Oral Argument: Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022
Oral Argument: Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022  
Podcast: SCOTUS Oral Arguments and Opinions
Published On: Mon Apr 25 2022
Description: Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law....