorsed qualified orders even during short recessesSubstance matters more than timing: testimony discussions aren't constitutionally protectedThe rule works in practice: defense counsel understood and compliedFairness and truth-seeking justify the restrictionThe Current Court's JurisprudenceEmphasis on workability and bright-line rulesSkepticism of broad constitutional rules that are difficult to administerText and original meaning analysis of "assistance of counsel"Historical wrinkle: defendants couldn't testify when Sixth Amendment was ratifiedStakes and ImplicationsImpact on trial court management of testimony scheduling nationwideEffect on criminal defendants' consultation rights during testimony breaksBroader tension: advocacy system vs. truth-seeking functionPotential for significant practical impact regardless of outcomeRelevant Precedential CasesGeders v. United States | 425 U.S. 80 (1976) Holding: Trial courts...

Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether Delaware's expert affidavit requirement for medical malpractice claims conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when applied in federal diversity casesEpisode OverviewThis episode examines Berk v. Choy, a case that started with a simple fall but could reshape how federal courts handle state law requirements across the country. The Supreme Court must decide whether Delaware's expert affidavit requirement for medical malpractice claims conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when applied in federal diversity cases, presenting a fundamental clash between federal procedural uniformity and state regulatory authority.RoadmapOpening: A Fall That Could Reshape Federal Court PracticeHarold Berk's fall from bed leads to medical malpractice case with nationwide implicationsDelaware's expert affidavit requirement vs. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure29 states with similar medical malpractice requirements creating potential patchworkThe Legal Framework: Erie Meets the Federal RulesErie Doctrine (1938): Federal courts must apply state substantive law for state claimsFederal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938): Uniform procedures for all federal courtsShady Grove Test: When Federal Rule and state law "answer the same question," Federal Rule winsTension between federal procedural uniformity and state regulatory authorityThe Shady Grove FoundationShady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance (2010) background$500 individual claim vs. multimillion-dollar class action potentialNew York's prohibition on statutory penalty class actions vs. Federal Rule 23Fractured Decision: Scalia plurality vs. Stevens concurrence vs. four dissentsThe Procedural Journey: From Delaware District Court to the Supreme CourtBerk's five-month struggle to obtain required expert affidavitDr. Raikin's refusal despite initially supporting Berk's caseMultiple physicians declining to provide affidavits against other doctorsThird Circuit's dismissal: affidavit "not a pleading" with "different purpose"Petitioner's Three-Pronged AttackDirect conflict with Federal Rules 8 and 9 under Shady Grove testUniformity concerns: Undermines federal procedural consistency established in 1938Anti-circumvention: State requirements shouldn't allow end-run around federal pleading standardsRespondents' Three-Part DefenseSeparate spheres: Delaware law operates as evidentiary requirement distinct from pleading rulesErie compliance: Represents substantive state law that federal courts must respectLimited Shady Grove: Fractured decision provides narrow precedential valueCASE SIGNIFICANCEThe outcome will likely determine whether federal courts remain faithful to both federal procedural uniformity and state substantive authority, or whether one value must give way to the other in the modern era of complex state regulatory schemes.Key Legal Concepts ExplainedDiversity Jurisdiction: Federal court authority over cases between citizens of different states involving state law claimsErie Doctrine: Principle requiring federal courts to apply state substantive law in diversity cases while using federal procedureFederal...

Episode OverviewThe Supreme Court returns from summer recess with a blockbuster lineup of cases for October and November 2025. This episode provides a comprehensive preview of the 19 cases already scheduled for oral argument, spanning critical issues from voting rights to conversion therapy bans to criminal procedure reforms. We examine why this term opens with such consequential cases and what practitioners and citizens should watch for as the arguments unfold.What You'll LearnComplete October & November argument schedule with key dates and case pairingsWhy Louisiana v. Callais could be the most significant voting rights case in years - including why the Court ordered reargument with explosive new briefingHow Chiles v. Salazar tests the boundaries between professional regulation and First Amendment protectionCriminal justice cases that could reshape double jeopardy doctrine, death penalty procedures, and federal sentencingWhat these early cases signal about the Court's priorities for the full 2025-2026 termEpisode RoadmapOpening: Term Overview Supreme Court's 2025-2026 schedule: 19 cases across 10 argument daysWhy the Court frontloaded significant cases in October-NovemberWhat's still coming: Additional cases and argument dates to be announcedOctober Arguments Deep DiveWeek 1: October 6-8Villarreal v. Texas - Sixth Amendment right to counsel during trial recessesBerk v. Choy - State procedural rules in federal courtChiles v. Salazar - Colorado conversion therapy ban and First Amendment clashBarrett v. United States - Double jeopardy and multiple sentencesBost v. Illinois Board of Elections - Standing to challenge election proceduresU.S. Postal Service v. Konan - Federal tort immunity for intentional mail failuresWeek 2: October 14-15Criminal procedure cases: Bowe and Ellingburg on post-conviction relief and ex post facto protectionsThe blockbuster: Louisiana v. Callais reargument on voting rights and equal protectionCase v. Montana - Fourth Amendment emergency aid exceptionNovember Arguments AnalysisEarly November Focus Areas:Capital punishment: Hamm v. Smith on intellectual disability assessmentsGovernment contractor liability: Hencely v. Fluor CorporationPrisoners' religious rights: Landor v. Louisiana Department of CorrectionsFederal Sentencing Reform Finale:Fernandez, Rutherford, and Carter cases on "extraordinary and compelling" sentence reductionsLooking Ahead: What's NextAdditional cases expected throughout fallPattern analysis: What these early cases reveal about Court prioritiesPreview of upcoming episode plans for individual case deep-divesKey Cases HighlightedMust-Watch CasesLouisiana v. Callais (Oct. 15) - Could fundamentally alter Voting Rights Act enforcementChiles v. Salazar (Oct. 7) - Conversion therapy ban meets First AmendmentHamm v. Smith (Nov. 4) - Life-or-death intellectual disability standardsImportant for PractitionersBerk v. Choy - Federal court procedure and state law intersectionBost v. Illinois Board of Elections -...

OverviewThis episode examines the Supreme Court's September 9, 2025 Order that expedited review of two consolidated cases challenging President Trump's authority to impose sweeping tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), representing a constitutional clash over the separation of powers and presidential trade authority.RoadmapOpening: Explosive Constitutional QuestionsSeptember 9, 2025 certiorari grant and consolidation orderExpedited briefing schedule for November 2025 oral argumentsStakes: Presidential power to tax trillions in trade and reshape the economyBackground: The Trump Tariff OrdersReciprocal Tariffs: 10% on virtually all imports, higher rates for 57 countriesTrafficking Tariffs: Levies on Mexico, Canada, and China for drug enforcementIEEPA as claimed statutory authority for both tariff schemesNational emergency declarations underlying the ordersThe Central Legal QuestionDoes "regulate" in IEEPA include power to impose tariffs?Constitutional separation of taxing vs. regulating powersArticle I distinctions between taxation and commerce regulationHistorical significance: "No taxation without representation"Lower Court JourneyMultiple simultaneous lawsuits in different courtsDistrict court and Court of International Trade conflicting approachesFederal Circuit en banc decision striking down tariffsJudge Taranto's influential dissent supporting tariff authorityReferenced CasesTrump v. V.O.S. Selections | Case No. 24-1286 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose these specific sweeping tariffsGovernment Arguments:"Regulate" includes power to impose tariffs as lesser-included authorityHistorical practice supports broad executive trade power during emergenciesMajor questions doctrine doesn't apply in foreign policy contextsV.O.S. Arguments:Constitutional separation requires clear authorization for taxation"Regulate" and "tariff" are distinct powers with different purposesMajor questions doctrine requires explicit congressional authorizationLearning Resources v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes any presidential tariffs whatsoeverLearning Resources Arguments:"Regulate" means control behavior, "tariff" means raise revenue - fundamentally differentNo historical practice of IEEPA tariffs in nearly 50 yearsConstitutional avoidance: IEEPA covers exports where tariffs are prohibitedGovernment Arguments:Plain text of "regulate importation" naturally includes tariff authorityYoshida precedent shows Congress ratified tariff interpretationPresidential action deserves greater deference than agency actionKey Legal Precedents ExaminedHistorical Foundation CasesGibbons v. Ogden (1824):...

This episode examines how the Supreme Court's 2024-25 term may be quietly reshaping First Amendment doctrine through four cases that suggest new approaches to constitutional scrutiny levels.We analyze how the Court appears to be moving away from the mechanical application of strict, intermediate, and rational basis review established in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, instead developing more contextual approaches that consider traditional government authority, institutional expertise, and competing constitutional values.The episode explores Catholic Charities Bureau's traditional strict scrutiny analysis of denominational discrimination, TikTok's content-neutral treatment of national security regulations, Free Speech Coalition's novel "partial protection" theory for age verification requirements, and Mahmoud's expansion of religious liberty protection in public schools.Cases Covered:Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission | Case No. 24-154 | Opinion Summary: Here;TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Case No. 24-656, 24-657 | Opinion Summary: Here;Free Speech Coalition Inc. v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Opinion Summary: Here; andMahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Opinion Summary: Here.Key Precedents Referenced:Reed v. Town of Gilbert;Employment Division v. Smith;Wisconsin v. Yoder;Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC; andLarson v. Valente.

This episode revisits the Supreme Court's 2020 Bostock decision and examines how the Court's recent retreat from Bostock in United States v. Skrmetti sets up a constitutional showdown over transgender rights in school sports. We analyze the methodical legal reasoning behind Bostock's landmark ruling that Title VII protects gay and transgender employees, then explore how each faction of justices treated Bostock differently in Skrmetti's constitutional challenge to Tennessee's transgender healthcare ban. The episode concludes by examining how both sides strategically deployed Bostock and anticipated Skrmetti's outcome in their cert petitions for the upcoming transgender sports cases, revealing fundamental disagreements about statutory interpretation, constitutional methodology, and the scope of civil rights protections.Cases Covered:Bostock v. Clayton County | Case No. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107 | Opinion: HereUnited States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Opinion: HereState of West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-735 | Docket Link: HereLittle v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: HereWest Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: HereEpisodes Referenced:August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its Origins | Link: HereJuly 7th Roundup: New Certs: Transgender Rights in Schools and Religious Liberties | Link: HereOpinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477 | Link: HereOral Argument: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24 | Link: Here

This episode catches up on recent Supreme Court developments in the regular and emergency dockets.We examine how the Court may be preparing to reshape voting rights law through Louisiana v. Callais, then dive into the contentious emergency docket battle in Trump v. Doyle over presidential firing power and agency independence. The second half features an in-depth analysis of Maryland v. Shatzer (2010), exploring how a seemingly narrow Miranda ruling about re-invoking counsel rights later became a foundation for broader limitations on constitutional protections, while showcasing the fractured judicial philosophies of Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas on court-made constitutional rules.Case Covered:Trump v. Boyle | Case No. 25A11 | Docket Link: HereLouisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Docket Link: Here | Supplemental Briefing Order: Here (Consolidated with Robinson v. Callais | Case No. 24-110 | Docket Link: Here)Maryland v. Shatzer | Case No. No. 08-680 | Opinion: HereVega v. Tekoh | Case No. 21–499 | Opinion: HereEpisodes Referenced:Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966 | Episode Link: HereTimestamps:[00:00:00] Introduction[00:01:58] Regular Docket Update: Louisiana v. Callais[00:03:09] Emergency Docket Drama: Trump v. Boyle[00:07:24] Deep Dive: Maryland v. Shatzer Analysis[00:08:20] Shatzer's Case Details and Supreme Court Ruling[00:19:42] Implications and Evolution of Miranda Rights[00:21:42] Conclusion

This episode examines a July 14th Supreme Court emergency docket ruling that reveals fundamental tensions about executive power over federal agency firings at the Education Department and the limits of congressional authority. This episode also compares and contrasts this case (McMahon v. New York) with OPM v. AFGE, a government workforce reduction case discussed in our July 9th episode. In both cases, the government raised virtually identical arguments about standing, jurisdiction and the merits. In both cases, SCOTUS permitted the reductions to take effect while litigation played out.Case Covered:McMahon v. New York | Case No. 24A1203 | Docked Link: HereBottom Line: SCOTUS allows Trump Administration to proceed with eliminating over half the Department of Education's workforce while legal challenges continue, despite lower courts finding likely constitutional violations.

This episode examines two major Supreme Court emergency docket rulings that reveal fundamental tensions about presidential power, judicial authority, and constitutional rights. Both cases demonstrate the Court's willingness to grant extraordinary relief to the government while exposing deep philosophical divisions among the justices.Cases Covered:Trump v. American Federation of Government Employees | Case No. 24A1174 | Docket Link: HereBottom Line: Court allows President to proceed with planning massive federal workforce reductions while legal challenges continueDepartment of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. | Case No. 24A1153 | Docket Link: HereBottom Line: Court twice intervened to help government deport individuals to third countries without additional constitutional process

This episode covers four major Supreme Court cases granted certiorari in summer 2024 (July 3, 2025 Miscellaneous Order: Here), examining the Court's strategic approach to constitutional law and its rapid movement on key cultural and legal issues.Episode RoadmapOpening: The Court's Strategic AccelerationSupreme Court's unusual speed in granting certiorari after major rulingsRejection of traditional "percolation" approachWhy the Court chose direct review over GVR ordersTransgender Sports CasesLittle v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: HereBackground: Idaho's "Fairness in Women's Sports Act" banning transgender women from women's sports teamsKey Player: Lindsay Hecox, transgender student at Boise State UniversityNinth Circuit Reasoning: Applied heightened scrutiny; found likely Equal Protection violationsPost-Skrmetti Impact: How the medical treatment precedent affects sports participationWest Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: HereBackground: West Virginia's H.B. 3293 categorical sports banKey Player: B.P.J., 14-year-old transgender student with amended birth certificateUnique Factors: Puberty blockers, competitive performance, individual circumstancesFourth Circuit's Approach: Case-by-case analysis vs. categorical rulesStrategic Litigation: Why B.P.J. argued for waiting on Skrmetti decisionReligious Liberty CaseOlivier v. City of Brandon | Case No. 24-993 | Docket Link: Here 24-1021Background: Street preaching arrest and subsequent civil rights lawsuitCore Legal Issue: Heck v. Humphrey doctrine and prospective reliefCircuit Split: Fifth Circuit's restrictive approach vs. Ninth Circuit's permissive stanceKey Arguments:Prospective relief exception to HeckNo custody/no habeas access theoryBroader Impact: Civil rights enforcement for repeat constitutional violationsSovereign Immunity CaseNJT v. Colt | Case No. 24-1113 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Cedric Galette, Petitioner v. New Jersey Transit Corporation | Case No. 24-1021 | Docket Link: Here)Background: Manhattan pedestrian struck by NJ Transit busProcedural Drama: Three-year delay before immunity claimGeographic Split: New York vs. Pennsylvania Supreme Court...

This episode:Analyzes the Supreme Court's blockbuster end to the 2024-2025 term, covering the final nine opinions and examining patterns across all 61 cases decided this term. Explores the dramatic Friday release where cases "trickled out slowly" due to lengthy dissents read from the bench, dive into comprehensive term statistics, and conduct an in-depth analysis of Justice Barrett's methodological approach in Trump v. CASA—particularly her heavy reliance on historical sources versus textual analysis.Concludes with analysis of seven landmark cases the Court agreed to hear for next term, including a billion-dollar copyright battle over internet piracy (Cox v. Sony Music), a campaign finance showdown (National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC), and disputes over federal removal deadlines, private rights of action, and criminal fugitive tolling that could reshape fundamental areas of American law. June 30 Order List: Here.Episode HighlightsFinal Week Patterns: June 27th saw uniform 6-3 splits with conservative dominance, while June 26th showed more fractures with 5-4 and 6-3 divisionsTerm Overview: 61 total cases decided with a 70% reversal rate, demonstrating the Court's role as an error-correction mechanismVoting Consensus: 43% of cases decided unanimously (26 cases), showing remarkable agreement despite ideological divisionsBarrett's Methodology: Deep dive into her historical originalism approach in Trump v. CASA versus her typical textualist methods in other casesNew Cert Grants: Overview of the 7 new cases SCOTUS agreed to hear.Key Justice Statistics (2024-2025 Term)The Justices wrote 5 Per Curiam opinions.Justice Roberts: Authored or joined 59 opinions, authored or joined 1 concurrences and authored or joined 2 dissents.Justice Thomas: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.Justice Alito: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.Justice Sotomayor: Authored or joined 45 opinions, authored or joined 11 concurrences and authored or joined 13 dissents.Justice Kagan: Authored or joined 51 opinions, authored or joined 2 concurrences and authored or joined 9 dissents.Justice Gorsuch: Authored or joined 42 opinions, authored or joined 6 concurrences and authored or joined 12 dissents.Justice Kavanaugh: Authored or joined 57 opinions, authored or joined 9 concurrences and authored or joined 3 dissents.Justice Barrett: Authored or joined 54 opinions, authored or joined 10 concurrences and authored or joined 5 dissents.Justice Jackson: Authored or joined 41 opinions, authored or joined 12 concurrences and authored or joined 17 dissents.Referenced CasesTrump v. CASA (universal injunctions)Grupo Mexicano (historical equity test)Louisiana v. Callais (relisted case)Esteras v. United States (criminal sentencing)Medical Marijuana v. Horn (statutory interpretation)FDA v. R.J. Reynolds (administrative law)New Cert Grants:M & K Employee Solutions, LLC, et al. v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Docket Link: Here.Cox Communications,...

This episode provides a comprehensive analysis of five major Supreme Court decisions released on June 27, 2025, that collectively reshape key areas of constitutional law including judicial authority, parental rights, agency power, executive appointments, and online speech regulation. We also discuss the notable absence of a decision in Louisiana v. Callais, a complex redistricting case that many Court watchers expected to be resolved.Cases Covered:Trump v. CASA, Inc.Holding: Federal district courts lack authority to issue universal injunctions that prohibit government enforcement of policies against anyone beyond the named plaintiffsVote: 6-3 (Barrett majority; Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh concurrences; Sotomayor and Jackson dissents)Mahmoud v. TaylorHolding: Parents challenging a school board's LGBTQ-inclusive storybooks and refusal to allow opt-outs are entitled to preliminary injunction under the Free Exercise ClauseVote: 6-3 (Alito majority; Thomas concurrence; Sotomayor dissent)FCC v. Consumers' ResearchHolding: The FCC's universal service contribution scheme does not violate the Constitution's nondelegation doctrineVote: 6-3 (Kagan majority; Kavanaugh and Jackson concurrences; Gorsuch dissent)Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.Holding: U.S. Preventive Services Task Force members are inferior officers who can be constitutionally appointed by the HHS Secretary rather than requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirmationVote: 6-3 (Kavanaugh majority; Thomas dissent)Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. PaxtonHolding: Texas's age verification law for pornographic websites is constitutional under intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutinyVote: 6-3 (Thomas majority; Kagan dissent)Pending Cases: Louisiana v. Callais. On June 27, 2025, the Court stated that it will rehear this case.

Opinion Summary: Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 23-1122 Link to Docket: Here.Background:This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors. Question Presented:Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.Holding: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of adults. H. B. 1181 survives intermediate scrutiny because it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.Result: Affirmed. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D.C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-297 Link to Docket: Here. Background:Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read. Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct." Question Presented:Whether public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out.Holding: Parents challenging the Board's introduction of the "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D.C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)For Respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-354 This case was consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422.Link to Docket: Here.Background:In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries. Questions Presented: 1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund. 2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates. 3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.Holding: The universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.For Respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-316 Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here. On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs.Link to Docket: Here.Background:The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1). Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.Holding: Result: Voting Breakdown: Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Trump, President of U.S. v. Casa, Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24A884 Links to Docket: Here (Case No. 24A884); Here (Case No. 24A885); and Here (Case No. 24A886).Questions Presented:Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts' nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s 1/20/25 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states.Whether district courts have the authority to issue nationwide preliminary injunctions irrespective of class-action certification.Background:On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order regarding birthright citizenship. Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, repudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinterpreted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a). Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that 6 person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1. Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order,” i.e., after February 19. Id. § 2(b). Three district courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington have issued overlapping nationwide injunctions at the behest of 22 States, two organizations, and seven individuals. Those universal injunctions prohibit a Day 1 Executive Order from being enforced anywhere in the country, as to “hundreds of thousands” of unspecified individuals who are “not before the court nor identified by the court.” Three Circuit Courts of Appeals refused to limit...

Opinion Summary: Riley v. Bondi | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1270 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal." This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.Questions Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?Holding: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). An "order of removal" includes an "order of deportation," which, in turn, is defined as an order "concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation." 2. The 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 5-4 as to the holding that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). 9-0 as to the holding that the 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined only as to Part II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part IV.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner:For Respondent:Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-7809 Link to Docket: Here.Background:In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order." In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024). The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023). Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1275 Link to Docket: Here. Background:More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar." The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question. Questions Presented:1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider. 2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?Holding: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under Section 1983.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Hewitt v. United States | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-1002 This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.Link to Docket: Here.Background:The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b). There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence. Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C. For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

In today's episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:Last week's 11 opinions and emerging patternsTerm statistics and remaining docket overviewMajor religious liberty case granted certiorari via June 23rd Order ListKey Topics CoveredTerm Statistics (As of June 23, 2025)Total cases heard: 62 unique cases this termCases decided: 52 (approximately 84%)Cases pending: 11 (approximately 16%)Methodology: Consolidated cases counted onceLast Week's Opinion AnalysisUnanimous consensus: 7 of 11 cases showed stable coalition of seven justicesOpinion distribution: Justice Thomas, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Barrett each authored exactly 4 opinionsChief Justice Roberts: Finally joined dissent after 41 consecutive majority opinionsMethodological splits: Justices divided on simple textual approaches vs. complex multi-factor testsFeatured Case Deep Dive: Esteras v. United StatesIssue: Whether judges can consider retribution in supervised release decisionsMajority (Barrett): Applied "expressio unius" canon - Congress deliberately excluded retributionDissent (Alito/Gorsuch): Criticized majority's "mind-bending exercises" for trial judgesVote: 7-2 with additional splintering on implementation detailsStanding Doctrine Analysis: FDA v. Reynolds & Diamond Energy v. EPACommon thread: When can businesses challenge regulations affecting market participants?Identical 7-2 splits with completely different reasoning approachesBarrett's approach: Traditional statutory interpretation and precedent analysisKavanaugh's approach: Practical economic reasoning and regulatory dynamics Certiorari Grant: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Docket Link: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) permits individual-capacity damages suits against state prison officials who violate prisoners' religious exercise rights.The Shocking FactsPetitioner: Damon Landor, devout Rastafarian with 20-year religious dreadlocksIncident: Prison officials threw away Fifth Circuit decision protecting his rights, then forcibly shaved his headTimeline: Occurred with just 3 weeks left in his sentenceLegal precedent: Clear violation of Ware v. Louisiana Department of CorrectionsLegal FrameworkRFRA (1993): Applies to federal government; Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020) permits individual damagesRLUIPA (2000): Applies to state/local governments receiving federal fundsSister statutes: Nearly identical language and purposesCircuit split: All courts of appeals currently reject RLUIPA individual damagesPetitioner’s (Landor) Key...

Opinion Summaries: June 20, 2025 Opinions The Supreme Court released six significant opinions on June 20, 2025, spanning tobacco regulation, terrorism jurisdiction, environmental standing, telecommunications law, disability rights, and federal sentencing. This episode provides comprehensive analysis of each decision, including voting breakdowns, key holdings, and detailed examination of concurring and dissenting opinions.Host Note: Today I'm personally narrating this episode, so the pacing may be slightly different from our usual format.Here are details about the six cases:1. FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187Holding: Retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order may seek judicial review of that order under § 387l(a)(1).Result: Affirmed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.2. Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) | Case No. 24-20 (consolidated with United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151)Holding: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II.Link to Opinion: Here.3. Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7Holding: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson filed dissenting opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.4. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1226_1a72.pdf"...

Opinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Holding: SB1 is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N. Y. For respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: Perttu v. Richards | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1324 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?Holding: Parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Jackson joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich. For respondent: Lori Alvino McGill, Charlottesville, Va.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Oklahoma v. EPA | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1067 This case was consolidated with: Pacificorp V. EPA, Case No. 23-1067.Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits. Questions Presented:Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.Holding: EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.Result: Reversed. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla. For Petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill. For Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1229 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Holding: EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C. For respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: NRC v. Texas | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1300 This case was consolidated with: Interim Storage Partners, LLC V. Texas, Case No. 23-1312.Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.(For Interim Storage Partners, LLC) Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exercise of authority to issue a license to a private party to temporarily possess spent nuclear fuel at a location away from an operating nuclear power reactor was lawful under the applicable statutes (as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held) or not (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case). Whether, notwithstanding an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action, a person must take steps to become a "party" to an agency proceeding under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, in order to then subsequently challenge the agency action resulting from that proceeding in court (as the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action can override statutory limitations on jurisdiction (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).Holding: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners in 23-1300: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For petitioner in 23-1312: Brad Fagg, Washington, D. C. For respondents Texas, et al.: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.For respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

In this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:Six near unanimous decisions released on June 12th, 2025Two major cases granted certiorari via June 16th, 2025 OrderIn this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:Term statistics and remaining docket overviewSix decisions released on June 12th, 2025Two major cases granted certiorari via June 16th, 2025 Order2024 Term StatisticsTotal cases heard: 62 unique cases this termCases decided: 41 (approximately 66%)Cases pending: 21 (approximately 33%)Methodology: Consolidated cases counted once (e.g., Trump v. CASA/Washington/New Jersey)Timing significance: June typically brings most consequential decisionsKey Observations from June 12th, 2025 DecisionsObservation #1: Unanimity Reigned Supreme. June 12th consensus: 4 unanimous (9-0) decisions, 2 near-unanimous (8-1) decisions. Two-week pattern: 9 unanimous decisions and 3 8-1 splits out of 12 total case. Historical context: Must go back 15 opinions to find more than 2 dissents (May 22nd Oklahoma Charter School case). Full-term data: 29 of 41 decided cases unanimous or near-unanimous (71% consensus)Observation #2: Opinion Assignments Tell a Story. Recent distribution: 8 of 9 justices wrote majority opinions in past two weeks; Justice Kavanaugh who wrote sole opinion the week before)Observation #3: Speed Suggests Strategic Docket Management. Rapid turnaround: 6-10 weeks from oral argument to decision. Contrast with pending cases: U.S. v. Skrmetti (transgender medical care): 6+ months since December 4th argument; Hewitt v. United States (First Step Act): pending since January 13th; and Stanley v. City of Sanford (ADA): pending since January 13th.Observation #4: Uncle Sam Had a Bad Day. Government losses: 5 of 6 cases involved citizens vs. government agencies. Case types: FBI raid victims, disabled student vs. school district, veterans vs. benefits administration, prisoner vs. federal procedures, taxpayer vs. IRS. Pattern: Court prioritizing individual redress against institutional power. Only government win: Rivers v. Guerrero, which involved stricter habeas petition standards.Observation #5: The Court as Error Corrector. Reversal rate: 10 of 12 cases vacated or reversed (83%). Term comparison: Higher than overall 66% reversal rate. "Kick it back" approach: Court often vacates with instructions rather than final resolutionObservation #6: Roberts' Perfect Record. Chief Justice pattern: 41 cases, 41 majority opinions joined. Zero concurrences, zero dissents. Contrast with other justices:Justice Thomas: 5 dissents, Justice Gorsuch: 4 dissents (including both June 12th dissents) and Justice Jackson: 3 dissents authored, 1 joined.June 16th, 2025 Certiorari Grants1. First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Matthew Platkin | Case No. 24-781 | Docket Link: Here. Question Presented: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?Key Facts:New Jersey Attorney General issued civil investigatory...

Opinion Summary: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–249 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment."That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting. Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.Holding: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Roman Martinez For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralFor Respondents: Lisa S. BlattWebsite Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Soto v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24-320 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Holding: Result: Voting Breakdown: Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner:For Respondent:Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Martin v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–362 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit. Questions Presented: Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law. Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.Holdings:The law enforcement proviso in Section 2680(h) overrides only the intentional-tort exception in that subsection, not the discretionary-function exception or other exceptions throughout Section 2680.The Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a defense in FTCA suits.On remand, the Eleventh Circuit should consider whether subsection (a)'s discretionary-function exception bars either the plaintiffs' negligent- or intentional-tort claims—undertaking that assessment without reference to the mistaken view that the law enforcement proviso applies to subsection (a). Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Patrick M. JaicomoFor Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralFor Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. MillsWebsite Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: Rivers v. Guerrero | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 23-1345 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing. The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit). Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Parrish v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–275 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted. Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich. For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–416 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.Holding: The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 6330 to resolve disputes between a taxpayer and the IRS when the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Supreme Court Roundup: Decisions, Emergency Actions, and New GrantsIn this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:Six unanimous decisions released on June 5th, 2025Two significant emergency docket interventions involving DOGEThree major cases granted certiorari via June 6th, 2025 OrderJune 5, 2025 Unanimous DecisionsRemarkable consensus: 5 unanimous decisions, 1 8-1 dismissalStrategic clearing of non-controversial cases with 30 contentious cases pendingJustice Thomas's concurrences in 5 of 6 cases challenging judge-made doctrinesHeavy focus on procedural rules as proxies for deeper policy debatesEmergency Docket Actions1. U.S. DOGE Service v. CREW: Court limits discovery of internal executive communicationsCourt orders narrowing of discovery rather than outright prohibitionDecision based on separation of powers principlesJustices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissented2. Social Security Administration v. AFSCME: Court allows DOGE access to sensitive SSA recordsJustice Jackson's forceful dissent highlighting privacy concernsLower courts' compromise solution rejected by majorityConcerns about disclosure of personal data without legal determinationCertiorari Grants1. Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | Case No. 24-808Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether a motion to vacate a void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within a "reasonable time"Key Facts: Coney Island claims improper service six years after default judgmentPetitioner's Argument: Void judgments are legal nullities from the start; no time limit should applyRespondent's Argument: Rule 60(c)(1) explicitly requires "reasonable time" with no exceptionsStakes: Balance between jurisdictional principles and need for legal finality2. Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 (Consolidated with Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860)Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in allowing courts to consider non-retroactive changes in law as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reductionKey Fact: Carter received 70-year sentence under pre-First Step Act "stacking" provisions that would result in much shorter sentence todayPetitioner's Argument: Commission has broad authority to define "extraordinary and compelling reasons"; gross disparities qualifyGovernment's Argument: Commission can't circumvent Congress's decision not to make First Step Act retroactiveStakes: Potential relief for hundreds of federal prisoners serving lengthy "stacked" sentences3. Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: How courts should apply the clinical definition of intellectual disability when all IQ scores are above 70Key Fact: Smith has five IQ scores (75, 74, 72, 78, 74) all above 70 but significant adaptive deficitsPetitioner's Argument: Multiple IQ scores above 70 should preclude

Opinion Summary: Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–304 In this episode, I breakdown the dismissal, Justice Kavanaugh's dissent and theories for the dismissal. Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.Result: Dismissed as improvidently granted. Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Per Curiam decision.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Noel J. FranciscoFor United States, as Amicus Curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General For Respondents: Deepak GuptaWebsite Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1141 Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Mexican Government sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government. Questions Presented:Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson each filed concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm’n. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–154 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Holding: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  Justices Thomas and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner:For Respondent:Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1201 This case was consolidated with: Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Case No. 24-17.Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.The question presented in Antrix Corp. Ltd. is: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).Host Note: Consolidated with: Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Case No. 24-17Holding: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner in 24-17: Aaron Streett, Houston, Tex. For petitioners in 23-1201: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D.C. For United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For respondents: Carter G. Phillips, Washington, D. C. Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:

Opinion Summary: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman| Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1259 Link to Docket: Here.Background:For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up). In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint. The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint. Question Presented: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.Holding: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Robers and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined and in which Justice Jackson joined in all parts but Part III. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C.For respondents: Michael J. Radine, Hackensack, N.J.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Opinion Summary: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Decided: 6/5/25 In this episode, we'll Ames versus Ohio Department of Youth Services, Case Number 23–1039. I'll walk through the opinion, give my thoughts on case implications and also compare how the oral arguments compared and contrasted to the ultimate opinions. Spoiler alert: oral arguments heavily forecasted the results.Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." Holding: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which re¬quires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:

Guns, Warrantless Home Searches, and Ballot Boxes: Inside the Supreme Court's June 2nd Order List In this episode of Supreme Court Oral Arguments and Opinions, I break down the Court's June 2, 2025 Order List, focusing on several cases that touch on fundamental constitutional questions affecting Americans' daily lives. The episode examines four cases where the Court granted certiorari and two denied cases that sparked passionate written dissents.Cases Granted Review: 1. Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Docket Link: Here.Question: Do federal candidates have standing to challenge state laws allowing ballots to be counted after Election Day?Background: Stems from a lawsuit by Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican Presidential Elector Nominees involving a challenge to Illinois' law that allows mail-in ballots to be received and counted up to fourteen days after Election Day.Implications: Could affect how mail-in ballots are processed in federal elections across more than half the states2. Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Docket Link: Here. Question: Do police need probable cause or only reasonable suspicion to enter homes without a warrant during emergencies?Background: Stems from a welfare check that resulted in William Trevor Case being shot by police and later convicted of assaulting a peace officerImplications: Will clarify Fourth Amendment standards for warrantless home entries during potential emergencies3. GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal | Case No. 24-758 | Docket Link: Here.Question: Can government contractors immediately appeal denials of derivative sovereign immunity claims?Background: Involves allegations that a private detention center operator forced detainees to clean common areas and paid only $1.00 per day for voluntary workImplications: Will affect litigation risks for companies contracting with the government in sensitive areas4. Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | Case No. 24-924 | Docket Link: Here.Question: Does federal law preempt state tort claims against military contractors in war zones?Background: Arises from a 2016 suicide bombing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan that severely injured a U.S. Army specialistImplications: Billions in potential liability for military contractors and access to remedies for injured service membersNotable Cert Denials:1. Nicholson v. W.L. York | Case No. 23–7490Issue: When does the statute of limitations restart for repeated acts of racial discrimination?Dissent: Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that each discriminatory act should start a new limitations clockSignificance: Affects when victims of ongoing discrimination can bring legal claims2. Snope v. Brown | Case No. 24–203Issue: Does Maryland's ban on AR-15s and...

Emergency Docket Order Summary: Noem v. Doe | Order Date: 5/30/25 | Case No. 24A1079 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the April 15, 2025 order entered by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and any further proceedings in this Court.The central issue in this case is whether the Secretary of Homeland Security lawfully terminated the CHNV parole program and the existing parole status of approximately half a million individuals through a single Federal Register Notice, or if this en masse termination exceeded the Secretary's authority and violated statutory requirements for case-by-case assessment and proper legal reasoning. Decision: Stay granted. The Supreme Court granted the application and stayed the district court order. This means that DHS can terminate the lawful status of all CHNV parolees and proceed to remove them pursuant to law. Link to Opinion: Here.

Reading the Eagle County Tea Leaves: How the Justices' Oral Argument Questions Foreshadowed Their Opinions This episode of SCOTUS Oral Arguments and Opinions delves into the case of Seven County Infrastructure Coalition versus Eagle County, decided on May 29, 2025. The episode compares and contrasts the oral arguments and written opinions of Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor. Justice Kavanaugh's majority opinion emphasized broad judicial deference to federal agencies and the economic impact of extensive environmental reviews. In contrast, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence focused on the narrow legal authority under federal transportation law. The episode highlights how Justices Barrett and Jackson influenced the written opinions despite not penning their own separate analyses. Overall, it explores how this oral arguments predicted judicial outcomes.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:00:00 Introduction to the Case01:39 Justice Kavanaugh's Majority Opinion05:58 Justice Sotomayor's Concurrence08:32 Influence of Other Justices11:47 Conclusion and Final Thoughts

Opinion Summary: Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County | Date Decided: 5/29/25 | Case No. 23–975 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:[00:00:00] Introduction[00:02:10] Question Presented[00:03:04] Voting Breakdown[00:03:32] Justice Kavanaugh's Majority Opinion[00:09:56] Justice Sotomayor's Concurring Opinion[00:21:22] Case Implications

L. M. v. Middleborough, Petitioner v. United States, et al. | Decision Date: 5/27/25 | Case No. 24-410Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether school officials may presume substantial disruption or a violation of the rights of others from a student’s silent, passive, and untargeted ideological speech simply because that speech relates to matters of personal identity, even when the speech responds to the school’s opposing views, actions, or policies.Result: Denial of certiorari.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justices Thomas and Alito dissented from the denial of certiorari.Link to Decision: Here.

Apache Stronghold, Petitioner v. United States, et al. | Order Date: 5/23/25 | Case No. 24-291Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the government “substantially burdens” religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), or must satisfy heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, when it singles out a sacred site for complete physical destruction, ending specific religious rituals forever.Result: Denial of certiorari.Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Justice Gorsuch with whom Justice Thomas joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari.Link to Decision: Here.

Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966 This case comes from the Emergency Docket.Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the judgments issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any further proceedings in this Court. The underlying case involves the questions of whether the President may remove without cause members of the National Labor Relations Board and Merit Systems Protection Board, or whether statutory for-cause removal protections for these agency heads violate the President's constitutional authority under Article II to supervise and control officers who exercise executive power on his behalf.Holding: The Court granted the stay application. The lower court decisions are on hold until the case fully resolves.Result: The Justices did not sign the order. Justice Kagan filed a dissent from the grant of the stay application and was joined by along with Justices Sotomayor and Justice Jackson.Link to Opinion: Here.

I created this episode to highlight and contrast the Justices' questions and comments at oral argument to the written opinion in Kousisis.While all Justices agreed on rejecting the economic-loss requirement, their different concerns and questioning approaches during oral argument directly predicted the fragmented reasoning that would characterize their written opinions. The oral argument served as a laboratory for testing legal theories that would ultimately prove difficult to reconcile in a single coherent framework, explaining why this unanimous result required four separate opinions to express the Court's reasoning. Specifically:Justice Barrett used oral argument to test the coherence of competing legal standards, ultimately crafting a majority opinion that rejected petitioners' approach while leaving significant questions unresolved.Justice Thomas used his questioning to explore the specific regulatory context, leading to a concurrence focused on materiality as a limiting principle in DBE cases specifically.Justice Gorsuch consistently probed the boundaries between criminal and non-criminal conduct, resulting in a concurrence defending traditional common-law limitations on fraud liability.Justice Sotomayor maintained focus on the specific case facts and narrow legal question, producing a concurrence that warns against broader doctrinal pronouncements.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Opinion Summary: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Decided: 5/22/25 Link to Docket: Here.Background: The Oklahoma Constitution requires Oklahoma to “establish[ ] and maint[ain] . . . a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control.” The Oklahoma Constitution also requires that [n]o public money . . . shall ever be appropriated . . . or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion . . . or sectarian institution.” Consistent with these constitutional mandates, the Oklahoma Legislature established a type of public school[] established by contract called a charter school. The Oklahoma Charter School Board established a public charter school that fully incorporates Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities.Following the Board’s predecessor’s establishment of the aforementioned public charter school, the Oklahoma Attorney filed an original action with the Oklahoma Supreme Court to prevent the charter school from operating.The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education. Questions Presented:Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students. Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.Holding: The entire opinion reads: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 4-4. Per Curiam Opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners in 24-394: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va. For Petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C. Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:00:00 Introduction00:15 Question Presented00:53 Result01:05 Opinion01:10 Case Implications

Opinion Summary: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Decided: 5/22/25 Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented: Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services. Whether all contract rights are "property."Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.Result: Affirmed. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For Respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:00:00 Introduction 00:57 Justice Barrett’s Majority Opinion09:01 Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion15:22 Justice Gorsuch opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment24:27 Justice Sotomayor opinion concurring in the judgment00:29:52 Case Implications

Case Info: A.A.R.P. v. Trump, Case No. 24A1007 | Date Decided: 5/16/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether Venezuelan nationals detained as alleged members of a terrorist organization are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to challenge their removal before being deported under the Alien Enemies Act, and if so, what minimum notice requirements must the government provide to satisfy due process.Plain Language Breakdown: In this case, the Supreme Court decided that Venezuelan nationals detained by the government as alleged members of a terrorist organization must receive adequate notice before being removed from the United States under the Alien Enemies Act. The Court found that the District Court's inaction for over 14 hours constituted a constructive denial of the detainees' request for emergency relief, and that due process requires notice that allows detainees a meaningful opportunity to challenge their removal through habeas proceedings. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of the appeal and granted an injunction preventing the government from removing class members until the Fifth Circuit could determine what level of notice is constitutionally required.Justice Kavanaugh concurred, agreeing with the temporary injunction but expressing a preference for the Supreme Court to resolve the critical legal issues promptly rather than remanding to lower courts. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the District Court's actions were reasonable given the circumstances and insufficient evidence was presented to prove imminent harm to the detainees; he also questioned whether class relief could be obtained in habeas proceedings and whether the requirements for class certification could be met in this case.Voting Details: The Supreme Court delivered a Per Curiam opinion. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice Thomas joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Timestamps:00:00 Introduction and Plain Language Breakdown02:10 Summary of Per Curiam Opinion12:47 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion14:33 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Dissenting Opinion

Here are some highlights from the Trump v. CASA, Inc. case heard on May 15, 2025.Justice Kagan and Justice Barrett went viral for their questions. Those portions begin around 09:17.Please see the oral argument episode for additional case details.As always, I welcome any feedback on the episode or podcast. Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

Case Info: Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc. | Case No. 24A884 | Date Argued: 5/15/25Consolidation Note: The following cases were consolidated: (1) Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc., Case No. 24A884; (2) Trump, President of U.S. v. Washington, Case No. 24A885; and (3) Trump, President of U.S. v. New Jersey, Case No. 24A886.Parties: Applicants: United States and Federal OfficialsRespondents: (1) States and cities such as New Jersey, California, Delaware, Massachusetts, and the City and County of San Francisco; (2) Immigrant rights organizations such as CASA, Inc. and Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Inc; and (3) private individuals.Links to Docket: Here (Case No. 24A884); Here (Case No. 24A885); and Here (Case No. 24A886).Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts' nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s 1/20/25 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states.Background:On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order regarding birthright citizenship. Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, repudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinterpreted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a). Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that 6 person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1. Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this

Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force. In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re­quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the per­spective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re­quires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circum­stances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.)Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:[00:00] Introduction[00:38] Justice Kagan Unanimous Opinion[04:35] Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion[10:12] Case Implications

In Memoriam: A Reflection on the Remarkable Journey of Justice David SouterEpisode OverviewIn this special memorial episode, we discuss the remarkable life and judicial career of Justice David H. Souter, a Supreme Court Justice who defied political expectations and remained committed to principled jurisprudence.Key HighlightsBorn: September 17, 1939 in Melrose, MassachusettsAppointed to Supreme Court: 1990 by President George H.W. BushRetired: 2009 (succeeded by Justice Sotomayor)Passed Away: May 8, 2025Notable Career MilestonesRhodes Scholar at Oxford UniversityNew Hampshire Attorney GeneralAssociate Justice of New Hampshire Supreme CourtJudge on the First Circuit Court of AppealsSupreme Court Justice (1990-2009)Landmark Cases Discussed1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) (Opinion Here)Co-authored opinion affirming Roe v. WadeCrafted influential section on judicial precedent2. Bush v. Gore (2000) (Opinion Here)Demonstrated judicial independenceCritiqued recount process while questioning judicial overreachJudicial Philosophy HighlightsBelieved law should adapt to empirical realitiesAdvocated for judicial restraintSupported separation of church and stateConsistently prioritized legal principles over political expectationsThe Supreme Court issued two press releases: Here and Here.

Episode Description:This episode features a May 7, 2025 conversation between Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts and U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo. They discuss why judicial independence matters in our democracy and how it helps balance power between different parts of government. Both judges share stories about their personal backgrounds, law school experiences, and key moments in their careers. They also talk about what makes legal writing effective and why court decisions should be written clearly so everyone can understand them. The conversation gives listeners a unique look into the thoughts of two important judges as they reflect on their shared history and how the legal world has changed over time.Background:On May 7, 2025, Chief Justice John Roberts headlined the Western District of New York 125th Anniversary Dinner Event in Buffalo, NY. As part of this event, U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo interviewed Chief Justice Roberts. From the Event's press release: “Chief Justice Roberts was born in Buffalo and spent his early childhood here, so we claim him as one of our own,” said Chief U.S. District Judge Elizabeth Wolford. “His willingness to join us for our 125th Anniversary makes the celebration all the more special. It’s a testament to Western New York’s rich legal history and the Chief Justice’s commitment to our profession.”Event Press Release: Here.H/T to WGRZ-TV for the recording.Timestamps:00:00 Welcoming Remarks and Reflections 00:57 Reflecting on the Past: A Journey Back to Buffalo 09:26 The Art of Writing Clearly14:07 Judicial Independence and Its Implications 25:42 The Role of the Chief Justice in Public Life 32:04 Reflections on Two Decades on the Court 38:43 The Evolution of Legal Perspectives 43:20 The Influence of Judicial Mentorship 48:35 Reflections on Clerking and the Law

Case Info: United States v. Shilling | Order Decided: 5/6/25 | Case No. 24A1030Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the nationwide injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.Plain English Translation: This order means that the district court’s nationwide injunction is on hold until final adjudication of the case on the merits.  The district court’s nationwide injunction prohibited the Department of Defense from implementing a policy that generally disqualifies from military service individuals who have gender dysphoria or have undergone medical interventions for gender dysphoria.Voting Breakdown: The Order is unsigned.  Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson would deny the application.Timestamps:00:00 Introduction00:16 Question Presented00:28 Emergency Order Text01:23 Voting Breakdown01:31 Plain English Order Summary02:07 Procedural History - Policy Adoption02:39 Procedural History - Respondent Identities02:52 Procedural History - District Court Orders04:39 Procedural History - Government Appeals Denial of Stay of Nationwide Injunction to 9th Circuit; 9th Circuit Denies Appeal05:15 Procedural History - Government Appeals Applies to Supreme Court for a Stay05:20 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Satisfies Rational Basis Review06:42 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Comports with the First Amendment07:49 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Complies with the Due Process Clause and Principles of Equity07:59 Summary of Government Application - The District Court Erred in Issuing a Nationwide Injunction10:04 Summary of Government Application - The Remaining Factors Support the Issuance of a Stay

Case Info: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Argued: 4/30/25 | Date Decided: 5/22/25Link to Docket: Here.Background: The Oklahoma Constitution requires Oklahoma to “establish[ ] and maint[ain] . . . a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control.” The Oklahoma Constitution also requires that [n]o public money . . . shall ever be appropriated . . . or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion . . . or sectarian institution.” Consistent with these constitutional mandates, the Oklahoma Legislature established a type of public school[] established by contract called a charter school. The Oklahoma Charter School Board established a public charter school that fully incorporates Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities.Following the Board’s predecessor’s establishment of the aforementioned public charter school, the Oklahoma Attorney filed an original action with the Oklahoma Supreme Court to prevent the charter school from operating.The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education. Questions Presented:Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students. Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.Holding: The entire opinion reads: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 4-4. Per Curiam Opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Host Notes: Justice Barrett did not participate in this case. Also, this case was consolidated with St. Isidore of Seville Sch. v. Drummond, Case No. 24-396.Oral Advocates: For Petitioners in 24-394: James A. CampbellFor Petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinleyFor United States, as Amicus Curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of JusticeFor Respondent: Gregory G. GarreWebsite Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Timestamps:00:00 Introduction00:08 Petitioner (in...

Case Info: Feliciano v. Department of Transportation | Date Decided: 4/30/25 | Case No. 23-861Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeWebsite Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.Timestamps:00:00 Introduction00:15 Question Presented00:23 Voting Breakdown00:40 Justice Gorsuch Majority Opinion08:10 Result08:11 Justice Thomas Dissenting Opinion14:41 Case Implications

Case Info: Martin v. United States | Case No. 24-362 | Date Argued: 4/29/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit. Questions Presented: Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law. Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Patrick M. JaicomoFor Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralFor Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. MillsWebsite Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Timestamps:00:00 Introduction00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins02:11 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin21:58 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin22:06 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins23:53 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin37:10 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin39:31 Respondent Questions End, Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Opening Statement Begins40:33 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions Begin46:45 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Sequential Questions Begin46:51 Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Case Info: Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis | Case No. 24-304 | Date Argued: 4/29/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Noel J. FranciscoFor United States, as Amicus Curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General For Respondents: Deepak GuptaWebsite Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.Timestamps:00:00 Introduction00:06 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins02:16 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin21:22 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin1:09:22 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins1:10:41 Government Free for All Questions Begin1:20:15 Government Sequential Questions Begin1:36:29 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins1:38:22 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin2:06:52 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin2:12:05 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy | Date Decided: 4/29/25 | Case No. 23-715Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here. Advocates: For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus SherryFor Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Soto v. United States | Case No. 24-320 | Date Argued: 4/28/25Link to Docket: Here.Background: This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculate the period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment. Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement." Question Presented: When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Tracy F. Flint, Chicago, Ill. For Respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralWebsite Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Timestamps:00:00 Introduction00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins2:07 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin25:24 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin30:00 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins32:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin57:40 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin57:46 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Case Info: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Case No. 24-249 | Date Argued: 4/28/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment."That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting. Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.Holding: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Roman Martinez For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralFor Respondents: Lisa S. BlattHost Note: This is probably the sauciest oral argument I've heard this term. Respondent's counsel accuses Petitioner of lying and of asking the Court to consider "uniquely stupid standards." Respondent's counsel also accused the Supreme Court of routinely remanding cases without setting the law. All of these statements clearly made the justices uncomfortable. I included timestamps for these exchanges. Timestamps:00:00 Introduction00:07 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins2:04 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin18:06 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin23:04 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins24:29 Government Free for All Questions Begin33:42 Government Sequential Questions Begin45:17 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins47:16 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin50:26 Respondent alleges that Petitioner lied and made inaccurate statements about Respondent’s position50:55 Justice Gorsuch tells Respondent to be more careful with her words with respect to alleging that Petitioner lied 52:03 Respondent states that Petitioner asks the court to adopt “uniquely stupid standards.”1:03:17 Justice

Case Info: Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7 | Date Argued: 04/23/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B). In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EPA's waiver would have any effect on automakers.Questions Presented: Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties. Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.Holding: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson filed dissenting opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Jeffrey B. WallFor Federal Respondents: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor GeneralFor State Respondents: Joshua A. Klein, Deputy Solicitor General, Oakland, Cal.

Case Info: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Date Argued: 4/22/25Link to Docket: Here. Background:Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read. Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct." Question Presented:Whether public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D.C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)For Respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y.Timestamps:00:00 Introduction00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement02:06 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin18:38 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin53:39 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement54:43 Government Free for All Questions Begin 1:04:21 Government Sequential Questions Begin01:22:12 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement01:24:02 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin01:52:42 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin2:25:55 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Case Info: CIR v. Zuch | Case No. 24-416 | Date Argued: 4/22/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Velazquez v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Date Decided: 4/22/25 | Case No. 23-929Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Gerard J. CedroneFor Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralWebsite Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.Host Note: Please note that the opinion date is April 22, 2025.

Case Info: Parrish v. United States | Case No. 24-275 | Date Argued: 4/21/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted. Question Presented: Whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened.Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich. For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Case No. 24-316 | Date Argued: 4/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1). Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here. On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs. This may mean that the Supreme Court is skeptical of Respondent’s position that the Task Force members constitute principal officers and that the Supreme Court may not remand the question to the Fifth Circuit. Check out the exchange involving Mr. Mitchell on this point at 42:00.

Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Date Decided: 4/17/25 | Case No. 23-1007Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausi­bly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without ad­dressing potential §1108 exemptions.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Advocates:For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Case No. 23-1275 | Date Argued: 4/2/25Link to Docket: Here. Background:More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar." The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question. Questions Presented:1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider. 2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?Holding: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under Section 1983.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-365Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury. Result: Affirmed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concur­ring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-1038Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Fuld v. PLO | Case No. 24-20 | Date Argued: 4/1/25Case consolidated with: United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151.Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq., provides an extraterritorial private right of action for victims of terror attacks committed against American nationals abroad. In 2019, Congress amended the ATA by enacting the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Under the PSJVTA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in an ATA action if: (a) more than 120 days after the statute's enactment, they pay any terrorist convicted of or killed while committing a terror attack against an American national, and the payment is made "by reason of' the conviction or terror attack, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e) (1)(A); or (b) more than 15 days after the statute's enactment, they "conduct any activity" while physically present in the United States (with limited exceptions), id. § 2334(e)(1) (B). The PLO and PA engaged in both categories of conduct after the trigger dates. But in the decisions below, the Second Circuit facially invalidated the PSJVTA. The court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from specifying conduct that triggers a defendant's consent to federal jurisdiction unless the statute provides the defendant with some "governmental benefit" in return, and that the PLO and PA had not received such a benefit. Question Presented: Whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment.Holding: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners in 24-20: Kent A. Yalowitz, New York, N. Y.For Petitioner in 24-151: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Mitchell R. Berger, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Rivers v. Guerrero | Case No. 23-1345 | Date Argued: 3/31/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing. The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit). Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n | Case No. 24-154 | Date Argued: 3/31/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Wisconsin exempts from its state unemployment tax system certain religious organizations that are "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches" and that are also "operated primarily for religious purposes." Petitioners are Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Superior and several sub-entities. Although all agree Catholic Charities is controlled by a church-the Diocese of Superior-the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities is not "operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus does not qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the court held that Catholic Charities' activities are not "typical" religious activities because Catholic Charities serves and employs non-Catholics, Catholic Charities does not "attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith," and its services to the poor and needy could also be provided by secular organizations. Questions Presented: Does a state violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state's criteria for religious behavior? In addressing federal constitutional challenges, may state courts require proof of unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt?"Holding: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  Justices Thomas and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Eric C. Rassbach, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, Wis.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Case No. 24-354 | Date Argued: 3/26/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries. Questions Presented: 1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund. 2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates. 3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.Host Note: Consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.For Respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: United States v. Miller | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-824Link to Docket: Here. Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim. Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-852Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); andWhether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined.  Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.  Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Oklahoma v. EPA | Case No. 23-1067 | Date Argued: 3/25/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits. Questions Presented:Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.Host Note: Consolidated with: Pacificorp V. EPA, Case No. 23-1067.Holding: EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.Result: Reversed. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla.For petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill. For respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Case Info: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Case No. 23-1229 | Date Argued: 3/25/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:In a pair of final actions, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied 105 petitions filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Standard program. Six of those refineries petitioned for review of EPA's decisions in the Fifth Circuit, which denied the government's motion for transfer to the D.C. Circuit. Question Presented: Whether venue for the refineries' challenges lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the agency's denial actions are "nationally applicable" or, alternatively, are "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect." 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).Holding: EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C. For respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.

Case Info: Riley v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-1270 | Date Argued: 3/24/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal." This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.Questions Presented:Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Keith Bradley, Denver, Colo.For respondent in support of petitioner: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below: Stephen J. Hammer, Dallas, Tex.

Case Info: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Date Argued: 3/24/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Questions Presented: Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8? Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny? Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions? Is this action non-justiciable?Host Note: Consolidated with Robinson V. Callais (Case No. 24-110)Oral Advocates:For Appellant in 24-109: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La. For Appellants in 24-110: Stuart C. Naifeh, New York, N.Y. For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Mo.

Case Info: Thompson v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-1095Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.Holding: 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state­ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false. Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Alito and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Chris C. Gair, Chicago, Ill. For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-825Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be  committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A). Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. | Case No. 22-1079 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Asbestos claims in state court have been plagued by rampant fraud, with claimants seeking inflated recoveries against some asbestos defendants by suppressing evidence of claims against other asbestos defendants. For nearly a decade, bankruptcy courts have sought to protect debtors and their insurers by requiring fraud-prevention measures-like ensuring access to claims information-before channeling the asbestos claims against the debtor to a trust. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). In this case, a Chapter 11 debtor colluded with representatives for asbestos claimants to propose and confirm a plan that includes these fraud-prevention measures only for uninsured asbestos claims-not insured asbestos claims. Petitioner is the insurer who bears the financial burden of those 14,000 insured claims. The Bankruptcy Code's plain text empowers any "party in interest" to "raise" and "be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). But the court of appeals refused to adjudicate Petitioner's objections to the fraud and collusion, relying on judge-made limitations engrafted onto the Code.Question Presented: Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a "party in interest" that may object to a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.Holding: An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a "party in interest" under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) that "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 case.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Justice Alito, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.) For debtor Respondents: C. Kevin Marshall, Washington, D.C. For claimant Respondents: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: NRC v. Texas | Case No. 23-1300 | Date Argued: 3/5/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.(For Interim Storage Partners, LLC) Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exercise of authority to issue a license to a private party to temporarily possess spent nuclear fuel at a location away from an operating nuclear power reactor was lawful under the applicable statutes (as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held) or not (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case). Whether, notwithstanding an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action, a person must take steps to become a "party" to an agency proceeding under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, in order to then subsequently challenge the agency action resulting from that proceeding in court (as the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action can override statutory limitations on jurisdiction (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).Host Note: Consolidated with: Interim Storage Partners, LLC V. Texas, Case No. 23-1312.Holding: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners in 23-1300: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For petitioner in 23-1312: Brad Fagg, Washington, D. C. For respondents Texas, et al.: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.For respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Bufkin v. Collins | Date Decided: 3/5/25 | Case No. 23-713Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38  U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's  application of that rule?Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-re­lated disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Case No. 23-1141 | Date Argued: 3/4/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Mexican Government sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government. Questions Presented:Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson each filed concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Date Decided: 3/4/25 | Case No. 23-753Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose  generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their  discharges must conform.Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end­ result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per­mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissent­ing in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal. For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. CWebsite Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: CC/Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. | Case No. 23-1201 | Date Argued: 3/3/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.The question presented in Antrix Corp. Ltd. is: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).Holding: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner in 24-17: Aaron Streett, Houston, Tex. For petitioners in 23-1201: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D.C. For United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Carter G. Phillips, Washington, D.C. Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman | Case No. 23-1259 | Date Argued: 3/3/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up). In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint. The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint. Question Presented: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.Holding: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Robers and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined and in which Justice Jackson joined in all parts but Part III. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg¬ment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C.For respondents: Michael J. Radine, Hackensack, N.J.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Argued: 2/26/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." Holding: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-971Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).Holding: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b). Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Vincent Levy, New York, N. Y. For respondent: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-900Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engi­neers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accord­ingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “de­fendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Perttu v. Richards | Case No. 23-1324 | Date Argued: 2/25/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich. For respondent: Lori Alvino McGill, Charlottesville, Va.

Case Info: Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483 | Date Argued: 2/25/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The supervised-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when sentencing a person for violating a supervised release condition. In that list, Congress omitted the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(A)-the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense. Question Presented: Even though Congress excluded section 3553(a)(2)(A) from section 3583(e)'s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, may a district court rely on the section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release?Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Christian J. Grostic, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Cleveland, Ohio. For Respondent: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 23-621Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 22-7466Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when  assessing the materiality of  Brady and Napue claims. Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction  is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.Holdings:This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C. For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Case No. 23-7809 | Date Argued: 2/24/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order." In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024). The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023). Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-1127Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por­tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.Result: Affirmed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex. For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Williams v. Reed | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-191Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.Holding: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion require­ment in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Result: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined as to Part II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-867Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that  proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the  expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to  affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law  have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here. Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Case No. 23-1007 | Date Argued: 1/22/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (C), prohibits a plan fiduciary from "engag[ing] in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest." The statute elsewhere defines "party in interest" broadly to include a variety of parties that may contract with or provide services to a plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have, on the other hand, required plaintiffs to allege additional elements to state a claim, because a "literal reading" of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) would purportedly produce "results that are inconsistent with ERISA's statutory purpose." Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022). Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausi­bly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without ad­dressing potential §1108 exemptions.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Advocates:For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force. In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re­quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the per­spective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re­quires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circum­stances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.)

Case Info: McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226 | Date Argued: 1/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Matthew W.H. Wessler, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Joseph R. Palmore, Washington, D.C.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187 | Date Argued: 1/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. If FDA denies an application for authorization, "any person adversely affected by such * * * denial may file a petition for judicial review of such * * * denial with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which such person resides or has their principal place of business." 21 U.S.C. 387l(a)(l). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has determined that a manufacturer may seek judicial review in that circuit even if it neither resides nor has its principal place of business there, so long as its petition is joined by a seller of its products, such as a gas station or convenience store, based in the circuit. Question Presented: Whether a manufacturer may file a petition for review in a circuit (other than the D.C. Circuit) where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer's products that is located within that circuit.Holding: Retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order may seek judicial review of that order under § 387l(a)(1).Result: Affirmed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Ryan J. Watson, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Date Decided: 1/17/25 | Case No. 24–656Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to Petitioners, violates the First Amendment.Holding: The challenged provisions do not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: The Supreme Court wrote a Per Curiam unanimous opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C. For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal. For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Date Argued: 1/15/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors. Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D.C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-677Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-217Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the  applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six  circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an em­ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gor­such filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services | Case No. 23-971 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 2/26/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) empowers district courts, on just terms and under circumstances specified in that Rule, to "relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding."Question Presented: Whether a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).Holding: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b). Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Vincent Levy, New York, N. Y. For respondent: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Thompson v. United States | Case No. 23-1095 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 3/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.Holding: 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state­ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false. Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Alito and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Chris C. Gair, Chicago, Ill. For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997 | Date Argued: 1/13/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee-who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed-lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?Holding: To prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D.C.; and Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Jessica C. Conner, Orlando, Fla.

Case Info: Hewitt v. United States | Case No. 23-1002 | Date Argued: 1/13/25This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.Link to Docket: Here.Background:The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b). There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence. Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C. For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: TikTok, Inc. v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 24-656 | Date Argued: 1/10/25 | Date Decided: 1/17/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to Petitioners, violates the First Amendment.Holding: The challenged provisions do not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: The Supreme Court wrote a Per Curiam unanimous opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C. For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal. For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Host Note: Consolidated with: Firebaugh v. Garland, Case No. 24-657.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Case No. 23-900 | Date Argued: 12/11/24 | Date Decided: 2/26/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engi­neers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accord­ingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “de­fendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Seven County Coalition v. Eagle County | Case No. 23-975 | Date Argued: 12/10/24Link to Docket: Here.Background:In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004), this Court held that when an agency cannot prevent an environmental effect "due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions," the National Environmental Policy Act does not require it to study that effect. This holding has divided the courts of appeals. Five circuits read Public Citizen to mean that an agency's environmental review can stop where its regulatory authority stops. Two circuits disagree and require review of any impact that can be called reasonably foreseeable. Here, the Surface Transportation Board relied on Public Citizen to cabin its environmental review of a new rail line in Utah. But the D.C. Circuit rejected that approach, ruling that the Board "cannot avoid" environmental review "on the ground that it lacks authority to prevent, control, or mitigate" distant environmental effects. As a result, it ordered the Board to study the local effects of oil wells and refineries that lie outside the Board's regulatory authority. Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Link to Opinion: Here. Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas | Date Decided: 12/10/24 | Case No. 23-583Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion­ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of” the agency.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y. For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 5/22/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented: Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services. Whether all contract rights are "property."Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.Result: Affirmed. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Feliciano v. Dept. of Transportation | Case No. 23-861 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/30/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:This case presents a question of critical importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans who serve their country both as federal civilian employees and members of the Armed Services' reserve components. Congress enacted the differential pay statute, 5 U.S.C. § 5538, to eliminate the financial burden that reservists face when called to active duty at pay rates below their federal civilian salaries. To ensure that these reservists suffer no financial penalty for active-duty service, the differential pay statute requires that the government make up the difference. Federal civilian employees are entitled to differential pay when performing active duty "pursuant to a call or order to active duty under * * * a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10." That section, Section 101(a)(13)(B), enumerates several statutory authorities and includes a catchall provision: "any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress." Recently, in a decision that departed from settled understandings of this language, the Federal Circuit held that reservists relying on Section 101(a)(13)(B)'s catchall provision to claim differential pay must show that they were "directly called to serve in a contingency operation." Adams v. DHS, 3 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Under that demanding, fact-intensive standard, the Federal Circuit has rejected claims for differential pay even by reservists like petitioner whose activation orders expressly invoked a presidential emergency declaration. Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeWebsite Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Holding: Tennessee's law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N.Y. For Respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.

Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Case No. 23-867 | Date Argued: 12/03/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:A foreign sovereign is generally immune from suit in domestic courts, subject to the specific exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the expropriation exception, claims involving rights in property taken in violation of international law may be heard if "property or any property exchanged for such property" has a commercial nexus with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Specifically, the property or its proceeds must be either "present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity" or "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." Id. The circuit courts have split as to the showing required to meet the commercial nexus requirement. Questions Presented:Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that  proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the  expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to  affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law  have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here. Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: United States v. Miller | Case No. 23-824 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25Link to Docket: Here. Background:The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any prepetition transfer of the debtor's property that would be voidable "under applicable law" outside bankruptcy by an actual unsecured creditor of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). The applicable law may be state law. Elsewhere, the Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governmental units "to the extent set forth in this section with respect to" various sections of the Code, including Section 544. 11 U.S.C. 106(a)(l). The court of appeals below joined a circuit split in holding that Section 106(a)(l) permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b), even though no actual creditor could have obtained relief outside of bankruptcy in light of sovereign immunity, the Supremacy Clause, and the Appropriations Clause. Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim. Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Case No. 23-1038 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. The agency may grant such authorization only if the applicant shows, among other things, that the marketing of the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." 21 U.S.C. 387j(c)(2)(A). In this case, the agency denied respondents' applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products because they had failed to show that marketing the products would be appropriate for the protection of the public health. The Fifth Circuit set aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious, relying on legal theories that have been rejected by other courts of appeals that have reviewed materially similar FDA denial orders. Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB | Case No. 23-970 | Date Argued: 11/13/24 | Date Decided: 12/11/24Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes "[e]xacting pleading requirements" on plaintiffs who file securities fraud class actions. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 311, 313 (2007). To state a claim, plaintiffs must "state with particularity all facts" supporting their allegations of falsity and must also allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of the required mental state. 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1), (2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs frequently try to meet these requirements by claiming that internal company documents contradicted the company's public statements. Questions Presented: Whether plaintiffs seeking to allege scienter under the PSLRA based on allegations about internal company documents must plead with particularity the contents of those documents. Whether plaintiffs can satisfy the PSLRA's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion to substitute for particularized allegations of fact.Result: Writ of certiorari DISMISSED as improvidently granted by per curiam Opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C.For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-929 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 4/22/25Link to Docket: Here. Background: Federal immigration law allows the government to grant a "voluntary departure" period of up to 60 days to a noncitizen "of good moral character" who receives an adverse decision in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b). If the noncitizen fails to depart during that window, he or she is subject to a civil fine and is ineligible for various forms of immigration relief (like cancellation of removal or adjustment of status) for 10 years. §1229c(d)(1). If, however, the noncitizen "file[s] a post-decision motion to reopen or reconsider during the period allowed for voluntary departure," the penalties for failure to voluntarily depart do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(3)(iii). Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Gerard J. CedroneFor Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralWebsite Link to Opinion Summary: Here. Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Case No. 23-825 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 3/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), a felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Courts have disagreed about how to apply use-of-force language to crimes that require proof of a victim's bodily injury or death but can be committed by failing to take action. In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that any crime requiring proof of death or bodily injury categorically involves the use of physical force, even if it can be committed through inaction-such as by failing to provide medicine to someone who is sick or by failing to feed a child. That ruling reflects the law in eight circuits. Two courts of appeals, by contrast, have held that the use of force is not an element of such crimes if the crime may be committed by inaction. One of those courts recently rejected the government's petition for rehearing en banc, which had argued that any crime requiring proof of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be  committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A). Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank | Case No. 23-980 | Date Argued: 11/6/24Link to Docket: Here.Background:This petition presents two important questions that have divided the federal courts of appeals.First, the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the "risk factors" section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm.Second, the circuits disagree on the proper pleading standard for the loss causation element of a private securities-fraud claim. The Fourth Circuit holds that loss causation allegations must satisfy Federal Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud, while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply the ordinary Rule 8 standard. The Ninth Circuit here initially applied Rule 8, then substituted citations of Rule 9(b) without changing its analysis. Questions Presented: Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm? Does Federal Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) supply the proper pleading standard for loss causation in a private securities-fraud action?Result: Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted by per curiam.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Case No. 23-217 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25 Link to Docket: Here.Background: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covers more than 140 million workers and guarantees eligible workers a minimum wage and overtime pay. But the FLSA also contains 34 exemptions from those requirements. Employers do not have to pay overtime to, e.g., bona fide executives, agricultural workers, and outside salesmen. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(b). The question presented is: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the  applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six  circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an em­ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gor­such filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS | Case No. 23-715 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 4/29/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Because low-income patients are often costlier to treat, Congress directed the government to reimburse hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low--income patients at higher Medicare rates. A hospital qualifies for higher payments in part based on the number of days that a hospital provides inpatient care to senior (or disabled) low- income patients, measured as those who "were entitled to benefits under part A of [Medicare] and were entitled to supplementary security income [SSI] benefits." 42 U.S.C.§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I). In Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, this Court agreed with the agency that "entitled to [Medicare part A] benefits" included "all those qualifying for the [Medicare] program," whether or not Medicare paid for that hospital stay. 597 U.S. 424, 445 (2022). But Empire expressly left open the question of whether "entitled to [SSI] benefits" likewise includes all those who qualify for the SSI program. Id. at 434 n.2. The agency still insists, contrary to its Medicare interpretation, that only patients who received an SSI cash payment for the month of their hospital stay are "entitled to benefits." This case thus presents Empire's open question: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and SSI, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here. Advocates: For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus SherryFor Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath | Case No. 23-1127 | Date Argued: 11/4/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to further the goal of universal access to telecommunications services. In response, the FCC established what's known as the "E-rate" program to provide discounted services to eligible schools and libraries. The program is administered by a private, non-profit corporation and funded entirely by contributions from private telecommunications carriers. After telecommunications carriers provide services to eligible schools and libraries, either the schools and libraries or the providers can submit reimbursement requests to the private corporation for the amount of the discount. In this way, the E-rate program distributes up to $4.5 billion each year. Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por­tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.Result: Affirmed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex. For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Case No. 23-753 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Congress designed the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) to ensure that anyone holding a discharge permit issued under the Act has notice of how much they must control their discharges to comply with the law. The CWA requires that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized states provide this notice by prescribing specific pollutant limitations in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits they issue. Consistent with its text, this Court and the Second Circuit have read the Act to require EPA and states to develop specific limits to achieve goals for surface waters, called water quality standards. Parting with these decisions, the Ninth Circuit held here that EPA may issue permits that contain generic prohibitions against violating water quality standards. Rather than specify pollutant limits that tell the permitholder how much they need to control their discharges as required by the CWA, these prohibitions effectively tell permitholders nothing more than not to cause "too much" pollution. These generic water quality terms expose San Francisco and numerous permitholders nationwide to enforcement actions while failing to tell them how much they need to limit or treat their discharges to comply with the Act. Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose  generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their  discharges must conform.Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end­ result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per­mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissent­ing in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal. For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. CWebsite Link to Oral Arguments: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

Case Info: Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA | Case No. 23-713 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/5/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:For more than a century, veterans have been entitled to the benefit of the doubt on any close issue relating to their eligibility for service-related benefits. As presently codified, "[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant." 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). In 2002, Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits Act. Among other things, the Act supplemented the responsibilities of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "Veterans Court") by requiring it to "take due account of the Secretary's application of section 5107(b)" as part of its review of benefits appeals. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1). In these cases, the Federal Circuit held that § 7261(b)(1) "does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond the clear error review" of underlying factual findings - something already required by the pre-2002 review statute, under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a). Pet. App. 16a-17a (quoting Pet. App. 8a- 11a). Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38  U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's  application of that rule?Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-re­lated disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Case No. 23-365 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) creates a civil treble-damages action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of” certain offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury. Result: Affirmed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concur­ring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security | Case No. 23-583 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 12/10/24Link to Docket: Here.Background:When considering whether to approve a petition for an immigrant visa, the government must adhere to certain nondiscretionary criteria. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (c) (providing that "[n]o petition shall be approved" if the individual seeking a visa has previously entered a marriage "for the purpose of evading the immigration laws"). When a visa petition is denied based on a petitioner's failure to satisfy such a nondiscretionary requirement, it is generally understood that the petitioner has a right to judicial review of that decision. Once a visa petition has been approved, the government has the power to revoke approval of the visa petition for "good and sufficient cause" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155. The circuits are in open conflict over whether judicial review is available when the government revokes an approved petition on the ground that it had initially misapplied nondiscretionary criteria during the approval process. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that judicial review is available under these circumstances, but the Second, Third, Seventh, and now the Eleventh Circuit all hold that revocations are "discretionary" decisions for which there is no right to judicial review, even when they are based on a misapplication of the same nondiscretionary criteria that would be reviewable if the petition had originally been denied. Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion­ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of ” the agency.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y. For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Case No. 22-7466 | Date Argued: 10/9/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when  assessing the materiality of  Brady and Napue claims. Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction  is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.Holdings:This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C. For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Case No. 23-621 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Case No. 23-852 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:In the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., Congress imposed licensing, background-check, recordkeeping, and serialization requirements on persons engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. The Act defines a "firearm" to include "any weapon * * * which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," as well as "the frame or receiver of any such weapon." 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) and (B). In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives issued a regulation clarifying that certain products that can readily be converted into an operational firearm or a functional frame or receiver fall within that definition. See 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (codified in relevant part at 27 C.F.R. 478.11, 478.12(c)). The Fifth Circuit held that those regulatory provisions are inconsistent with the Act. Questions Presented:Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); andWhether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined.  Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.  Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Williams v. Washington | Case No. 23-191 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.Holding: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion require­ment in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Result: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined as to Part II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger | Case No. 23-677 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

The question presented in this case is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.The Supreme Court held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.TIMESTAMPS:00:00 Introduction00:14 Question Presented00:30 Voting Breakdown01:10 Chief Justice Roberts Majority Opinion02:08 Holding21:32 Justice Thomas Concurring Opinion23:48 Justice Barrett Opinion Concurring in Part28:59 Justice Sotomayor Dissenting Opinion38:40 Justice Jackson Dissenting Opinion

The Question Presented is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.Argued:For Petitioner: D. John Sauer; For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Counselor to the Special Counsel, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.TIMESTAMPS:00:00 Introduction00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins1:58 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin27:18 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin57:34 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins59:27 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin128:11 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin2:39:15 Respondent Questions End, Rebuttal (D. John Sauer said he had nothing further)

Oral Argument: Moyle v. United States | Case No. 23-726 | Date Argued: 4/24/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/24 Case consolidated with Idaho v. United States, Case No. 23-727.Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether EMTALA preempts state laws that protect human life and prohibit abortions, like Idaho's Defense of Life Act.Holding: Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.Result: Dismissed.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Per curiam opinion. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, and Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I and II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Joshua N. Turner, Chief of Constitutional Litigation and Policy, Boise, Idaho. For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. VIDED.

Oral Argument: Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney | Case No. 23-367 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issues, prosecutes, and adjudicates complaints alleging that employers committed unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Section 10(j) of the Act authorizes federal district courts, while the NLRB adjudication remains pending, to grant preliminary injunctive relief at the NLRB's request "as [the court] deems just and proper." Id. § 160(j).Question Presented: Whether courts must evaluate the NLRB's requests for section 10(j) injunctions under the traditional, stringent four-factor test for preliminary injunctions or under some other more lenient standard.Holding: When considering the National Labor Relations Board's request for a preliminary injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Department of State v. Muñoz | Case No. 23-334 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., the decision to grant or deny a visa application rests with a consular officer in the Department of State. Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), any noncitizen whom a consular officer "knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in* * * unlawful activity" is ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted to the United States.Question Presented: Whether a consular officer's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's noncitizen spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen.Whether, assuming that such a constitutional interest exists, notifying a visa applicant that he was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) suffices to provide any process that is due.Holding: A U.S. citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Eric T. Lee, Southfeld, Mich.

Oral Argument: Smith v. Spizzirri | Case No. 22-1218 Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important statutory question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.1-16. The FAA establishes procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Under Section 3 of the Act, when a court finds a dispute subject to arbitration, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until [the] arbitration" has concluded. 9 U.S.C. 3 (emphasis added). While six circuits read Section 3's plain text as mandating a stay, four other circuits have carved out an atextual "exception" to Section 3's stay requirement-granting district courts discretion to dismiss (not stay) if the entire dispute is subject to arbitration. In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit declared itself bound by circuit precedent to affirm the district court's "discretion to dismiss," despite "the plain text of the FAA appear[ing] to mandate a stay." The panel candidly acknowledged the 6-4 circuit conflict, and a two-judge concurrence emphasized "the courts of appeals are divided," asserted the Ninth Circuit's position is wrong, and urged "the Supreme Court to take up this question"-an issue this Court has twice confronted but reserved in the past.Question Presented: Whether Section 3 of the FAA requires district courts to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or whether district courts have discretion to dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration.Holding: When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondents: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N. Y.

Oral Argument: City of Grants Pass v. Johnson | Case No. 23-175 | Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:In Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prevents cities from enforcing criminal restrictions on public camping unless the person has "access to adequate temporary shelter." Id. at 617 & n.8. In this case, the Ninth Circuit extended Martin to a classwide injunction prohibiting the City of Grants Pass from enforcing its public-camping ordinance even though civil citations. That decision cemented a conflict with the California Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, which have upheld similar ordinances, and entrenched a broader split on the application of the Eighth Amendment to purportedly involuntary conduct. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless denied rehearing en banc by a 14-to-13 vote.Question Presented: Does the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?Holding: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Theane D. Evangelis, Los Angeles, Cal. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Thornell v. Jones | Case No. 22-982 | Date Argued: 4/17/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Over thirty years ago, Respondent Danny Lee Jones beat Robert Weaver to death and also beat and strangled Weaver's 7-year-old daughter, Tisha, to death, for which he was convicted and sentenced to death. The district court denied habeas relief following an evidentiary hearing on Jones's ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claims. But a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court, giving no deference to the district court's detailed factual findings. Judge Mark Bennett authored a nine-judge dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing.Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit violate this Court's precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing Strickland prejudice when it disregarded the district court's factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the State's rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief?Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's grant of habeas relief on Danny Lee Jones's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on an erroneous interpretation and application of Strickland v. Washington.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jason D. Lewis, Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz. For Respondent: Jean-Claude Andre, Santa Monica, Cal.Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Fischer v. United States | Case No. 23-5572 | Date Argued: March 25, 2024 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Did the D.C. Circuit err in construing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (“Witness, Victim, or Informant Tampering"). Which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations to include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?Holding: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey T. Green, Bethesda, Md. For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Introduction[00:00:07] Petitioner Opening Statement Begins[00:01:52] Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin[00:25:37] Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin[00:34:25] Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins[00:36:31] Respondent Free for All Questions Begin[01:05:01] Respondent Sequential Questions Begin[01:36:13] Respondent Sequential Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Oral Argument: Snyder v. United States | Case No. 23-108 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a federal crime for a state or local official to "corruptly solicit[,] demand[,] ... or accept[] ... anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any" government business "involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more."Question Presented: Whether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.Holding: Federal law proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past acts.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon | Case No. 23-50 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:To make out a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that legal process was instituted without probable cause. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1338 (2022). Under the charge-specific rule, a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge, even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause. Under the "any-crime" rule, probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause.Question Presented: Whether Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, as the Second, Third, and Eleventh circuits hold, or by the "any-crime" rule, as the Sixth Circuit holds.Holding: Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, the presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondents: Megan M. Wold, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Erlinger v. United States | Case No. 23-370 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Constitution requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant's prior convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another," as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).Holding: The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's past offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas filed concurring opinions. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined except as to Part III. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Menlo Park, Cal. For Respondent supporting Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Court-appointed Amicus Curiae in support of the judgment below: D. Nick Harper, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Connelly v. United States | Case No. 23-146 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Closely held corporations often enter into agreements requiring the redemption of a shareholder's stock after the shareholder's death in order to preserve the closely held nature of the business. Corporations that enter such agreements often purchase life insurance on the shareholder in order to fund the transaction.Question Presented: Whether the proceeds of a life-insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder's stock should be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder's shares for purposes of the federal estate tax.Holding: A corporation's contractual obligation to redeem shares is not necessarily a liability that reduces a corporation's value for purposes of the federal estate tax.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | Case No. 23-235 | Date Argued: 3/26/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Case consolidated with Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, Case No. 23-236.Link to Docket: Here.Background:In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Danco's drug Mifeprex for termination of early pregnancy based on the agency's expert judgment that clinical data showed the drug to be safe and effective. The agency later modified certain conditions of use for mifepristone in 2016 and 2021, again relying on clinical data and the agency's expert judgment that the drug would remain safe and effective under the modified conditions of use. In 2022, associations of doctors who have never prescribed Mifeprex sued FDA, arguing that FDA's actions modifying the drug's conditions of use in 2016 and 2021 violated the Administrative Procedure Act.Question Presented: Whether an association can demonstrate Article III standing to enjoin a government action by arguing that some unspecified member may be injured at some future time by the challenged action; andWhether the Fifth Circuit erred in upholding the preliminary injunction of FDA's 2016 and 2021 actions based on the court's review of an incomplete administrative record.Holding: Plaintiffs lack Article Ill standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory actions regarding mifepristone.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For federal Petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C.: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Harrow v. Department of Defense | Case No. 23-21 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:When a federal employee petitions the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board." In the decision below, the Federal Circuit relied on settled circuit precedent holding this filing deadline to be jurisdictional, despite recent opinions from other Circuits and this Court holding analogous filing deadlines to be nonjurisdictional.Question Presented: Whether the 60-day deadline in Section 7703(b)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.Holding: Title 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(l)'s 60-day filing deadline for a federal employee to petition the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is not jurisdictional.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Joshua P. Davis, San Francisco, Cal. For Respondent: Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe | Case No. 23-250 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24 Case consolidated with Becerra v. Northern Arapaho Tribe, Case No. 23-253.Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 5301 et seq., permits eligible Indian tribes to contract with the federal government to assume responsibility for federal health care programs administered for the benefit of Indians. Upon entering into the contract, a tribe is entitled to the appropriated funds that the Indian Health Service (IHS) would have otherwise allocated to the federal program. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(1). The Act also requires IHS to pay "contract support costs"-funds "added to" that appropriated amount to cover the costs of activities the tribe must undertake to operate the transferred program, but which either "normally are not carried on" by IHS when acting as program operator, or which IHS would have "provided * * * from resources other than" the appropriated funds transferred under the contract. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(2). Separately, contracting tribes are permitted to collect payment from third-party payors-like private insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid-when they provide health care services to covered individuals.Question Presented: Whether IHS must pay "contract support costs" not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe's expenditure of income collected from third parties.Holding: The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act requires the Indian Health Service to pay the contract support costs that a tribe incurs when it collects and spends program income (i.e., revenue from third-party payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers) to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to it from IHS in a self-determination contract.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent in 23-253: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C. For Respondent in 23-250: Lloyd B. Miller, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Texas v. New Mexico | Case No. 141, Orig. | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATE TO THE THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER: The United States excepts to the Special Master's recommendation that the States' joint motion to enter a consent decree be granted.Holding: Because the proposed consent decree would dispose of the United States’ Compact claims without its consent, the States’ motion to enter the consent decree is denied.Result: Exception sustained.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For United States, as intervenor: Ann O'Connell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For plaintiff: Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General of Texas, Austin, Texas. For defendant Colorado: Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General of Colorado, Denver, Colo. For defendant New Mexico: Marcus J. Rael, Jr., Albuquerque, N.M.

Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Trevino | Case No. 22-1025 | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:In Nieves v. Bartlett, this Court held that probable cause does not bar a retaliatory arrest claim against a "police officer" when a plaintiff shows "that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been." 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). The circuits admittedly disagree on whether only specific examples of non-arrests, Pet. App. 28-29 (5th Cir. 2022), or any "objective proof of retaliatory treatment" can satisfy this standard, Lund v. City of Rockford, 956 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 62 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, a 72-year-old councilwoman organized a petition criticizing a city manager, and unwittingly placed it in her binder during a council meeting. Two months later, Respondents-the city manager's allies- engineered her arrest for tampering with a government record. That charge has no precedent involving similar conduct, was supported by an affidavit based on the councilwoman's viewpoints, and skirted ordinary procedures to ensure her jailing. The councilwoman sued Respondents but no arresting officer.Question Presented: Whether the Nieves probable cause exception can be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened.Whether the Nieves probable cause rule is limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests.Holding: In requiring Petitioner Sylvia Gonzalez to provide specific comparator evidence to support her retaliatory arrest claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit did not properly apply the principles of Nieves v. Barlett.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Per curiam opinion. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Anya A. Bidwell, Arlington, Va. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Murthy v. Missouri | Case No. 23-411 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether Respondents have Article III standing; Whether the government's challenged conduct transformed private social-media companies' content-moderation decisions into state action and violated Respondents' First Amendment rights; and Whether the terms and breadth of the preliminary injunction are proper.Holding: Respondents, two states and five individual social media users who sued executive branch officials and agencies, alleging that the government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment, lack Article Ill standing to seek an injunction.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.

Oral Argument: Diaz v. United States | Case No. 23-14 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides: "In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone." Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).Question Presented: In a prosecution for drug trafficking-where an element of the offense is that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs-does Rule 704(b) permit a governmental expert witness to testify that most couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters?Holding: Expert testimony that "most people" in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about "the defendant" and thus does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo | Case No. 22-842 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Bantam Books v. Sullivan held that a state commission with no formal regulatory power violated the First Amendment when it "deliberately set out to achieve the suppression of publications" through "informal sanctions," including the "threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation." 372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963). Respondent here, wielding enormous regulatory power as the head of New York's Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), applied similar pressure tactics-including backchannel threats, ominous guidance letters, and selective enforcement of regulatory infractions-to induce banks and insurance companies to avoid doing business with Petitioner, a gun rights advocacy group. App. 199-200 ¶ 21. Respondent targeted Petitioner explicitly based on its Second Amendment advocacy, which DFS's official regulatory guidance deemed a "reputational risk" to any financial institution serving the NRA. Id. at 199, n.16. The Second Circuit held such conduct permissible as a matter of law, reasoning that "this age of enhanced corporate social responsibility" justifies regulatory concern about "general backlash" against a customer's political speech. Id. at 29-30.Question Presented: Does the First Amendment allow a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government's own hostility to the speaker's viewpoint or (b) a perceived "general backlash" against the speaker's advocacy?Holding: The NRA plausibly alleged that former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services Maria Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA's gun-promotion advocacy.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch and Justice Jackson each filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: David D. Cole, Washington, D.C. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Garland v. Cargill | Case No. 22-976 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Since 1986, Congress has prohibited the transfer or possession of any new "machinegun." 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5801 et seq., defines a "machinegun" as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The statutory definition also encompasses "any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun." Ibid. A "bump stock" is a device designed and intended to permit users to convert a semiautomatic rifle so that the rifle can be fired continuously with a single pull of the trigger, discharging potentially hundreds of bullets per minute. In 2018, after a mass shooting in Las Vegas carried out using bump stocks, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) published an interpretive rule concluding that bump stocks are machineguns as defined in Section 5845(b). In the decision below, the en banc Fifth Circuit held that the ATF rule was unlawful because the statutory definition of "machinegun" does not encompass bump stocks.Question Presented: Whether a bump stock device is a "machinegun" as defined in 26 U.S.C. 5845(b) because it is designed and intended for use in converting a rifle into a machinegun, i.e., into a weapon that fires "automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger."Holding: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a rule that classifies a bump stock as a "machinegun" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski | Case No. 23-3 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 5/23/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, should an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?Holding: Where parties have agreed to two contracts, one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts, a court must decide which contract governs.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: David J. Harris, Jr., San Diego, Cal.

Oral Argument: McIntosh v. United States | Case No. 22-7386 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 4/17/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a district court may enter a criminal forfeiture order outside the time limitations set forth in Rule 32.2, Fed.R.Crim.P.?Holding: A district court's failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B)'s requirement to enter a preliminary order imposing criminal forfeiture before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Steven Y. Yurowitz, New York, N. Y. For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. | Case No. 22-529 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: At least thirteen states have, enacted laws requiring mortgage lenders to pay a minimum interest rate on funds held in mortgage escrow accounts. Congress has since recognized the existence of these state escrow-interest laws and has expressly required national banks to comply with them where applicable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639d(g)(3).Question Presented: Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit failed to analyze whether New York's interest-on-escrow law is preempted as applied to national banks in a manner consistent with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.) For Respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton | Case No. 22-555 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Date Decided: 7/1/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Throughout our Nation's history, the First Amendment's freedoms of speech and press have protected private entities' rights to choose whether and how to publish and disseminate speech generated by others. E.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570, 575 (1995); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974). Over two decades ago, this Court held there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to" speech disseminated on "the Internet." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). Today, many Internet websites publish and disseminate curated collections of expression generated by themselves and others. Nevertheless, the State of Texas-much like Florida before it-has enacted a viewpoint-, content-, and speaker-based law (House Bill 20 or "HB20") targeting certain disfavored "social media" websites. HB20 Section 7 prohibits these websites from making editorial choices based on "viewpoint." And HB20 Section 2 imposes on these websites burdensome operational and disclosure requirements, chilling their editorial choices. This Court has already ensured once that Respondent cannot enforce this law against Petitioners' members. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 142 S. Ct. 1715, 1715-16 (2022).Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-, content-, or speaker-based laws restricting select websites from engaging in editorial choices about whether, and how, to publish and disseminate speech-or otherwise burdening those editorial choices through onerous operational and disclosure requirements.Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-277).Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: Moody v. NetChoice, LLC | Case No. 22-277 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Case No. 7/1/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Florida has enacted a law that attempts to prevent social-media companies from abusing their enormous power to censor speech.Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring that social-media companies host third-party communications, and from regulating the time, place, and manner in which they do so. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring social-media companies to notify and provide an explanation to their users when they censor the user's speech.Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-555).Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: For Petitioners: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.For Respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy | Case No. 22-1078 | Date Argued: 2/21/2024 | Date Decided: 5/9/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether, under the discovery accrual rule applied by the Circuit Courts and the Copyright Act's statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. §507(b), a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit.Holding: The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Joe Wesley Earnhardt, New York, N.Y.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Ohio v. EPA | Case No. 23A349 | Date Argued: 2/21/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/2024 Case consolidated with Kinder Morgan, Inc. v. EPA, Case No. 23A350, American Forest & Paper Assn. v. EPA, Case No. 23A351 and U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, Case No. 23A384.Link to Docket: Here.Holding: The enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency's federal implementation plan against the applicant states, whose own state implementation plans were determined by EPA to be inadequate because they failed to adequately address certain obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision, shall be stayed pending disposition of the applicants' petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought.Result: Application for stay granted.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For state applicants: Mathura J. Sridharan, Deputy Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio. For industry applicants: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For state Respondents: Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS | Case No. 22-1008 | Date Argued: 2/20/2024 | Date Decided: 7/1/2024 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Petitioner Corner Post, Inc. is a convenience store and truck stop in North Dakota that first opened for business in 2018. In 2021, Corner Post sued the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging a Board rule adopted in 2011 that governs certain fees for debit-card transactions. The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims were barred by 28 U.S.C. §2401 (a)'s six-year statute of limitations. In so doing, it adopted the majority position in an acknowledged circuit split on when APA claims "first accrue[]" under §2401(a). The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims "first accrue[d]" when the Board issued the rule in 2011-even though Corner Post did not open for business until seven years later. As a result, Corner Post's limitations period expired in 2017-a year before it opened for business. The court did not explain how Corner Post could have "suffer[ed] legal wrong" from or been "adversely affected or aggrieved by" the Board's rule-a predicate to stating an APA claim, 5 U.S.C. §702-before Corner Post accepted even one debit-card payment subject to the rule.Question Presented: Does a plaintiff's APA claim "first accrue[]" under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) when an agency issues a rule-regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date (as the Eighth Circuit and five other circuits have held)-or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to "suffer[] legal wrong" or be "adversely affected or aggrieved" (as the Sixth Circuit has held)?Holding: An Administrative Procedure Act claim does not accrue for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), the default 6-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States, until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Bryan K. Weir, Arlington, Va. For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC | Case No. 23-51 | Date Argued: 2/20/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Federal Arbitration Act exempts the "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The First and Seventh Circuits have held that this exemption applies to any member of a class of workers that is engaged in foreign or interstate commerce in the same way as seamen and railroad employees-that is, any worker "actively engaged" in the interstate transportation of goods. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have added an additional requirement: The worker's employer must also be in the "transportation industry."Question Presented: To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?Holding: A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal. For Respondents: Traci L. Lovitt, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Trump v. Anderson | Case No. 23-719 | Date Argued: 2/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Supreme Court of Colorado held that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President because he "engaged in insurrection" against the Constitution of the United States-and that he did so after taking an oath "as an officer of the United States" to "support" the Constitution. The state supreme court ruled that the Colorado Secretary of State should not list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. The state supreme court stayed its decision pending United States Supreme Court review.Question Presented: Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?Holding: Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the states, responsible for enforcing Section 3 of the 14th Amendment against federal officeholders and candidates, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in ordering former President Donald Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot.Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per curiam opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex. For Respondents Anderson, et al.: Jason C. Murray, Denver, Colo. For Respondent Griswold: Shannon W. Stevenson, Solicitor General, Denver, Colo.

Oral Argument: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Serv. v. Kirtz | Case No. 22-846 | Argument Date: 11/6/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.Holding: A consumer may sue a federal agency under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 16810 for defying the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Nandan M. Joshi, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce | Case No. 22-1219 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Magnuson-Stevens Act ("MSA'') governs fishery management in federal waters. It states that, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") may require fishing vessels to carry federal observers who enforce the agency's regulations. Congress appropriates funds for these observers. In three circumstances absent here, but not elsewhere, the MSA allows federal observers to be paid in some manner by the regulated party. Deeming annual Congressional appropriations for the federal observers insufficient, the agency asserted a right to force the fishing vessels into contracts to pay the federal observers. The First Circuit approved this practice without stating whether its conclusion was a "product of Chevron step one or step two." It held the mere fact that the MSA provides for federal observers gave the agency carte blanche to charge the regulated party for those observers. Neither Chevron nor the MSA provision allowing measures "necessary and appropriate" to enforce the statute allows this result.Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo | Case No. 22-451 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Case consolidated with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, Case No. 22-1219.Link to Docket: Here.Background: The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishery management in federal waters and provides that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may require vessels to "carry" federal observers onboard to enforce the agency's myriad regulations. Given that space onboard a fishing vessel is limited and valuable, that alone is an extraordinary imposition. But in three narrow circumstances not applicable here, the MSA goes further and requires vessels to pay the salaries of the federal observers who oversee their operations-although, with the exception of foreign vessels that enjoy the privilege of fishing in our waters, the MSA caps the costs of those salaries at 2-3% of the value of the vessel's haul. The statutory question underlying this petition is whether the agency can also force a wide variety of domestic vessels to foot the bill for the salaries of the monitors they must carry to the tune of 20% of their revenues. Under well-established principles of statutory construction, the answer would appear to be no, as the express grant of such a controversial power in limited circumstances forecloses a broad implied grant that would render the express grant superfluous. But a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit answered yes under Chevron on the theory that statutory silence produced an ambiguity that justified deferring to the agency.Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Case No. 22-1165 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Section l0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. To that end, SEC Rule l0b-5 declares it unlawful to make an untrue statement or omit a material fact "necessary" to make an affirmative statement "not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). A violation of this requirement can give rise to a private claim-a judicially implied private right of action that this Court has construed narrowly. Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K calls for additional disclosures under a different standard. Item 303 is an administrative rule that requires a company to disclose known trends or uncertainties that are likely to have a material impact on its financial position, regardless of whether the company had made any statements that would otherwise be misleading.Question Presented: Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding-in conflict with the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 can support a private claim under Section l0(b), even in the absence of an otherwise-misleading statement.Holding: Pure omissions are not actionable under SEC Rule 10b-5(b), which makes it unlawful to omit material facts in connection with buying or selling securities when that omission renders "statements made" misleading.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Linda T. Coberly, Chicago, Ill. For Respondent Moab Partners, L.P.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Devillier v. Texas | Case No. 22-913 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/16/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, this Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was "self-executing" and that "[s]tatutory recognition was not necessary" for claims for just compensation because they "are grounded in the Constitution itself[.]" 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). Since First English, several state courts of last resort have held that the self-executing nature of the Takings Clause requires them to entertain claims directly under the Clause without the need for statutory authorization. Two federal Circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, disagree and have held that claims for just compensation are only available if they are legislatively authorized.Question Presented: May a person whose property is taken without compensation seek redress under the self-executing Takings Clause even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action?Holding: Owners of property north of U.S. Interstate Highway 10 adversely affected by the flood evacuation barrier constructed by Texas should be permitted on remand to pursue their takings clause claims through the cause of action available under Texas law.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Robert J. McNamara, Arlington, Va.For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Smith v. Arizona | Case No. 22-899 | Date Argued: 1/10/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independent opinion and the analyst's statements are offered not for their truth but to explain the expert's opinion, and (b) the defendant did not independently seek to subpoena the analyst.Holding: When an expert conveys an absent lab analyst's statements in support of the expert's opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth, and thus implicate the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and IV. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed opinions concurring in part. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Hari Santhanam, Chicago, Ill. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Alexander W. Samuels, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.

Oral Argument: United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC | Case No. 22-1238 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Section 1004(a) of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.115-72, Div. B, 131 Stat. 1232 (28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018)), amended the schedule of quarterly fees payable to the United States Trustee in certain pending bankruptcy cases. In Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), this Court held that that provision contravened Congress's constitutional authority to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies," U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4, because it was initially applied only in the 88 federal judicial districts that have United States Trustees but not in the 6 districts that have Bankruptcy Administrators. This Court left open the question of "the appropriate remedy" for the violation. Siegel, 142 S. Ct. at 1783.Question Presented: Whether the appropriate remedy for the constitutional uniformity violation found by this Court in Siegel, supra, is to require the United States Trustee to grant retrospective refunds of the increased fees paid by debtors in United States Trustee districts during the period of disuniformity, or is instead either to deem sufficient the prospective remedy adopted by Congress or to require the collection of additional fees from a much smaller number of debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator districts.Holding: Prospective parity (i.e., requiring equal fees for otherwise identical Chapter 11 debtors going forward) is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel v. Fitzgerald.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. "Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex.

Oral Argument: Sheetz v. County of El Dorado | Case No. 22-1074 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:George Sheetz applied, to the County of El Dorado, California, for a permit to build a modest manufactured house on his property. Pursuant to legislation enacted by the County, and as the condition of obtaining the permit, Mr. Sheetz was required to pay a monetary exaction of $23,420 to help finance unrelated road improvements. The County demanded payment in spite of the fact that it made no individualized determination that the exaction-a substantial sum for Mr. Sheetz bore an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" to the purported impacts associated with his modest project as required in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Mr. Sheetz challenged the exaction as an unconstitutional condition under Nollan and Dolan. A California trial court upheld the exaction, holding that, because it was authorized by legislation, the exaction was immune from Nollan/Dolan review. In a published decision, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. California's judicially-created exemption from Nollan/Dolan scrutiny for legislative exactions conflicts with the decisions of other federal and state courts across the country, and is in strong tension with this Court's more recent precedents.Question Presented: Whether a permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan and Dolan simply because it is authorized by legislation.Holding: The Fifth Amendment's takings clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul J. Beard, II, Los Angeles, Cal. For Respondent: Aileen M. McGrath, San Francisco, Cal.; and Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: FBI v. Fikre | Case No. 22-1178 | Date Decided: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/19/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Individuals are sometimes removed from the No Fly List during ongoing litigation about their placement on that list. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that an individual's removal from the No Fly List moots a case when the government represents that the individual will not be placed back on the list based on currently available information. In conflict with those decisions, the Ninth Circuit held in this case that Respondent's claims were not moot even though he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he "will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information."Question Presented: Whether Respondent's claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List are moot.Holding: The government failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that Yonas Fikre's removal from the government's No Fly List mooted his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case because its declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Gadeir Abbas, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Campos-Chaves v. Garland | Case No. 22-674 | Date Argued: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24 Host Note: This case was consolidated with Garland v. Singh, Case No. 22-884.Link to Docket: Here.Background: The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a noncitizen who does not appear at a removal hearing shall be ordered removed in absentia, but only if she was provided "written notice required under paragraph (l) or (2) of section 1229(a).'' 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(5)(A). The Act authorizes rescission of an in absentia order if the noncitizen "did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)." Id. § 1229a (b)(5)(C)(ii). Paragraph (1) of section 1229(a) requires a single notice document that contains all the information specified in the statute, including the "time and place" of proceedings. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480-1485 (2021). Paragraph (2) requires notice of the "new time and place" "in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings."Question Presented: If the government serves an initial notice document that does not include the "time and place" of proceedings, followed by an additional document containing that information, has the government provided notice "required under" and "in accordance with para- graph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)" such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen's request to rescind that order?Holding: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper notice for the removal hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed from the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under Section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).Result: Affirmed. Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General: Charles L. McCloud, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner in 22-674 and Respondents in 22-884: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.

Oral Argument: Muldrow v. St. Louis | Case No. 22-193 | Date Argued: 12/6/23 | Date Decided: 4/17/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual" with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Eighth Circuit below followed binding circuit precedent to hold that discriminatory job transfers (and denials of requested transfers) are lawful under Title VII when they do not impose "materially significant disadvantages" on employees.Question Presented: Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees?Holding: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant.Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh each filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian Wolfman, Washington, D.C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Moore v. United States | Case No. 22-800 | Date Argued: 12/5/23 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Beginning with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), this Court's decisions have uniformly held "income," for Sixteenth Amendment purposes, to require realization by the taxpayer. In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit approved taxation of a married couple on earnings that they undisputedly did not realize but were instead retained and reinvested by a corporation in which they are minority shareholders. It held that "realization of income is not a constitutional requirement" for Congress to lay an "income" tax exempt from apportionment. App.12. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit became "the first court in the country to state that an 'income tax' doesn't require that a 'taxpayer has realized income.'" App.38 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).Question Presented: Whether the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states.Holding: The Mandatory Repatriation Tax, "which attributes the realized and undistributed income of an American-controlled foreign corporation to the entity's American shareholders, and then taxes the American shareholders on their portions of that income" does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew M. Grossman, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. | Case No. 23-124 | Date Argued: 12/4/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by nondebtors against nondebtor third parties, without the claimants' consent.Holding: The bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C. For Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Pratik A. Shah, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: SEC v. Jarkesy | Case No. 22-859 | Date Argued: 11/29/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24 Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented: Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment.Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine.Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.Holding: When the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.Result: Affirmed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: S. Michael McColloch, Dallas, Tex.

Oral Argument: Wilkinson v. Garland | Case No. 22-666 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 3/19/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of non-permanent residents who satisfy four eligibility criteria, including "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the applicant's immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Congress stripped courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but expressly preserved their jurisdiction to review "questions of law." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as this Court has already held, this "statutory phrase 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts"—that is, a "mixed question of law and fact." Guerrero-Lasprilla u. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020).Question Presented: Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.Holding: The Immigration Judge's discretionary decision that Situ Kamu Wilkinson failed to satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D)'s "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard for determining eligibility for cancellation of removal is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(D)'s jurisdiction restoring exception for "questions of law"; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit's holding that the IJ's decision was unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) was in error.Result: Reversed in part, Vacated in part, remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jaime A. Santos, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: McElrath v. Georgia | Case No. 22-721 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal on one criminal charge and its verdict of guilty on a different criminal charge arising from the same facts were logically and legally impossible to reconcile. It called the verdicts "repugnant," vacated both of them, and subsequently held that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time on both charges.Question Presented: Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?Holding: The jury's verdict that the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity of malice murder constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury's other verdicts.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Richard A. Simpson, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.

Oral Argument: Brown v. United States | Case No. 22-6389 | Date Argued: 11/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/23/24 Host Note: Case consolidated with Jackson v. United States, Case No. 22-6640.Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.Question Presented: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach?Holding: For purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on certain defendants with three or more previous convictions, a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and III.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner Brown: Jeffrey T. Green, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner Jackson: Andrew Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, Fla. For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Rudisill v. McDonough | Case No. 22-888 | Date Argued: 11/8/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.Holding: Service members who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to 38 U.S.C. § 3695(a)'s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: For Petitioner: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.For Respondent: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: United States v. Rahimi | Case No. 22-915 | Date Argued: 11/7/23 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.Holding: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: J. Matthew Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Amarillo, Tex.

Oral Argument: Vidal v. Elster | Case No. 22-704 | Date Argued: 11/1/23 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Question Presented: Whether the refusal to register a mark under Section 1052(c) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.Holding: The Lanham Act's names clause "which prohibits the registration of a mark that "[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent," does not violate the First Amendment.Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III. Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined that opinion in full; Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined all but Part III; and Justice Barrett joined Parts I, II-A, and II-B. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Kagan joined, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts I, II, and III-B, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Lindke v. Freed | Case No. 22-611 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/24Background: Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office." Question Presented: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.Holding: A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official's social-media page engages in state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the state's behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Victoria R. Ferres, Port Huron, Mich.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Case Info: O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier | Case No. 22-324 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/2024Question Presented: Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.Holding: Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion in Lindke v. Freed.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per Curiam opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Washington, D.C.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)For Respondents: Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford, Cal.

Case Info: Culley v. Marshall | Case No. 22-585 | Date Argued: 10/30/23 | Date Decided: 5/9/24Question Presented: In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.Holding: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the due process clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Case Info: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | Case No. 22-807 | Date Argued: 10/11/23 | Date Decided: 5/23/24Background: The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight-day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job.Questions Presented:Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent?Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case?Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics?Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles?Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?Holding: Because the district court's finding that race predominated in the design of South Carolina's first congressional district was clearly erroneous, the district court's racial-gerrymandering and vote-dilution holdings cannot stand.Result: Reversed in Part, Remanded in Part.Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to all but Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Appellants: John M. Gore, Washington, D.C. For Appellees: Leah C. Aden, New York, N. Y.For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC | Case No. 22-660 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24Background: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv).Question Presented: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?Holding: A whistleblower seeking to invoke the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act must prove that their protected activity was a contributing factor in the employer's unfavorable personnel action, but need not prove that the employer acted with "retaliatory intent."Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)For Respondents: Eugene Scalia, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co. | Case No. 22-500 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24Question Presented: Under federal admiralty law, can a choice of law clause in a maritime contract be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the state whose law is displaced?Holding: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions not applicable in this case.Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Howard J. Bashman, Fort Washington, Pa.

Case Info: Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer | Case No. 22-429 | Date Argued: 10/4/23 | Date Decided: 12/5/23Question Presented: Does a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act "tester" have Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation?Holding: Because Deborah Laufer voluntarily dismissed her pending suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Laufer's case against Acheson is moot.Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson filed opinions concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd. | Case No. 22-448 | Date Argued: 10/3/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 12 U.S.C. 5497, violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 9, Cl. 7, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the CFPB was receiving such funding.Holding: Congress' statutory authorization allowing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the bureau's duties, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(l)-(2), satisfies the appropriations clause.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Pulsifer v. United States | Case No. 22-340 | Date Argued: 10/2/23 | Date Decided: 3/15/24Background: The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).Question Presented: Whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).Holding: A criminal defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(l) only if the defendant satisfies each of the provision's three conditions.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Argument: Tyler v. Hennepin County | Case No. 22-166 | Date Argued: 4/26/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023

Oral Argument: Yegiazaryan v. Smagin | Case No. 22-381 | Date Argued: 4/25/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: Lac du Flambeau Band v. Coughlin | Case No. 22-227 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023

Oral Argument: Dupree v. Younger | Case No. 22-210 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023

Oral Argument: Counterman v. Colorado | Case No. 22-138 | Date Argued: 4/19/2023 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023

Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu Inc. | Case No. 21-1326 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023

Oral Argument: Groff v. DeJoy | Case No. 22-174 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023

Oral Argument: Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani | Case No. 22-200 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023

Oral Argument: Pugin v. Garland | Case No. 22-23 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: Samia v. United States | Case No. 22-196 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Smith v. United States | Case No. 21-1576 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023

Oral Argument: Lora v. United States | Case No. 22-49 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023

Oral Argument: United States v. Hansen | Case No. 22-179 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi | Case No. 21-757 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Karcho Polselli v. IRS | Case No. 21-1599 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products | Case No. 22-148 | Date Argued: 3/22/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023

Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski | Case No. 22-105 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. | Case No. 21-1043 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023

Oral Argument: Arizona v. Navajo Nation | Case No. 21-1484 | Date Argued: 3/20/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: New York v. New Jersey Oral Argument | Case No. 156-Orig | Date Argued: 3/1/2023 | Date Decided: 4/18/2023

Oral Argument: Deptartment of Education v. Brown | Case No. 22-535 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023

Oral Argument: Biden v. Nebraska | Case No. 22-506 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023

Oral Argument: Dubin v. United States | Case No. 22-10 | Date Argued: 2/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023

Oral Argument: Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh | Case No. 21-1496 | Date Argued: 2/22/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools | Case No. 21-887 | Date Argued: 1/18/2023 | Date Decided: 3/21/2023

Oral Argument: Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States | Case No. 21-1450 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023

Oral Argument: Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 21-1436 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Financial Oversight Board v. CPI | Case No. 22-96 | Date Argued: 1/11/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters | Case No. 21-1449 | Date Argued: 1/10/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023

Oral Argument: OH Adjutant Gen.'s Dept. v. FLRA | Case No. 21-1454 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: In Re Grand Jury | Case No. 21-1397 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023

Oral Argument: Moore v. Harper | Case No. 21-1271 | Date Argued: 12/7/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023

Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health | Case No. 21-1052 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023

Oral Argument: Bartenwerfer v. Buckley | Case No. 21-908 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023

Oral Argument: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC | Case No. 21-1270 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023

Oral Argument: 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis | Case No. 21-476 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023

Oral Argument: Wilkins v. United States | Case No. 21-1164 | Date Argued: 11/30/2022 | Date Decided: 3/28/2023

Oral Argument: United States v. Texas | Case No. 22-58 | Date Argued: 11/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Percoco v. United States | Case No. 21-1158 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Ciminelli v. United States | Case No. 21-1170 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Haaland v. Brackeen | Case No. 21-376 | Date Argued: 11/9/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023

Oral Argument: Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. | Case No. 21-1168 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023

Oral Argument: Health and Hospital Corp. v. Talevski | Case No. 21-806 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023

Oral Argument: SEC v. Cochran | Case No. 21-1239 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/13/2023

Oral Argument: Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC | Case No. 21-86 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/14/2023

Oral Argument: Bittner v. United States | Case No. 21-1195 | Date Argued: 11/2/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023

Oral Argument: Jones v. Hendrix | Case No. 21-857 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: Cruz v. Arizona | Case No. 21-846 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023

Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. UNC | Case No. 21-707 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023

Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard | Case No. 20-1199 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023

Oral Argument: Helix Energy Solutions v. Hewitt | Case No. 21-984 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023

Oral Argument: Andy Warhol Found., Inc. v. Goldsmith | Case No. 21-869 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023

Oral Argument: Reed v. Goertz | Case No. 21-442 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023

Oral Argument: National Pork Producers v. Ross | Case No. 21-468 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023

Oral Argument: Merrill v. Milligan | Case No. 21-1086 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023

Oral Argument: Arellano v. McDonough | Case No. 21-432 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023

Oral Argument: Sackett v. EPA | Case No. 21-454 | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023

Oral Argument: Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin | Case No. 145-Orig | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta | Case No. 21-429 | Date Argued: 4/27/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022Question Presented: 1. Whether a State has authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country. 2. Whether McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), should be overruled.Holding: The Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Zachary C. Schauf, Washington, D.C.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

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Biden v. Texas | Case No. 21-954 | Date Argued: 4/26/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022Background: This case concerns the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a former policy of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under which certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. On June 1, 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum terminating MPP. The district court vacated the Secretary's termination decision and remanded the matter to the agency on two grounds: (1) that terminating MPP violates 8 U.S.C. 1225 because DHS lacks capacity to detain all the inadmissible noncitizens it encounters who purportedly must be detained under that provision, and (2) that the Secretary had not adequately explained his decision. The court entered a permanent injunction requiring DHS to reinstate and maintain MPP unless Congress funds sufficient detention capacity for DHS to detain all noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225 and until the agency adequately explained a future termination. On October 29, 2021, after thoroughly reconsidering the matter on remand, the Secretary issued a new decision terminating MPP and providing a comprehensive explanation for the decision. The court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the injunction, endorsing the district court's reading of Section 1225 and holding that the Secretary's new decision could not be considered because it had no legal effect.Question Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. 1225 requires DHS to continue implementing MPP. Whether the court of appeals erred by concluding that the Secretary's new decision terminating MPP had no legal effect.Holding: The Government’s rescission of MPP did not violate section 1225 of the INA, and the October 29 Memoranda constituted final agency action.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined as to all but theLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law....

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. | Case No. 21-418 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022Background: Petitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a football coach at a public high school because he knelt and said a quiet prayer by himself at midfield after the game ended. After considering an interlocutory petition in which Kennedy sought review of the lower courts' refusal to grant him a preliminary injunction, four members of this Court observed that "the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the free speech rights of public school teachers is troubling and may justify review in the future," but concluded that this Court should stay its hand until the lower courts definitively determined the reason for Kennedy's termination. The statement also noted that Kennedy had a then unaddressed claim under the Free Exercise Clause. On remand, the lower courts found-and the school district ultimately agreed-that Kennedy lost his job solely because of his religious expression. Yet the Ninth Circuit nevertheless ruled against him again. The court not only doubled down on its "troubling" free-speech reasoning, which transforms virtually all speech by public-school employees into government speech lacking any First Amendment protection, but reached the remarkable conclusion that, even if Kennedy's prayer was private expression protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses (which it undoubtedly was), the Establishment Clause nevertheless required its suppression. The court denied en banc review over the objection of 11 judges.Question Presented: 1. Whether a public-school employee who says a brief, quiet prayer by himself while at school and visible to students is engaged in government speech that lacks any First Amendment protection. 2. Whether, assuming that such religious expression is private and protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, the Establishment Clause nevertheless compels public schools to prohibit it.Holding: The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined and in which Justice Kavanaugh joined except as to Part IIIâB. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard B. Katskee, Washington, D.C.

Vega v. Tekoh | Case No. 21-499 | Date Argued: 4/20/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), this Court announced a prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. That rule generally prohibits criminal trial courts from admitting into evidence against a criminal defendant any self- incriminating statement made by that defendant while he was in custody, unless the defendant first received certain warnings spelled out in Miranda. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a damages remedy for deprivations of any right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff may state a claim for relief against a law enforcement officer under Section 1983 based simply on an officer's failure to provide the warnings prescribed in Miranda.Holding: A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a §1983 claim.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Paul L. Hoffman, Hermosa Beach, Cal.

Kemp v. United States | Case No. 21-5726 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022Background: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorizes relief from final judgment based on "mistake," as well as inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.Question Presented: The question presented is: Whether Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court's error of law.Holding: The term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

George v. McDonough | Case No. 21-234 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Background: In the veterans-benefits system, Congress has provided that an otherwise-final agency decision is subject to revision if that decision is based on "clear and unmistakable error." Here, the Federal Circuit held that the agency's application of a regulation that conflicts with the plain meaning of a statute cannot amount to "clear and unmistakable error." The Federal Circuit reasoned that a federal court's later invalidation of such a regulation is merely a change in interpretation of the law. But this Court has made clear that when a court interprets the plain meaning of a statute, it is not announcing a change but rather declaring what the statute has always meant. An agency regulation that departs from that plain meaning is — and always was — legally invalid. And if the agency relied on that unlawful regulation in an adjudication, that adjudication is infected with a legal error that is clear and unmistakable on the face of the ruling.Question Presented: When the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denies a veteran's claim for benefits in reliance on an agency interpretation that is later deemed invalid under the plain text of the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the denial, is that the kind of "clear and unmistakable error" that the veteran may invoke to challenge VA's decision?Holding: The invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief based on clear and unmistakable error.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IIâC.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022Question Presented: Whether a state workers' compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities "in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State."Holding: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Wash.

Siegel v. Fitzgerald | Case No. 21-441 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022Background: This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over the constitutionality of a federal statute governing the quarterly fees in large Chapter 11 bankruptcies. The Bankruptcy Clause authorizes Congress to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Notwithstanding this directive, Congress has divided the nation's bankruptcy courts into two distinct programs: 88 judicial districts operate under the U.S. Trustee program, and 6 judicial districts (all in North Carolina and Alabama) operate under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Each program generally performs similar tasks, and each program-until recently-imposed the same quarterly fees on Chapter 11 debtors in their districts. In the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, however, Congress adopted a five-year increase in quarterly fees paid only in U.S. Trustee districts-increasing the maximum fee from $30,000 to $250,000 for all pending cases. 28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018). That same increase was not imposed in Administrator districts until nine months later, and it applied only to cases filed after that date. The result is a wide disparity in fees paid by identically situated debtors based solely on the geographic location of their bankruptcy. The total difference exceeds $100 million in aggregate fees in Chapter 11 cases nationwide. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit (each over dissents) in upholding these non-uniform fees; the Second Circuit has rejected those decisions and declared the 2017 Act unconstitutional.Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in U.S. Trustee districts.Holding: Congress’ enactment of a significant fee increase that exempted debtors in two States violated the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana | Case No. 20-1573 | Date Argued: 3/30/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Background: In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018), this Court held that when parties agree to resolve their disputes by individualized arbitration, those agreements are fully enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Courts are not free to disregard or "reshape traditional individualized arbitration" by applying rules that demand collective or representational adjudication of certain claims. Epic, 138 S.Ct. at 1623. The FAA allows the parties not only to choose arbitration but to retain the benefits of arbitration by maintaining its traditional, bilateral form. While California courts follow Concepcion and Epic when a party to an individualized arbitration agreement tries to assert class-action claims, they refuse to do so when a party to such an agreement asserts representative claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), which — like a class action — allows aggrieved employees to seek monetary awards on a representative basis on behalf of other employees. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). As a result, Concepcion and Epic have not caused bilateral arbitration to flourish in California, as this Court intended, but have merely caused FAA-defying representational litigation to shift form.Question Presented: Whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.Holding: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch joined in which Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Parts I and III and in which Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to Part III. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, inLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Scott L. Nelson, Washington, D.C.

Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety | Case No. 20-603 | Date Argued: 3/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022Background: In the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Congress gave the over 19 million military servicemembers — including over 800,000 who work for state and local government employers — a cause of action to remedy adverse employment actions taken because of their military service. It enacted USERRA pursuant to its constitutional War Powers, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16, recognizing that unremedied employment discrimination by state employers based on military service could interfere with the nation's "ability to provide for a strong national defense." H.R. Rep. No. 105-448, at 5 (1998). USERRA's cause of action against state employers may be pursued only in state courts. In a sharply divided decision that conflicts with the Constitution's text, structure, and history, the court below, a Texas intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over more than 2 million Texas citizens, held that USERRA's cause of action is unconstitutional because Congress lacks the power to authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.Question Presented: Whether Congress has the power to authorize suits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.Holding: By ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty would yield to the national power to raise and support the Armed Forces. Congress may exercise this power to authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in USERRA.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.; and Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon | Case No. 21-309 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022Question Presented: Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that the FAA does not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), this Court held that Section 1 applies only to interstate "transportation workers." The Court did not define the term "transportation worker."Holding: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.

LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | Case No. 20-807 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: [NO INFORMATION]Result: Voting information not foundVoting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not foundLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Colleen E. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: J. Scott Ballenger, Washington, D.C.

Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. | Case No. 21-328 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022Background: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and, in the context of contracts, occurs when one party to a contract either explicitly repudiates its rights under the contract or acts in a manner inconsistent with an intention of exercising them.Question Presented: Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court's instruction that lower courts must "place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?" AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).Holding: The Eighth Circuit erred in conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Federal courts have generally resolved cases like this one as a matter of federal law, using the terminology of waiver. The parties dispute whether that framework is correct. Assuming without deciding that it is, federal courts may not create arbitration-specific variants of federal procedural rules, like those concerning waiver, based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24. That policy “is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind. But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 218–221. The federal policy is about treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration. The text of the FAA makes clear that courts are not to create arbitration-specific procedural rules like the one here. Section 6 of the FAA provides that any application under the statute—including an application to stay litigation or compel arbitration—“shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions” (unless the statute says otherwise). A directive to treat arbitration applications “in the manner provided by law” for all other motions is simply a command to apply the usual federal procedural rules, including any rules relating to a motion’s timeliness. Because the usual federal rule of waiver does not include a prejudice requirement, Section 6 instructs that prejudice is not a condition of finding that a party waived its right to stay litigation or compel arbitration under the FAA. Stripped of its prejudice requirement, the Eighth Circuit’s current waiver inquiry would focus on Sundance’s conduct. Did Sundance knowingly relinquish the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right? On remand, the Court of Appeals may resolve that question, or determine that a different procedural framework (such as forfeiture) is appropriate. The Court’s sole holding today is that it may not make up a new procedural rule based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.”.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Karla A. Gilbride, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C.

Berger v. North Carolina State Conf. of NAACP | Case No. 21-248 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: The leaders of North Carolina's Republican-controlled legislature retained a private attorney to represent them, purportedly on behalf of the State, to defend the constitutionality of North Carolina's voter-ID law. Rather than allowing both Executive Branch officials and legislative leaders to speak on behalf of the State as they did at the district court, the Fourth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the legislative leaders from the case on appeal.Question Presented: Whether a state agent authorized by state law to defend the State's interest in litigation must overcome a presumption of adequate representation to intervene as of right in a case in which a state official is a defendant.Holding: North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: David H. Thompson, Washington, D.C. For NAACP Respondents: Elisabeth S. Theodore, Washington, D.C. For state Respondents: Sarah Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General, Raleigh, N. C.

Egbert v. Boule | Case No. 21-147 | Date Argued: 3/2/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: Bivens does not extend to create causes of action for Boule’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and First Amendment retaliation claim.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Sarah M. Harris, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Felicia H. Ellsworth, Boston, Mass.

Ruan v. United States | Case No. 20-1410 | Date Argued: 3/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022Background: A physician otherwise authorized to prescribe controlled substances may be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) if his prescriptions "fall outside the usual course of professional practice." United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975).Question Presented: Whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted under Section 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he "reasonably believed" or "subjectively intended" that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice.Holding: Section 841’s “knowingly or intentionally” mens rea applies to the statute’s “except as authorized” clause. Once a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was “authorized,” the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IâA, IâB and II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner in 20-1410: Lawrence S. Robbins, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner in 21-5261: Beau B. Brindley, Chicago, Ill. For Respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

West Virginia v. EPA | Case No. 20-1530 | Date Argued: 2/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: [NO INFORMATION]Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For state Petitioners: Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, Charleston, W. Va. For private Petitioners: Jacob M. Roth, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For power company Respondents: Beth S. Brinkmann, Washington, D.C.

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas | Case No. 20-493 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Background: In 1987, following years of negotiation and drafting, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (the "Pueblo") and Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas (together, the "Tribes") secured restoration of their trust relationships with the federal government through the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act ("Restoration Act"). That Act includes a "Gaming Activities" provision that states in relevant part: (a) IN GENERAL.- All gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe ... (b) NO STATE REGULATORY JURISDICTION.-Nothing in this section shall be construed as a grant of civil or criminal regulatory jurisdiction to the State of Texas. In 1994, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Ysleta I") eschewed the Restoration Act's plain language, legislative history, and this Court's governing precedent to grant Texas regulatory jurisdiction over non-prohibited gaming activities on the Tribes' lands. Ysleta I and its progeny effectively read Section 107(b) out of the Restoration Act and deprive the Pueblo of its sovereign authority to regulate its own non-prohibited gaming.Question Presented: Whether the Restoration Act provides the Pueblo with sovereign authority to regulate non-prohibited gaming activities on its lands (including bingo), as set forth in the plain language of Section 107(b), the Act's legislative history, and this Court's holding in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), or whether the Fifth Circuit's decision affirming Ysleta I correctly subjects the Pueblo to all Texas gaming regulations.Holding: The Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Brant C. Martin, Fort Worth, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Denezpi v. United States | Case No. 20-7622 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022Background: In April 2017, a Court of Indian Offenses in Colorado prosecuted petitioner Merle Denezpi for violations of federal regulatory laws and the code of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe. In June 2018, more than a year after sentencing for those offenses, a federal court in Colorado indicted Mr. Denezpi for one count of aggravated sexual abuse. The indictment was based on the same incident for which Mr. Denezpi had been prosecuted and sentenced in the Court of Indian Offenses. Mr. Denezpi moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.Question Presented: Whether the Court of Indian Offenses of Ute Mountain Ute Agency is a federal agency such that a defendant's conviction in that court bars a subsequent prosecution for a federal offense arising out of the same incident.Holding: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined as to Parts I and III.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate | Case No. 21-12 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 5/16/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: 1. Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For appellant: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For appellees: Charles J. Cooper, Washington, D.C.

Concepcion v. United States | Case No. 20-1650 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Kagan and Gorsuch joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Shurtleff v. Boston | Case No. 20-1800 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 5/2/2022Background: Boston creates designated public forums in many contexts, including on City Hall Plaza. Over a twelve-year period, the City approved 284 applications from private organizations to use one of the City's three flagpoles on the Plaza, which the City designated as a public forum for private speech. Boston approved all prior applications, denying none, and exercised no substantive control over the content of these 284 flag raisings. The City rejected only one application, Camp Constitution's request to briefly raise a Christian flag in connection with an event celebrating the civic contributions of Boston's Christian community. Although the City admitted that the flag raisings are private speech, it invoked the Establishment Clause to justify censoring Camp Constitution's Christian viewpoint.Question Presented: Whether the First Circuit's failure to apply this Court's forum doctrine to the City's exclusion of the Christian flag from a city hall flagpole, which was designated as a public forum open to "all applicants" until the City denied access to the Christian flag, is inconsistent with this Court's precedents holding that speech restrictions based on religious viewpoint violate the First Amendment or are otherwise subject to strict scrutiny. Whether the First Circuit's classifying private religious speech as government speech because it occurs on a government flagpole in a public forum, when nothing about the religious speech or the circumstances of the temporary flag display in the forum is attributable to the government, conflicts with this Court's decisions in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Whether the First Circuit's finding that the Establishment Clause justified a city's viewpoint-based exclusion of religious expression from a flagpole forum that was open to "all applicants" conflicts with this Court's precedents in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).Holding: 1. Boston’s flag-raising program does not express government speech.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Mathew Staver, Orlando, Fla.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Washington, D.C.

Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection | Case No. 20-1566 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Background: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 ("FSIA"), provides that where a foreign state or an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state is not entitled to immunity, a federal court should "apply the law of the forum state, including its choice-of-law rules." Here, the foreign state defendant (an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain) seeks to avoid California's choice-of-law rule and instead asks the federal court to apply federal common law.Question Presented: Whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the FSIA must apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law.Holding: In an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state or instrumentality, a court should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Here, that means applying the forum State’s choiceof-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. The FSIA provides a baseline principle of foreign sovereign immunity from civil actions unless a statutory exception applies (including the expropriation exception found to apply here). See §§1604–1607. Yet the FSIA was never “intended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality” deemed amenable to suit. First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 620. To the contrary, Section 1606 of the statute provides: “As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under [the FSIA], the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” When a foreign state is not immune from suit, it is subject to the same rules of liability (the same substantive law) as a private party. See First Nat. City Bank, at 622, n. 11. Section 1606 dictates the selection of a choice-of-law rule: It must mirror the rule that would apply in a similar suit between private parties. Only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee use of the same substantive law—and thus guarantee the same liability. Consider two suits seeking recovery of a painting: one suit against a foreign-statecontrolled museum (as here), the other against a private museum. If the choice-of-law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substantive law chosen. And if the substantive law differed, so might the suits’ outcomes. Contrary to Section 1606, the two museums would not be “liable to the same manner and to the same extent.” In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-oflaw rule—because that is the rule a court would use in comparable private litigation. Consider the just-hypothesized suit against a private museum, brought as this case was in California and asserting 3 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus non-federal claims. If the private suit were filed in state court, California’s choice-of-law rule would govern. And if the private suit were filed in federal court, the same would be true, because a federal court sitting in diversity borrows the forum State’s choice-of-law rule. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496. If California’s choice-of-law rule applies in the private-museum suit, it must also apply in the suit here, against the Foundation. That is the only way to ensure—as Section 1606 demands—that the Foundation, although a Spanish instrumentality, will be liable in the same way as a private party. Even absent the clarity of Section 1606, the Court would likely reach the same result. Scant justification exists for federal common lawmaking in this context. Judicial creation of federal...

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue | Case No. 20-1472 | Date Argued: 1/12/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Background: Section 6330(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code establishes a 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").Question Presented: Whether the time limit in Section 6330(d)(1) is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling.Holding: Section 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due process determination is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Melissa Arbus Sherry, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Gallardo v. Marstiller | Case No. 20-1263 | Date Argued: 1/10/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022Question Presented: Whether the federal Medicaid Act provides for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid's payment of a beneficiary's past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary's tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses.Holding: The Medicaid Act permits a State to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed dissenting opinion in which, Justice Breyer joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Bryan S. Gowdy, Jacksonville, Fla.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.

Shinn v. Ramirez | Case No. 20-1009 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022Question Presented: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), precludes a federal court from considering evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney has failed to diligently develop the claim's factual basis in state court, subject to only two statutory exceptions. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), this Court announced an equitable exception to the procedural default bar, holding that a prisoner may obtain federal habeas review of a defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel if post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it. The Ninth Circuit has held that Martinez also requires an exception to § 2254(e)(2)'s prohibition on expansion of the state-court record in federal court. Does Martinez justify a federal habeas court's disregard of § 2254(e)(2)'s clear prohibition on expanding the state-court record?Holding: Under §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brunn W. Roysden, III, Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz. For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.

Carson v. Makin | Case No. 20-1088 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022Background: In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), this Court held that a state cannot exclude families and schools from participating in a student-aid program because of a school's religious status. The Court expressly declined to address religious use—that is, whether a state may exclude families and schools based on what they plan to do with the money.Question Presented: Does a state violate the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution by prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or "sectarian," instruction?Holding: Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IâB. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Michael Bindas, Seattle, Wash. For Respondent: Christopher C. Taub, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Augusta, Me.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

United States v. Taylor | Case No. 20-1459 | Date Argued: 12/7/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A)'s definition of "crime of violence" excludes attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a).Holding: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed dissenting opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Rebecca Taibleson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.

Hughes v. Northwestern University | Case No. 19-1401 | Date Argued: 12/6/2021 | Date Decided: 1/24/2022Background: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1104, a plan fiduciary must discharge its duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters" would use. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). Petitioners filed a class action alleging that respondents violated their duty of prudence by: (1) failing to monitor and control recordkeeping fees, resulting in unreasonably high costs to plan participants; (2) offering retail class mutual funds with higher fees than those charged by otherwise identical share classes of the same funds; and (3) offering options with unnecessary fees when other options with lower costs and identical investment guarantees were available to the plan fiduciaries.Question Presented: Whether allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for alternative available investment products or services are sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).Holding: The Seventh Circuit erred in relying on the participants’ ultimate choice over their investments to excuse allegedly imprudent decisions by respondents. Determining whether petitioners state plausible claims against plan fiduciaries for violations of ERISA’s duty of prudence requires a context-specific inquiry of the fiduciaries’ continuing duty to monitor investments and to remove imprudent ones as articulated in Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U. S. 523. Tibble concerned allegations that plan fiduciaries had offered “higher priced retail-class mutual funds as Plan investments when materially identical lower priced institutional-class mutual funds were available.” Id., at 525–526. The Tibble Court concluded that the plaintiffs had identified a potential violation with respect to certain funds because “a fiduciary is required to conduct a regular review of its investment.” Id., at 528. Tibble’s discussion of the continuing duty to monitor plan investments applies here. Petitioners allege that respondents’ failure to monitor investments prudently—by retaining recordkeepers that charged excessive fees, offering options likely to confuse investors, and neglecting to provide cheaper and otherwise-identical alternative investments—resulted in respondents failing to remove imprudent investments from the menu of investment offerings. In rejecting petitioners’ allegations, the Seventh Circuit did not apply Tibble’s guidance but instead erroneously focused on another component of the duty of prudence: a fiduciary’s obligation to assemble a diverse menu of options. But respondents’ provision of an adequate array of investment choices, including the lower cost investments plaintiffs wanted, does not excuse their allegedly imprudent decisions. Even in a defined-contribution plan where participants choose their investments, Tibble instructs that plan fiduciaries must conduct their own independent evaluation to determine which investments may be prudently included in the plan’s menu of options. See id., at 529–530. If the fiduciaries fail to remove an imprudent investment from the plan within a reasonable time, they breach their duty. The Seventh Circuit’s exclusive focus on investor choice elided this aspect of the duty of prudence. The court maintained the same mistaken focus in rejecting petitioners’ claims with respect to recordkeeping fees on the grounds that plan participants could have chosen investment options with lower expenses. The Court vacates the judgment below so that the Seventh Circuit may reevaluate the allegations as a whole, considering whether petitioners have plausibly alleged a violation of the duty of...

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health | Case No. 19-1392 | Date Argued: 12/1/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022Question Presented: Whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional. Whether the validity of a pre-viability law that protects women's health, the dignity of unborn children, and the integrity of the medical profession and society should be analyzed under Casey's "undue burden" standard or Hellerstedt's balancing of benefits and burdens. Whether abortion providers have third-party standing to invalidate a law that protects women from the dangers of late-term abortions by restricting inhumane dismemberment abortions.Holding: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, filedLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General, Jackson, Miss. For Respondents: Julie Rikelman, New York, N.Y.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Cummings v. Premier Rehab | Case No. 20-219 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022Background: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin, and provides that victims of discrimination may recover compensatory damages for intentional violations. This Court has interpreted Title VI's implied private right of action as providing victims of intentional discrimination compensatory, but not punitive, damages. Congress has expressly incorporated Title VI's remedial scheme into other statutes that prohibit recipients of federal funds from discriminating on other grounds, including disability.Question Presented: Whether the compensatory damages available under Title VI and the statutes that incorporate its remedial scheme include compensation for emotional distress.Holding: Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew Rozynski, New York, N.Y.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra | Case No. 20-1114 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Question Presented: Whether Chevron deference permits HHS to set reimbursement rates based on acquisition cost and vary such rates by hospital group if it has not collected hospital acquisition cost survey data. Whether petitioners' suit challenging HHS's adjustments is precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12), which bars judicial review of "the development of the [outpatient prospective payment] classification system," "the establishment of" various groups of outpatient services, and "adjustments" pursuant to certain provisions of the statute.Holding: 1. The statute does not preclude judicial review of HHS’s reimbursement rates. Judicial review of final agency action is traditionally available unless “a statute’s language or structure” precludes it, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, 486, and this Court has long recognized a “strong presumption” in its favor, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___. Here, no provision in the Medicare statute precludes judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates. HHS cites two nearby provisions that preclude review of the general payment methodology that HHS employs to set rates for other Medicare outpatient services. See §§1395l(t)(12)(A), (C). But HHS sets rates for outpatient prescription drugs using a different payment methodology. HHS also argues that other statutory requirements would make allowing judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates impractical. Regardless, such arguments cannot override the text of the statute and the traditional presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation | Case No. 20-1312 | Date Argued: 11/29/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022Background: The Medicare statute provides that a hospital that serves a "significantly disproportionate number of low-income patients" is entitled to an upward adjustment in the rate at which the federal government reimburses the hospital for services provided to Medicare patients. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i)(I), (ii). That adjustment-known as a "disproportionate share hospital" (DSH) adjustment-requires a determination of the percentage of the hospital's patients who are eligible for Medicaid, the low-income healthcare program.Question Presented: Whether the Secretary has permissibly included in a hospital's Medicare fraction all of the hospital's patient days of individuals who satisfy the requirements to be entitled to Medicare Part A benefits, regardless of whether Medicare actually paid the hospital for those particular days.Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to [Medicare Part A] benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Daniel J. Hettich, Washington, D.C.

Austin v. Reagan National Advertising | Case No. 20-1029 | Date Argued: 11/10/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Background: Austin sign code provisions distinguish between on-premise and off-premise signs based solely on location—specifically, whether a sign is located at the same location as the business, person, activity, goods, products, or services being advertised. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, this Court held that, because the Gilbert sign code "single[d] out specific subject matter for differential treatment," it was content-based regardless of the government's purpose. 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015).Question Presented: Is the city code's distinction between on- and off-premise signs a facially unconstitutional content-based regulation under Reed v. Town of Gilbert?Holding: The City’s on-/off-premises distinction is facially content neutral under the First Amendment.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.; and Benjamin Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

United States v. Vaello-Madero | Case No. 20-303 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Question Presented: Whether Congress violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income—a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind, and disabled individuals—in the 50 States and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not extending it to Puerto Rico.Holding: The Constitution does not require Congress to extend SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1, and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U. S. 651, the Court applied the deferential rational-basis test to uphold Congress’s decision not to extend certain federal benefits to Puerto Rico, noting that because Congress chose to treat residents of Puerto Rico differently from residents of the States for purposes of tax laws, it could do the same for benefits programs. Those two precedents dictate the result here. Congress’s decision to exempt Puerto Rico’s residents from most federal income, gift, estate, and excise taxes supplies a rational basis for likewise distinguishing residents of Puerto Rico from residents of the States for purposes of the SSI benefits program. Vaello Madero’s contrary position would usher in potentially far-reaching consequences, with serious implications for the Puerto Rican people and the Puerto Rican economy. The Constitution does not require that extreme outcome.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Hermann Ferre, New York, N.Y.

Ramirez v. Collier | Case No. 21-5592 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022Question Presented: Under the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), if a prisoner requests a religious accommodation that the state rejects, must the prisoner prove that the state has substantially burdened his religious exercise, or does the state need to prove that its denial of the religious accommodation satisfies strict scrutiny?Holding: Ramirez is likely to succeed on his RLUIPA claims because Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s compelling interests.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Seth Kretzer, Houston, Tex. For United States, as amicus curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. | Case No. 20-915 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 2/24/2022Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit err in breaking with its own prior precedent and the findings of other circuits and the Copyright Office in holding that 17 U.S.C. § 411 requires referral to the Copyright Office where there is no indicia of fraud or material error as to the work's registrability, but rather only good-faith mistakes in the registration application?Holding: Section 411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact; lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under §411(b)(1)(A)’s safe harbor.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.; and Melissa N. Patterson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Peter K. Stris, Los Angeles, Cal.

FBI v. Fazaga | Case No. 20-828 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022Background: Section 1806 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., governs the "[u]se of information" obtained or derived from electronic surveillance conducted under FSIA. Section 1806(c) requires the government to notify a person of its intent to use or disclose such information against that person in a judicial or administrative proceeding in specified circumstances.Question Presented: Whether Section 1806(f) displaces the state-secrets privilege and authorizes a district court to resolve, in camera and ex parte, the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of government surveillance by considering the privileged evidence.Holding: Section 1806(f) does not displace the state secrets privilege.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Agent Respondents: Catherine M.A. Carroll, Washington, D.C. For Respondents Fazaga, et al.: Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Los Angeles, Cal.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen | Case No. 20-843 | Date Argued: 11/3/2021 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: New York prohibits its ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying a handgun outside the home without a license, and it denies licenses to every citizen who fails to convince the state that he or she has "proper cause" to carry a firearm. In District of Columbia v. Heller, this Court held that the Second Amendment protects "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), and in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that this right "is fully applicable to the States," 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).Question Presented: Whether the Second Amendment allows the government to prohibit ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying handguns outside the home for self-defense.Holding: New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and KaganLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.; and Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson | Case No. 20-804 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022Question Presented: Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member's speech?Holding: Mr. Wilson does not possess an actionable First Amendment claim arising from the Board’s purely verbal censure.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Richard A. Morris, Houston, Tex.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: MIchael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

Badgerow v. Walters | Case No. 20-1143 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/31/2022Background: This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important jurisdictional question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). When parties to an arbitration seek to confirm, vacate, or modify their award under Sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA, those provisions do not themselves create federal jurisdiction. Instead, there must be an independent jurisdictional basis for federal courts to act. This Court has established that there is no "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 of the FAA absent complete diversity between the parties. But the circuits are hopelessly split on whether there is "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 for federal question cases. This case asks a straightforward question: Does the "look through" approach to federal jurisdiction apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitration awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA?Question Presented: Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question.Holding: Vaden’s “look-through” approach to determining federal jurisdiction does not apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson | Case No. 21-463 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021Background: The State of Texas adopted a law banning abortions at approximately six weeks of pregnancy, in clear violation of this Court's precedent. Rather than forthrightly defending the constitutionality of the law, or even the propriety of a state court enforcement proceeding, Texas crafted an unprecedented enforcement scheme that was designed to evade judicial review and shield this unconstitutional statute from the normal mechanisms by which state officials would otherwise have to enforce it. This state of affairs should not be tolerated in our federal system, especially where the rights at issue are explicitly protected by the Federal Constitution.Question Presented: Whether a State can insulate from federal-court review a law that prohibits the exercise of a constitutional right by delegating to the general public the authority to enforce that prohibition through civil actions.Holding: The order of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded. ___F. Supp. 3d ___, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. JUSTICE GORSUCH announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part II–C, concluding that a pre-enforcement challenge to S. B. 8 under the Federal Constitution may proceed past the motion to dismiss stage against certain of the named defendants but not others.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch, announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part IIâC. Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined that opinion in full and Justice Thomas joined except for Part IIâC. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Marc A. Hearron, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

United States v. Texas | Case No. 21-588 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021Question Presented: THE APPLICATION IS TREATED AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: MAY THE UNITED STATES BRING SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT AND OBTAIN INJUNCTIVE OR DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE, STATE COURT JUDGES, STATE COURT CLERKS, OTHER STATE OFFICIALS, OR ALL PRIVATE PARTIES TO PROHIBIT S.B. 8 FROM BEING ENFORCED.Holding: Dismissed as Improvidently GrantedResult: Voting information not foundVoting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not foundLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For state Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For private Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

United States v. Tsarnaev | Case No. 20-443 | Date Argued: 10/13/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that respondent's capital sentences must be vacated on the ground that the district court, during its 21-day voir dire, did not ask each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard, or seen about respondent's case. Whether the district court committed reversible error at the penalty phase of respondent's trial by excluding evidence that respondent's older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which respondent was convicted.Holding: The Court of Appeals improperly vacated Dzhokhar’s capital sentences.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined except as to Part IIâC.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Ginger D. Anders, Washington, D.C.

Thompson v. Clark | Case No. 20-659 | Date Argued: 10/12/2021 | Date Decided: 4/4/2022Question Presented: I. Whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has "formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020); or that the proceeding "ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2018); or that the proceeding terminated without a conviction, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and several other circuits have held. II. Whether, if the Supreme Court adopts the "affirmative indication of innocence" standard, the withdrawal of criminal charges suffices to satisfy that rule.Holding: To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for purposes of the Fourth Amendment claim under §1983 for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff need not show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence. A plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Thompson has satisfied that requirement here.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Amir H. Ali, Washington, D.C.; and Jonathan Y. Ellis, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: John D. Moore, New York, N.Y.

United States v. Zubaydah | Case No. 20-827 | Date Argued: 10/6/2021 | Date Decided: 3/3/2022Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred when it rejected the United States' assertion of the state-secrets privilege based on the court's own assessment of potential harm to the national security, and required discovery to proceed further under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a) against former Central Intelligence Agency contractors on matters concerning alleged clandestine CIA activities.Holding: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 938 F. 3d 1123, reversed and remanded. JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but Parts II–B–2 and III, concluding that, in the context of Zubaydah’s §1782 discovery application, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state secrets privilege did not apply to information that could confirm or deny the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 4-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts II-B-2 and III. Chief Justice Roberts joined that opinion in full, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to all but Part II-B-2, Justice Kagan joined as to all but Parts III and IV and the judgment of dismissal and Justices Thomas and Alito joined Part IV. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: David F. Klein, Washington, D.C.

Hemphill v. New York | Case No. 20-637 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 1/20/2022Background: A litigant's argumentation or introduction of evidence at trial is often deemed to "open the door" to the admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence. In People v. Reid, the New York Court of Appeals announced an "open door" rule of constitutional dimension, separate and apart from the traditional evidentiary rule. Under this rule, a criminal defendant who, in the court's view, "opened the door" to responsive evidence, may thereby forfeit hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections that would otherwise preclude admission of the responsive evidence. The New York court has applied that rule even where it rests on an accused's truthful trial arguments or evidence; the accused has not engaged in a course of conduct suggesting that the right to object to responsive evidence would be abused; nor, indeed, the accused has done anything that could be construed as a knowing waiver of constitutional protections.Question Presented: Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant who opens the door to responsive evidence also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause.Holding: The trial court’s admission of the transcript of Morris’ plea allocution over Hemphill’s objection violated Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For Respondent: Gina Mignola, Assistant District Attorney, Bronx, N.Y.

Brown v. Davenport | Case No. 20-826 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Background: In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the test for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless on habeas review is whether the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the verdict. Later, in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that, in addition to satisfying Brecht, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). AEDPA provides that federal courts cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law."Question Presented: May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the Brecht test is satisfied, or must the court also find that the state court's Chapman application was unreasonable under AEDPA?Holding: [NO INFORMATION]Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich. For Respondent: Tasha Bahal, Boston, Mass.

Wooden v. United States | Case No. 20-5279 | Date Argued: 10/4/2021 | Date Decided: 3/7/2022Question Presented: 1. Did the warrantless entry and search of petitioner's home violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal search and seizure? 2. Were petitioner Wooden's prior convictions for ten burglaries committed during a single criminal episode at a storage facility "committed on occasions different from one another" under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA")?Holding: Wooden’s ten burglary offenses arising from a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one prior conviction for purposes of ACCA.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined and in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined as to all but Part IIâB. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts II, III and IV.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.