On June 9, 2020, Mr. Burke-Whittaker attended a funeral for Dimarjo Jenkins, who had been shot and killed on a street in downtown Toronto on May 26, 2020. The funeral took place at a restaurant in North York. The parking lot behind the restaurant backed onto Highway 401. Late on the evening of the viewing, a vehicle driving on Highway 401 pulled onto the shoulder of the westbound lanes behind the restaurant. Someone in the car started firing shots into the crowd that had gathered in the parking lot. Many people in the parking lot ran into the building, but others stayed in the parking lot and returned fire in the direction of passing traffic on Highway 401. Still others hid behind a dumpster that was close to the door of the building. Mr. Burke-Whittaker was in the parking lot when the shooting started. He took cover behind the dumpster. He took a firearm out of his satchel and, having struggled to cock it, he came out from behind the dumpster, fired a shot toward the vehicle, and fled into the building through the parking lot door. The incident was relatively brief and captured on video. No one was killed or injured.The police investigation identified Mr. Burke-Whittaker as one of the shooters. He turned himself in on June 22, 2021, just over one year after the shooting. His firearm was never recovered. He pled guilty to one count of possession of a loaded or prohibited or restricted firearm contrary to s. 95 of the Criminal Code. He was 24 years old at the time of the shooting and has no other criminal record. He was raised by his mother and grandmother in Brampton, as his father was in and out of jail during much of his childhood. He completed high school and began college, but did not finish that course of studies. He has one child born in 2018. At the time of sentencing, he had been accepted into the Toronto Fire Academy. While on bail, he started a vending machine business. Several positive character letters submitted to the sentencing judge indicated that, as a young Black male, he had experienced systemic racism. An Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report was not submitted.The sentencing judge sentenced the respondent to a conditional sentence of two years less a day to be followed by three years’ probation. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence and dismissed the applicant’s appeal of the sentence. The dissenting justice would have allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge, and imposed a sentence of 38 months’ incarceration less credit of 17 months. Argued Date 2026-05-19 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Conditional sentencing orders — What principles should guide appellate courts’ review of conditional sentencing orders for offences under Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, 1, s. 95 — When, and based on what principles, appellate courts should reincarcerate offenders after otherwise successful Crown sentence appeal. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During the course of an investigation under the Traffic Safety Act, a police officer attempted to effect a warrantless arrest of the appellant for obstruction under s. 129(a) of the Criminal Code. In a pre-trial application, the trial judge found that the police officer was not executing a lawful arrest, and therefore breached the appellant’s s. 9 Charter right not to be arbitrarily detained by attempting the arrest. The trial judge acquitted the appellant of assault causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2026-05-20 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Accused assaulted police officer attempting to effect warrantless arrest for obstruction under s. 129(a) of Criminal Code — Trial judge holding that officer was not executing lawful arrest and breached accused’s s. 9 rights — Trial judge further holding Crown failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused was not acting in self-defence — Accused acquitted of assaulting officer — Court of Appeal allowing appeal and ordering new trial — Whether a police officer can arrest an individual for obstruction under the Criminal Code during the course of a regulatory (or municipal) investigation where the regulatory (or municipal) statute provides for a lesser enforcement remedy — Whether the discretion referenced in Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46, allows police officers to engage the more serious Criminal Code provisions during the course of an investigation for less serious regulatory or municipal offences? Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The applicants, two homeowners, hired the respondent company, Benchwood, to renovate their home. Benchwood is a general contracting and construction management business, and the respondent Michael Slaven is one of its co-owners. There were several areas of disagreement between the parties during the course of the renovations. A heated discussion occurred between Mr. Slaven and one of the homeowners. Benchwood performed no further work for the homeowners following this incident.The homeowners subsequently discovered that Benchwood posted photographs of their home online to attract new customers. This angered them and prompted them to post allegedly defamatory statements about Benchwood and Mr. Slaven on social media platforms.In response to these statements, Benchwood and Mr. Slaven commenced an action seeking damages for defamation. The homeowners subsequently brought a motion pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act for an order dismissing the action as a proceeding that limits freedom of expression on matters of public interest. The motion judge agreed with the homeowners and ordered that the action be dismissed. Benchwood and Mr. Slaven appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal of the action. Argued Date 2026-05-15 Keywords Torts — Libel and slander — Anti-SLAPP legislation — Dissatisfied clients of company posting negative statements online about company and its owner — Company and owner suing clients for defamation — Clients bringing motion to dismiss action pursuant to anti-SLAPP legislative provision — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the motion judge’s finding that the impugned expression relates to a matter of public interest — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the motion judge’s finding that there are no grounds to believe that the defences are not valid — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the motion judge’s finding that the harms resulting from the impugned expression do not outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression — Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 137.1 Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant was charged with firearms offences. Police had obtained a general warrant to detain the appellant and search for his phone. The search for the phone authorized by the warrant was limited to the person of the appellant and his immediate and surrounding area. The police stopped the appellant while he was driving. During the execution of the warrant, the police seized three cell phones as well as firearms from the appellant’s vehicle, including in a hidden compartment. The appellant successfully sought to exclude the firearms evidence from his trial pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter on the basis of a violation of his s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure. The appellant was acquitted of the firearms offences charged. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal against acquittal and ordered a new trial. It concluded that the application judge erred both in finding that the search was not authorized by the warrant and in finding that the firearms should have been excluded pursuant to s. 24(2). The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal would have dismissed the Crown’s appeal as she agreed with the application judge that, in executing the general warrant, the police exceeded the scope of the order and violated the appellant’s rights under s. 8. She further agreed that the firearms should have been excluded pursuant to s. 24(2). Argued Date 2026-05-14 Keywords Charter of rights — Search and seizure — Remedy — Exclusion of evidence — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in finding police complied with the warrant — If appellant’s s. 8 Charter rights were breached, whether Court should interfere with application judge’s s. 24(2) Charter analysis. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Jardins de Vérone S.E.C., owned land within the territory of the appellant, Ville de Québec (“City”). The land was officially designated as “serviced vacant land”, a particular that was included in the information concerning the unit of assessment on the assessment roll. On March 1, 2018, the respondent received a building permit from the City for the erection of a building with 109 dwellings. The work began on April 1, 2018, and was carried out without interruption as of that date. In July 2018, the respondent applied to the City’s assessment department to have the “serviced vacant land” particular removed from the information on the assessment roll. In October 2018, the municipal assessor’s representative denied that request on the ground that no action had been omitted by the assessor, having regard to ss. 32 and 244.36 of the Act respecting municipal taxation, CQLR, c. F-2.1 (AMT), and that there was therefore no basis for making an alteration. The respondent then brought a proceeding before the Administrative Tribunal of Québec (ATQ) under s. 132.1 of the AMT, seeking an order requiring the municipal assessor to alter the information on the roll so that the “serviced vacant land” particular was removed, in accordance with ss. 174, 57.1.1 and 244.36 of the AMT. The building was not entered on the roll until early summer in 2019. On December 16, 2019, the ATQ rendered a decision in the respondent’s favour, confirming that, as soon as a building is situated on land, the assessor must alter the assessment roll by removing the “serviced vacant land” particular, regardless of its value. The ATQ ordered that the “serviced vacant land” particular be removed from the assessment roll retroactively to the date when the work had begun.The Court of Québec allowed the City’s appeal. The ATQ’s decision was set aside and replaced. In the court’s view, the interpretation of s. 244.36 of the AMT adopted by the ATQ was not “correct” under the standard of review applicable in this case.The Superior Court dismissed the application filed by the respondent for judicial review of the Court of Québec’s decision. The reasonableness of the Court of Québec’s decision was upheld.The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal. It set aside the decisions of the Court of Québec and the Superior Court and restored the ATQ’s decision. The Court of Appeal held that, although the Court of Québec did not owe deference to a statutory interpretation by the ATQ, it still could not substitute its erroneous interpretation for the ATQ’s correct interpretation. The Court of Appeal accordingly found that the Court of Québec had not properly applied the correctness standard and therefore, contrary to what the Superior Court had concluded, the Court of Québec’s decision should have been found unreasonable. Argued Date 2026-05-12 Keywords Administrative law — Appeals — Standard of review — Municipal law — Taxation — Property assessments — Interpretation of concept of “serviced vacant land” under Act respecting municipal taxation — Manner in which Court of Québec must apply standard for appellate intervention (correctness) to conclusions of law in administrative decision — Whether Court of Québec performed its appellate function reasonably — Courts of Justice Act, CQLR, c. T-16, s. 83.1 — Act respecting municipal taxation, CQLR, c. F-2.1, ss. 32, 57.1.1, 131.2, 174 para. 13.1.1(a), 244.36 and 244.49. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case concerns the constitutional validity of the Act to interrupt the electoral division delimitation process (“A.T.I.”) and the issue of whether its infringement of the right to vote guaranteed by s. 3 of the Canadian Charter is justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter. The A.T.I. has the effect of interrupting, until Quebec’s next general election, the process relating to the delimitation of Quebec’s electoral divisions made by the Commission de la représentation after every second general election in order to ensure that the delimitation respects the right to effective representation of electors under the Election Act, R.Q.L.R., c. E 3.3. Argued Date 2026-04-22 Keywords Charter of Rights — Constitutional law — Elections — Right to vote — Right to effective representation of electors — Interruption of Quebec’s electoral division delimitation process — Whether Act to interrupt the electoral division delimitation process infringes s. 3 of Canadian Charter in manner that cannot be justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 and 3 — Act to interrupt the electoral division delimitation process, S.Q. 2024, c. 14. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In January 2018, the respondent, Mr. Thibodeau, filed six complaints under the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th supp.) (OLA) with the intervener, the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada against the appellant, St. John’s International Airport Authority (SJIAA) with regards to the violation of ss. 22 and 23 of the OLA related to the language of communication and services. In summary, Mr. Thibodeau alleged that the SJIAA: (1) has an exclusively English presence on social media such as Facebook, YouTube and Instagram; (2) has a website with an English-only URL and of which the French version is not of equal quality to the English version; (3) publishes its press releases in English only; (4) makes certain documents on its website, including annual reports and its master plan, available in English only; (5) uploads content on Twitter almost exclusively in English; and (6) displays certain automated teller machine (ATM) signage in English only within the airport.Mr. Thibodeau’s complaints resulted in the issuance of two separate reports by the Commissioner: the first addressed the complaints concerning various types of content posted on social media and online, while the second focused on the complaint related to the ATM. With respect to the first complaint, the Commissioner found that the OLA had been breached. The Commissioner recommended that all content posted by SJIAA, both on social media and online, be of equal quality in both official languages. With respect to the second complaint, because the Official Languages Regulations expressly designates ATMs as a service within the meaning of s. 23(2) of the OLA, the Commissioner concluded that the OLA had been contravened. However, given that the SJIAA had, by the time the report was issued, already replaced the signage with universally recognizable pictograms, the Commissioner declined to issue any recommendations and closed the file.Following the issuance of the Commissioner’s recommendations, Mr. Thibodeau commenced an application under s. 77 of the OLA, seeking a declaration that the OLA had been breached and requesting that the Court order SJIAA to issue a letter of apology and award him $9,000 in damages. The Federal Court has granted the application for a remedy and ordered the payment of $5,000 in damages against SJIAA. The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2026-04-20 Keywords Official languages — Airport authorities — Transfer of the administration of airports pursuant to the Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) Act — Obligations pursuant to the Official Languages Act for the local bodies operating airports — Are the authorities subject to the “head office rule” created by s. 22 of the Official Languages Act, or was that the rule excluded by the Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) Act? — What is the proper definition of the “travelling public” under the Official Languages Act? — What test should be used to determine when a communication of service is intended for the travelling public, rather than the general public? — Can an applicant under s. 77 of the Official Languages Act receive damages from any contravention of the Official Languages Act, even if the applicant’s own personally-held language rights are not implemented by that contravention? — Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Suppl), ss. 22, 23 and 77 — Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matter) Act, S.C. 1992, c. 5, s. 4(1) Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a trial by a judge sitting with a jury. The central issue at trial was whether the appellant had acted in self-defence during an exchange of gunfire with the deceased.On appeal, the appellant brought a motion to adduce further evidence from a third-party witness, who would have testified to the deceased being the aggressor in the altercation, as well as evidence from the law clerk of trial counsel as to why the evidence was not presented at trial. The majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that the proposed fresh evidence from the third-party witness was not reasonably capable of belief and therefore did not meet the criteria for admission. The majority dismissed the motion to adduce further evidence and dismissed the appeal.The dissenting judge would have granted the motion to adduce further evidence. In the dissenting judge’s view, the proposed fresh evidence was reasonably capable of belief and could reasonably be expected to have affected the result of the trial. Accordingly, the dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2026-04-17 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Fresh evidence — Court of Appeal dismissing motion to adduce fresh evidence — Whether Court of Appeal erred in dismissing motion to adduce further evidence — Whether fresh evidence would reasonably be expected to have affected result of trial — Whether Court of Appeal erred in dismissing appeal from conviction Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Damodar Arapakota, was charged with bribing a foreign public official, contrary to s. 3(1)(a) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34. The Crown alleged that the respondent bribed an official with the government of Botswana by paying for the official’s family vacation in Orlando, Florida, in return for which the respondent received letters confirming the government of Botswana’s intention to award a contract to his company and confirming the value of the prospective contract. The trial judge found that the respondent conferred a material benefit on the official, but that the benefit was not consideration for the letters that the official later provided. She further found that the letters did not rise to the level of a material or tangible economic advantage sufficient to trigger liability under s. 3(1)(a). As a result, she acquitted the respondent. The Crown appealed the acquittal. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal finding that while the trial judge misinterpreted one of the elements of the offence at s. 3(1)(a), this error had no impact on the proper disposition of the case. Justice Monahan, dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial. He found that the trial judge erred in her interpretation of s. 3(1)(a), which had a material impact on the verdict. Argued Date 2026-04-16 Keywords Criminal law — Bribing a foreign public official — Elements of offence — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of s. 3(1)(a) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34 — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the trial judge’s legal error did not affect the verdict. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

R.B.-C., an Iranian citizen in Canada on a post-graduation work permit, was convicted for sexual assault. More than 14 months after conviction, a conditional sentence of two years less a day plus probation was ordered. R.B.-C. applied for a stay of proceedings as a remedy for unreasonable delay during the sentencing phase of proceedings in breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The motions judge applied R. v. Charley, 2019 ONCA 726, which adopted the framework set out in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, and which set a five-month presumptive ceiling for post-verdict delay. After calculating total delay and deductions, the motions judge derived a net delay below the presumptive five-month ceiling and dismissed the motion to stay proceedings. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal. It held post-conviction delay exceeded the five-month presumptive ceiling and the appropriate remedy was to reduce the sentence to 20 months. Argued Date 2026-01-16 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Remedies — What is the test for unreasonable delay in the sentencing phase — What is the appropriate remedy for unreasonable delay in the sentencing phase? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Act respecting the laicity of the State was passed and assented to on June 16, 2019. Its purposes include affirming the laicity of the state in Quebec and specifying the general obligations arising therefrom, prohibiting the listed persons from wearing religious symbols in the exercise of their functions and requiring those persons to perform their functions with their face uncovered. The Act also contains provisions through which the legislature exercises the override power granted to it by s. 52 of the Quebec Charter and s. 33 of the Canadian Charter and permits the Act to apply notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms.Once the Act came into force, a number of persons, groups of persons and organizations brought separate proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Act or certain of its provisions. They raised constitutional grounds, some of which were related to the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter. The Superior Court largely dismissed the challenge, except on two points. The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusions except as regards the educational language rights that s. 23 of the Canadian Charter guarantees to Canadian citizens belonging to Quebec’s English linguistic minority. Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that the Act does not infringe s. 23. Argued Date 2026-03-26 Keywords Constitutional law — Constitutional validity — Division of powers — Pre-Confederation legislation — Constitutional architecture and unwritten principles — Charters of rights — Notwithstanding clauses — Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes — Minority language educational rights — Democratic rights of citizens — Enumerations — Whether grounds raised to challenge constitutional validity of Act respecting the laicity of the State should be accepted — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 3, 23, 28 and 33 — Charter of human rights and freedoms, ss. 50.1 and 52 — Act respecting the laicity of the State, CQLR, c. L-0.3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Act respecting the laicity of the State was passed and assented to on June 16, 2019. Its purposes include affirming the laicity of the state in Quebec and specifying the general obligations arising therefrom, prohibiting the listed persons from wearing religious symbols in the exercise of their functions and requiring those persons to perform their functions with their face uncovered. The Act also contains provisions through which the legislature exercises the override power granted to it by s. 52 of the Quebec Charter and s. 33 of the Canadian Charter and permits the Act to apply notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms.Once the Act came into force, a number of persons, groups of persons and organizations brought separate proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Act or certain of its provisions. They raised constitutional grounds, some of which were related to the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter. The Superior Court largely dismissed the challenge, except on two points. The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusions except as regards the educational language rights that s. 23 of the Canadian Charter guarantees to Canadian citizens belonging to Quebec’s English linguistic minority. Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that the Act does not infringe s. 23. Argued Date 2026-03-25 Keywords Constitutional law — Constitutional validity — Division of powers — Pre-Confederation legislation — Constitutional architecture and unwritten principles — Charters of rights — Notwithstanding clauses — Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes — Minority language educational rights — Democratic rights of citizens — Enumerations — Whether grounds raised to challenge constitutional validity of Act respecting the laicity of the State should be accepted — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 3, 23, 28 and 33 — Charter of human rights and freedoms, ss. 50.1 and 52 — Act respecting the laicity of the State, CQLR, c. L-0.3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Act respecting the laicity of the State was passed and assented to on June 16, 2019. Its purposes include affirming the laicity of the state in Quebec and specifying the general obligations arising therefrom, prohibiting the listed persons from wearing religious symbols in the exercise of their functions and requiring those persons to perform their functions with their face uncovered. The Act also contains provisions through which the legislature exercises the override power granted to it by s. 52 of the Quebec Charter and s. 33 of the Canadian Charter and permits the Act to apply notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms.Once the Act came into force, a number of persons, groups of persons and organizations brought separate proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Act or certain of its provisions. They raised constitutional grounds, some of which were related to the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter. The Superior Court largely dismissed the challenge, except on two points. The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusions except as regards the educational language rights that s. 23 of the Canadian Charter guarantees to Canadian citizens belonging to Quebec’s English linguistic minority. Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that the Act does not infringe s. 23. Argued Date 2026-03-24 Keywords Constitutional law — Constitutional validity — Division of powers — Pre-Confederation legislation — Constitutional architecture and unwritten principles — Charters of rights — Notwithstanding clauses — Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes — Minority language educational rights — Democratic rights of citizens — Enumerations — Whether grounds raised to challenge constitutional validity of Act respecting the laicity of the State should be accepted — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 3, 23, 28 and 33 — Charter of human rights and freedoms, ss. 50.1 and 52 — Act respecting the laicity of the State, CQLR, c. L-0.3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Act respecting the laicity of the State was passed and assented to on June 16, 2019. Its purposes include affirming the laicity of the state in Quebec and specifying the general obligations arising therefrom, prohibiting the listed persons from wearing religious symbols in the exercise of their functions and requiring those persons to perform their functions with their face uncovered. The Act also contains provisions through which the legislature exercises the override power granted to it by s. 52 of the Quebec Charter and s. 33 of the Canadian Charter and permits the Act to apply notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms.Once the Act came into force, a number of persons, groups of persons and organizations brought separate proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Act or certain of its provisions. They raised constitutional grounds, some of which were related to the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter. The Superior Court largely dismissed the challenge, except on two points. The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusions except as regards the educational language rights that s. 23 of the Canadian Charter guarantees to Canadian citizens belonging to Quebec’s English linguistic minority. Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that the Act does not infringe s. 23. Argued Date 2026-03-23 Keywords Constitutional law — Constitutional validity — Division of powers — Pre-Confederation legislation — Constitutional architecture and unwritten principles — Charters of rights — Notwithstanding clauses — Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes — Minority language educational rights — Democratic rights of citizens — Enumerations — Whether grounds raised to challenge constitutional validity of Act respecting the laicity of the State should be accepted — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 3, 23, 28 and 33 — Charter of human rights and freedoms, ss. 50.1 and 52 — Act respecting the laicity of the State, CQLR, c. L-0.3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On March 19, 2019, the respondent, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada received a complaint under s. 11(1) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”) which raised concerns about the appellant Facebook’s compliance with the PIPEDA. The concerns were related to Facebook’s practice of sharing Facebook users’ personal information with third-party applications hosted on its platform. The complaint was filed in the context of reports related to a professor at the University of Cambridge, U.K., Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, who launched an application through Facebook’s Platform titled “thisisyourdigitallife” (“TYDL”) in November 2013. Presented to users as a personality quiz, Dr. Kogan could access the personal information of installing users and installing users’ friends. In December 2015, it was reported that user data obtained by TYDL was sold to a corporation named Cambridge Analytica and a related entity, Strategic Communication Laboratories Elections Ltd. (SCL), who, in turn, used the data purchased from Dr. Kogan to help their clients target political messaging to potential voters in the then upcoming presidential election in the United States. When TYDL was launched in 2013, it agreed to Facebook’s Platform Policy and Terms of Service. In 2014, Facebook issued a version 2 (v.2) of its communication protocol, Graph API, under which third party developers could no longer request permission to access installing users’ friends unless the app developer, through an expanded access to additional personal information request, can demonstrate that the data would be used to “enhance the user’s in-app experience”. The process for consideration of expanded access requests was introduced alongside Graph API v.2 as “App Review.” Although Graph API v.2 took effect in 2014, existing apps were given a one-year grace period before complying with the new iteration. When Graph API v.2 was announced, Dr. Kogan’s request for expanded access to additional personal information was denied by Facebook because his intended use, research, would not enhance user experience. Nonetheless, Dr. Kogan continued to collect data under Graph API v.1 with no additional scrutiny from Facebook. As a result, though only 272 Canadians ever installed the TYDL app, Facebook estimates that these installations lead to the potential disclosure of the data of over 600,000 Canadians. In 2015, when the reports became public, Facebook removed TYDL from Platform and asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the user data it had obtained. Facebook did not notify the affected users that their Facebook data had been collected and sold. It was not until 2018 that Facebook suspended Dr. Kogan and Cambridge Analytica from Platform. After receiving the complaint, the Privacy Commissioner investigated and concluded that Facebook failed to obtain valid and meaningful consent for its disclosures to applications and failed to safeguard its users’ information. As a result, in February 2020, the Privacy Commissioner filed a notice of application in the Federal Court claiming that Facebook was in breach of its obligations set out in Schedule 1 pursuant to s. 5(1)(a) of PIPEDA through its practice of sharing Facebook users’ personal information with third-party applications hosted on the Facebook Platform.The Federal Court dismissed the application. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the Privacy Commissioner’s application in part. Argued Date 2026-03-19 Keywords Privacy — Online social media platform — Obligation to safeguard users’ data — Obligation to obtain meaningful consent from users for disclosure of personal data — Whether application judge erred in finding Privacy Commissioner of Canada did not prove that Facebook failed to get meaningful consent to disclose personal information to third-party apps — Whether application judge erred in finding Privacy Commissioner did not prove that Facebook failed to maintain adequate security safeguards to protect personal information in its possession or custody? — Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, ss. 3, 5(1), 6.1 and ss. 4.3 (principle 3) and 4.7 (principle 7) of schedule 1. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On March 19, 2019, the respondent, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada received a complaint under s. 11(1) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”) which raised concerns about the appellant Facebook’s compliance with the PIPEDA. The concerns were related to Facebook’s practice of sharing Facebook users’ personal information with third-party applications hosted on its platform. The complaint was filed in the context of reports related to a professor at the University of Cambridge, U.K., Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, who launched an application through Facebook’s Platform titled “thisisyourdigitallife” (“TYDL”) in November 2013. Presented to users as a personality quiz, Dr. Kogan could access the personal information of installing users and installing users’ friends. In December 2015, it was reported that user data obtained by TYDL was sold to a corporation named Cambridge Analytica and a related entity, Strategic Communication Laboratories Elections Ltd. (SCL), who, in turn, used the data purchased from Dr. Kogan to help their clients target political messaging to potential voters in the then upcoming presidential election in the United States. When TYDL was launched in 2013, it agreed to Facebook’s Platform Policy and Terms of Service. In 2014, Facebook issued a version 2 (v.2) of its communication protocol, Graph API, under which third party developers could no longer request permission to access installing users’ friends unless the app developer, through an expanded access to additional personal information request, can demonstrate that the data would be used to “enhance the user’s in-app experience”. The process for consideration of expanded access requests was introduced alongside Graph API v.2 as “App Review.” Although Graph API v.2 took effect in 2014, existing apps were given a one-year grace period before complying with the new iteration. When Graph API v.2 was announced, Dr. Kogan’s request for expanded access to additional personal information was denied by Facebook because his intended use, research, would not enhance user experience. Nonetheless, Dr. Kogan continued to collect data under Graph API v.1 with no additional scrutiny from Facebook. As a result, though only 272 Canadians ever installed the TYDL app, Facebook estimates that these installations lead to the potential disclosure of the data of over 600,000 Canadians. In 2015, when the reports became public, Facebook removed TYDL from Platform and asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the user data it had obtained. Facebook did not notify the affected users that their Facebook data had been collected and sold. It was not until 2018 that Facebook suspended Dr. Kogan and Cambridge Analytica from Platform. After receiving the complaint, the Privacy Commissioner investigated and concluded that Facebook failed to obtain valid and meaningful consent for its disclosures to applications and failed to safeguard its users’ information. As a result, in February 2020, the Privacy Commissioner filed a notice of application in the Federal Court claiming that Facebook was in breach of its obligations set out in Schedule 1 pursuant to s. 5(1)(a) of PIPEDA through its practice of sharing Facebook users’ personal information with third-party applications hosted on the Facebook Platform.The Federal Court dismissed the application. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the Privacy Commissioner’s application in part. Argued Date 2026-03-19 Keywords Privacy — Online social media platform — Obligation to safeguard users’ data — Obligation to obtain meaningful consent from users for disclosure of personal data — Whether application judge erred in finding Privacy Commissioner of Canada did not prove that Facebook failed to get meaningful consent to disclose personal information to third-party apps — Whether application judge erred in finding Privacy Commissioner did not prove that Facebook failed to maintain adequate security safeguards to protect personal information in its possession or custody? — Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, ss. 3, 5(1), 6.1 and ss. 4.3 (principle 3) and 4.7 (principle 7) of schedule 1. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

One evening in October 2021, the applicant was driving in rural southwestern Ontario. The sun had set and it was dark. The posted speed limit on the highway the applicant was using was 80km/h; he was travelling at least 116km/h. A horse-drawn buggy entered the roadway at an intersection. The applicant did not see the buggy in time to stop; his vehicle collided with it. Both occupants of the buggy died from injuries sustained in the collision. During the police investigation that night, the applicant admitted to being a chronic marijuana smoker and consented to providing two samples of his blood. Evidence established that the applicant’s blood drug concentration (“BDC”) exceeded the prescribed limit at the time of the collision. The parties agreed at trial that there was no evidence of a causal nexus between the applicant’s BDC and the collision. The applicant was charged with operating a conveyance with an excess BDC under s. 320.14(1)(c), two counts of committing an offence under s. 320.14(1)(c) causing death under s. 320.14(3), and two counts of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death under s. 320.13(3).The trial judge held that it is insufficient that the applicant had a prohibited BDC and was operating a conveyance at the time he caused a death; a conviction for offences under s. 320.14(3) requires a causal nexus between an accused’s BDC and the death of a victim. As the parties have agreed that there is no causal nexus between the applicant’s BDC and the death of the victims, the applicant was acquitted on those counts.The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of s. 320.14(3). A plain reading establishes that the elements are made out simply by operating a vehicle with excess BDC, and causing the death of a person. No causal nexus between the excess BDC and the cause of death is required. Accused persons retain the benefit of the basic legal causation standard: the Crown must prove that the applicant’s actions were a significant contributing cause of death. Because of the trial judge’s erroneous interpretation of s. 320.14(3), he did not make any finding as to whether the Crown had proven legal causation on this standard. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered a new trial on these counts. Argued Date 2026-03-17 Keywords Criminal law — Causing death while operating conveyance with excess blood drug concentration — Causation — Whether causal nexus required between blood drug concentration and death of victim — Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to life, liberty and security of person — Whether s. 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code violates s. 7 of the Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 320.14(3) Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Aphria Inc. (“tenant”), entered into a ten-year lease for commercial office premises with the respondent landlords and successors (collectively, “landlord”). The tenant served a notice of repudiation on the landlord and vacated the premises. The landlord did not accept the tenant’s repudiation of the lease. Ultimately, the landlord sued the tenant for rents owing.The motion judge in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the landlord summary judgment for the rent owing plus interest. The motion judge declined to grant the landlord judgment for future rent. The motion judge dismissed the tenant’s cross-motion for summary judgment for a declaration that if rent was owing, the amount was capped at rent owing for two years from the date of default pursuant to the lease. The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the tenant’s appeal. It held that the motion judge did not err by refusing to depart from Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas and Co. Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 562, in order to recognize a duty to mitigate on commercial landlords who reject a repudiation of a lease by the tenant. The court also held that the motion judge did not err in his interpretation of the lease. Argued Date 2026-02-18 Keywords Contracts — Commercial leases — Repudiation — Duty to mitigate — Stare decisis — Interpretation — Are commercial landlords exempt from the duty to mitigate damages? — If the common law is able to grow and adapt to changing conditions, when and how should lower courts depart from Supreme Court of Canada decisions on common law? — Should courts apply the plain meaning of the words chosen by the parties in interpreting a contract, in the absence of any factual matrix evidence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ms. Korduner was a motor vehicle driver involved in a two-vehicle accident. A responding police officer questioned her at the scene for approximately three minutes, during which she stated that she should not have been driving because she was drunk. Ms. Korduner was arrested for impaired operation of a motor vehicle. She refused to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device and was charged for refusing to provide a breath sample. In voir dire proceedings to determine the admissibility of Ms. Korduner’s statements, the trial judge held that Ms. Korduner’s statements were compelled by the Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, and were inadmissible pursuant to the use immunity principle; reliance on s. 320.31(9) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as a basis for admitting the statements would breach Ms. Korduner’s rights under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and Crown counsel failed to prove the breach was justified pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter. The charges were dismissed. The Court of King’s Bench of Alberta dismissed a summary conviction appeal. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Alberta allowed an appeal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2026-02-17 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Principles of fundamental justice — Self-incrimination — Criminal law — Evidence — Use immunity — Remedies — Police officer responding to motor vehicle accident questioning driver involved in accident — Statements by driver causing officer to demand breath samples in order to administer approved roadside screening device — Trial judge declaring statements to officer compelled by Traffic Safety Act — Section 320.31(9) of Criminal Code setting out that a statement to a peace officer including statement compelled under provincial Act admissible in evidence for purpose of justifying demand to provide breath sample — Whether s. 320.31(9) infringes s. 7 of Charter — If so, whether limit reasonable and demonstrably justified pursuant to s. 1 of Charter — If not, appropriate remedy — Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, ss. 69(1), 71(1) — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 320.21(9). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents in these applications for leave to appeal, Mr. Walter and Mr. Gobeil, were recognized as representative plaintiffs for the class covered by a class action brought against the applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, that is, the Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as the Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League Inc., and the impleaded hockey teams that are members of the League. In the class action, the respondents submitted that the applicants/interveners were refusing to recognize major junior hockey players as having employee status, with the result that the players had no access to the protection provided by legislation governing working conditions. Two other similar class actions were authorized, one in Ontario against the Ontario Hockey League and one in Alberta against the Western Hockey League. In total, 4,286 major junior hockey players, including 1,702 in Quebec, are covered by the class actions. On March 31, 2020, the parties to the three class actions reached a settlement agreement. The agreement was submitted to the superior courts in each of the three provinces through a joint hearing. The superior courts rejected the agreement in October 2020 solely on the basis that the scope of the release provided for was overly broad. In June 2023, after the releases were renegotiated, all of the parties, including the respondents, signed an amendment to the initial settlement agreement in order to replace the release provisions. However, it appears that, shortly after the signing, the respondents disavowed their signature and announced that they would oppose the submission of the amended agreement for judicial approval. Despite the instructions given by the respondents, Mr. Savonitto, a member of one of the firms that are applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, nevertheless submitted the amended settlement agreement to the Superior Court judge for her approval. In response, the respondents filed notices with the Superior Court formally revoking the mandate of the law firms that are applicants/interveners in this case and announced that they were retaining the services of other lawyers. The applicant/intervener law firms opposed the notices of revocation and asked the Superior Court to determine the conditions for approving the amended settlement agreement. The Superior Court recorded the revocation of the mandate of the applicants/interveners as far as the respondents were concerned, but it confirmed that the applicants/interveners still continued to represent the members of the class covered by the class action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Superior Court’s decision. Argued Date 2026-02-16 Keywords Civil procedure – Class action – Lawyer client relationship in context of class action –Lawyer’s ethical obligations to client in context of class action – Protection for class members – Revocation of legal mandates given to firms by class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in ordering that agreement to settle authorized class action be submitted to court by applicants/defendants for approval, thereby placing their lawyers in conflict of interest and in situation that compromised their ethical obligations – Whether Court of Appeal erred in ruling that lawyer who acts for plaintiffs in class action: (i) has lawyer client relationship only with class representative; (ii) does not represent class members; and (iii) has no duty to act in best interests of class where those interests conflict with instructions of class representative – Whether Court of Appeal erred in breaching its own duty to protect interests of absent members, especially where those interests conflict with interests of class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that art. 2633 of Civil Code of Québec and art. 528 of Code of Civil Procedure concerning homologation of transaction under ordinary law apply to process for approval of transaction in class action, and thus in asking defendants to submit amended settlement agreement for approval if Mr. Gobeil and Mr. Walter refused to do so – Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, arts. 87, 528, 571, 575, 586, 589 and 590 – Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers, CQLR, c. B 1, r. 3.1, ss. 20, 23, 71, 72 and 120. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents in these applications for leave to appeal, Mr. Walter and Mr. Gobeil, were recognized as representative plaintiffs for the class covered by a class action brought against the applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, that is, the Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as the Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League Inc., and the impleaded hockey teams that are members of the League. In the class action, the respondents submitted that the applicants/interveners were refusing to recognize major junior hockey players as having employee status, with the result that the players had no access to the protection provided by legislation governing working conditions. Two other similar class actions were authorized, one in Ontario against the Ontario Hockey League and one in Alberta against the Western Hockey League. In total, 4,286 major junior hockey players, including 1,702 in Quebec, are covered by the class actions. On March 31, 2020, the parties to the three class actions reached a settlement agreement. The agreement was submitted to the superior courts in each of the three provinces through a joint hearing. The superior courts rejected the agreement in October 2020 solely on the basis that the scope of the release provided for was overly broad. In June 2023, after the releases were renegotiated, all of the parties, including the respondents, signed an amendment to the initial settlement agreement in order to replace the release provisions. However, it appears that, shortly after the signing, the respondents disavowed their signature and announced that they would oppose the submission of the amended agreement for judicial approval. Despite the instructions given by the respondents, Mr. Savonitto, a member of one of the firms that are applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, nevertheless submitted the amended settlement agreement to the Superior Court judge for her approval. In response, the respondents filed notices with the Superior Court formally revoking the mandate of the law firms that are applicants/interveners in this case and announced that they were retaining the services of other lawyers. The applicant/intervener law firms opposed the notices of revocation and asked the Superior Court to determine the conditions for approving the amended settlement agreement. The Superior Court recorded the revocation of the mandate of the applicants/interveners as far as the respondents were concerned, but it confirmed that the applicants/interveners still continued to represent the members of the class covered by the class action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Superior Court’s decision. Argued Date 2026-02-16 Keywords Civil procedure – Class action – Lawyer client relationship in context of class action –Lawyer’s ethical obligations to client in context of class action – Protection for class members – Revocation of legal mandates given to firms by class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in ordering that agreement to settle authorized class action be submitted to court by applicants/defendants for approval, thereby placing their lawyers in conflict of interest and in situation that compromised their ethical obligations – Whether Court of Appeal erred in ruling that lawyer who acts for plaintiffs in class action: (i) has lawyer client relationship only with class representative; (ii) does not represent class members; and (iii) has no duty to act in best interests of class where those interests conflict with instructions of class representative – Whether Court of Appeal erred in breaching its own duty to protect interests of absent members, especially where those interests conflict with interests of class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that art. 2633 of Civil Code of Québec and art. 528 of Code of Civil Procedure concerning homologation of transaction under ordinary law apply to process for approval of transaction in class action, and thus in asking defendants to submit amended settlement agreement for approval if Mr. Gobeil and Mr. Walter refused to do so – Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, arts. 87, 528, 571, 575, 586, 589 and 590 – Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers, CQLR, c. B 1, r. 3.1, ss. 20, 23, 71, 72 and 120. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Confidentiality order)Following the Canadian general election held on April 28, 2025, and the subsequent judicial recount, the respondent Tatiana Auguste became a member of Parliament for the electoral district of Terrebonne. Only one vote in her favour separated her from her closest rival, the appellant, Nathalie Sinclair-Desgagné. One voter then notified the media that her special ballot, mailed within the prescribed time, had been returned to her after the polling day, marked [translation] “Moved or unknown – return to sender”. In fact, there was an error in the postal code that the returning officer placed on the prepaid envelope sent to the voter in that the last three characters of the postal code were for somewhere other than the polling station. But that voter maintained that she voted for Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné.The Superior Court found that there was no irregularity within the meaning of s. 524(1)(b) of the Canada Elections Act. It therefore dismissed the application to contest the election filed by Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné. Argued Date 2026-02-13 Keywords Elections — Application to contest election — Irregularity — Allegations of irregularities that affected result of election made by candidate defeated by single vote in federal election — Whether trial judge erred in interpretation of notion of irregularity — Whether trial judge erred in determination of consequences of irregularity on integrity of electoral system — Whether trial judge erred in imposing burden much greater than that under Canada Elections Act on voter — Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 524(1)b), 531(2). Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Maxime Bergeron was expelled from a mock parliament organized by one of the respondents, the Assemblée parlementaire des étudiants du Québec inc. Some participants said that they were afraid of him because of his [TRANSLATION] “disruptive behaviour”. His father, Jean Bergeron, a lawyer, quickly became involved in the situation, seeking to have the expulsion decision revoked and to obtain reparation for the damage sustained by his son. The respondents filed a motion to have J. Bergeron declared disqualified.The Superior Court found that exceptional circumstances warranted declaring J. Bergeron disqualified. A reasonably informed member of the public knowing the facts of the case would be satisfied that he did not have the distance he was required to have. The Court of Appeal found that there was no reviewable error. Public confidence in the proper administration of justice could be compromised if M. Bergeron’s father were authorized to continue representing him in the particular circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2026-02-12 Keywords Civil procedure — Motion to have lawyer declared disqualified — Whether principles applicable with regard to conflict of interest since MacDonald Estate apply by analogy in context of disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance — Criteria and factors to be weighed by trial judge considering application for disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance to balance lawyer’s obligations as officer of court — Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, art. 193. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Sophia Hemmings was left with a severe brain injury after suffering cardiac arrest during a caesarean section at the respondent Scarborough Hospital (hereafter, the “Hospital”).The appellants, Sophia Hemmings, by her Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, Rosalie Brown personally, Samantha Camile Gayle and Moses Hemmings, minors by their Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, and Samantha Hemmings, commenced an action against a number of health care practitioners, alleging that their negligence had caused Sophia’s injuries. The parties agreed on the amount of her damages. The action went to trial, solely on the issue of liability.At trial, Lloyd Gregory Padmore, Dr. Neil Thomas Jamensky, and the Hospital were found liable in negligence. The Court of Appeal allowed appeals brought by Dr. Padmore and the Hospital, and set the judgment as against them aside. The appeal brought by Dr. Jamensky was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-02-10 Keywords Torts – Professional liability – Negligence – Causation – Mother suffering severe brain injury following cardiac arrest during delivery of child by caesarian section – Application of law of causation by Canadian courts – How principles of causation to be applied in the context of women’s healthcare in Canada – What is required to show factual causation and how Courts should engage with counterfactual analyses – What is required to show legal causation and demonstrate meaningful contemplation of applicable test Civil procedure –Trial – Judgments – Reasons for judgment – Appeals – What is the permissible nature and extent of appellate courts’ power to review trial record when assessing sufficiency of reasons that are, on their face, deficient Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Gaétan Ouellet, was acquitted by Judge Garneau of the Court of Québec of a charge of sexual assault relating to three distinct incidents. On appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal, the prosecutor raised four grounds of appeal.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial judgment gave insufficient reasons. The majority were of the opinion that for that same reason, it was extremely difficult and speculative to assess the well foundedness of the two first grounds raised by the prosecutor, but they were nevertheless of the view that with respect to the second incident, the judge made a finding in the absence of evidence, which was an added reason for ordering a new trial. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, being of the opinion that the trial judge’s reasons were not so insufficient so as to undermine the validity of the judgment and that the other grounds of appeal were unfounded. Argued Date 2025-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Appeal — Sufficiency of reasons — Evidence — Absence of evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Whether trial judge’s reasons were so insufficient so as to undermine validity of his decision — Scope of error of law described in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, as “finding of fact for which there is no supporting evidence”. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Robert Joseph DeSutter, was charged with various sexual offences and one charge of assault, in relation to three different complainants, M.H., S.H. and J.R. The trial judge acquitted the respondent of all charges except the assault charge, finding insufficient evidence of a sexual purpose in the respondent’s actions and the lack of an exploitative relationship. The appellant Crown appealed the acquittals in relation to two counts of sexual exploitation (counts 3 and 14), alleging that the trial judge erred in law by excluding from evidence images of women found on a USB stick and concluding that the respondent was not in an exploitative relationship with one of the complainants, J.R. The majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Crown had not met its burden of establishing an error of law on the part of the trial judge justifying appellate intervention. In contrast, Derrick J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on counts 3 and 14. She found that the trial judge erred in her analysis of the USB images’ probative value and prejudicial effect. She also found that the trial judge failed to properly assess the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R., given the power imbalance and J.R.’s vulnerability. In her view, these errors could have materially affected the verdicts, warranting a new trial on the two counts of sexual exploitation. Argued Date 2025-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Assessment — Whether the trial judge erred in her analysis of the admissibility of the images on the USB — Whether the trial judge erred in her assessment of the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Bank of Nova Scotia (“taxpayer”), filed its return for the 2006 taxation year, reported taxable income, and paid such taxes as it calculated to be owing. The Minister of National Revenue (“Minister”) later audited the taxpayer’s 2006 to 2010 taxation years. In March 2015, the taxpayer and the Minister entered into a settlement agreement which required additional amounts to be included in the taxpayer’s 2006 income. The day before entering into the settlement agreement, the taxpayer wrote to the Minister to request to carryback a loss from its 2008 taxation year to apply it to offset the increase in its 2006 income. The Minister reassessed the taxpayer, implementing the audit adjustment and the requested loss carryback, and imposing interest resulting from the reassessment. The Minister applied a provision that requires that, for a specified period of time, interest is calculated by ignoring the loss carryback. The computing of interest that ignores the loss carryback ceases to apply 30 days after the latest of four end dates listed in s. 161(7)(b)(i)-(iv) of the Income Tax Act. The Minister computed interest by applying s. 161(7)(b)(iv) to ignore the loss carryback until the date the taxpayer requested it. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax Court of Canada, taking the position that s. 161(7)(b)(iv) did not apply because the Minister’s reassessment of its tax for 2006 was not “as a consequence” of its request to carryback losses from 2008 to offset its 2006 tax liability. The Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal. Argued Date 2026-01-21 Keywords Taxation — Income tax — Computation of interest payable — Minister’s reassessment taking into account audit adjustment and carryback requested by taxpayer to offset a loss — Minister applying s. 161(1)(b)(iv) of Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) to compute taxpayer interest up until day taxpayer requested loss carryback — Taxpayer appealing applicability of provision Minister relied on — Courts dismissing taxpayer’s appeal — Whether the event set out in s. 161(7)(b)(iv) occurred when the Minister reassessed taxpayer’s previous taxation year at a later date — What is the proper construction of s. 161(7)(b)(iv) and the words “where, as a consequence of a request in writing, the Minister reassessed the taxpayer’s tax for [a previous year] to take into account the deduction” of a loss? — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 161(7)(b)(iv). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-20 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-19 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch’s application for judicial review was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-01-15 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch’s application for judicial review was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-01-14 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Two fictitious advertisements were published by the police on Internet sites offering escort services; the text of the advertisements highlighted the youthfulness of the people. Mr. Denis communicated with someone who turned out to be a police officer acting in an undercover capacity. She stated that she mentioned the young girl’s age at least four times but that Mr. Denis did not react to that information. He was arrested by the police when he entered the room where the “escort” was.Following the trial, Mr. Denis was convicted of the offence under s. 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code (communication for the purpose of obtaining sexual services for consideration from a person under the age of 18 years). He brought a motion to have the mandatory minimum sentence declared invalid and of no force or effect. The trial judge, considering the six month minimum sentence to be appropriate, did not conduct the Charter analysis. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part to rule on the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentence and declare it invalid and of no force or effect, in accordance with s. 52(1) of the Charter. Argued Date 2026-01-13 Keywords Criminal law — Abuse of process — Entrapment — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — Mandatory minimum sentence — Commodification of sexual activity as regards person under age of 18 years — Whether s. 286.1(2)(a) of Criminal Code breaches s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 286.1 — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12, 24(1) and 52(1). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Indigenous respondent pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault of his Indigenous common law partner. He had a significant criminal record and a history of serious mental illness. The sentencing judge concluded the respondent’s incarceration was required to protect the public. The respondent was sentenced to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eight months’ incarceration for breaches of release orders. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to three years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault. The dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-12 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations — Aboriginal offender and Aboriginal female victim — Sentencing of Aboriginal offender for aggravated assault — Offence against vulnerable person — What does the deferential standard of review mean in terms of weighing sentencing factors and making factual findings? — How should courts approach sentencing when ss. 718.04, 718.201, and 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code apply? Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Indigenous respondent pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault of his Indigenous common law partner. He had a significant criminal record and a history of serious mental illness. The sentencing judge concluded the respondent’s incarceration was required to protect the public. The respondent was sentenced to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eight months’ incarceration for breaches of release orders. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to three years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault. The dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-11 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations — Aboriginal offender and Aboriginal female victim — Sentencing of Aboriginal offender for aggravated assault — Offence against vulnerable person — What does the deferential standard of review mean in terms of weighing sentencing factors and making factual findings? — How should courts approach sentencing when ss. 718.04, 718.201, and 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code apply? Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation entered into a contract with Mellon Trust Financial pursuant to which it provided market pricing data for various types of securities. Mellon Trust Financial merged with Bank of New York to form Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation succeeded to the rights and duties under the contract. Mellon Trust Financial and Bank of New York Mellon Corporation breached the contract by redistributing market pricing data to affiliates. Upon learning of the breach of contract, SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation’s counsel demanded an accounting and that Bank of New York Mellon Corporation preserve all related communications, documents, and files. Records including records created after the preservation demand were destroyed. SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation commenced an action against Bank of New York Mellon Corporation seeking damages for breach of contract. Based on spoliation, SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation in part asked the trial judge to draw an adverse inference that its data had been shared with 65 affiliates and it has lost the opportunity to enter into 65 additional agreements on substantially the same terms as the contract. The trial judge found Bank of New York Mellon Corporation liable for breach of contract. The trial judge did not accept SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation’s proposed adverse inference but did draw an adverse inference that all data usage was by Bank of New York Mellon Corporation’s affiliates. He awarded damages of CAD $922,887 and USD $5,696,850. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the finding of liability and allowed a cross-appeal on liability. It allowed an appeal from the damages award in part and set aside the award of CDN $922,887. Argued Date 2025-12-10 Keywords Civil procedure — Evidence — Spoliation — What is the appropriate remedy for spoliation — What should the appropriate remedy have been in this case? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Gitanyow Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title over certain lands in British Columbia, and has advanced claims against the federal and provincial Crown. Another Aboriginal group with a modern treaty covering an overlapping geographic area, the appellant, the Nisga’a Nation, sought to be added as a defendant in the Gitanyow action. A case management judge at the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s application to be added as a defendant. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s appeal from the first decision. Argued Date 2025-12-09 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal title — Aboriginal rights — Treaty rights — Aboriginal group advancing rights and title claims against Crown — Second group seeking to join action as defendant, given its modern treaty governing rights in overlapping territory — Case management judge declining to add second group as defendant in first group’s action — Court of Appeal upholding case management judge’s order — What is potential effect of declaration of Aboriginal title in favour of Indigenous claimant in respect of lands over which different Indigenous nation has existing section 35 rights under modern treaty, including modified Aboriginal title? — Did courts below incorrectly interpret Nisga’a Treaty by ruling that Treaty Party Provisions were not engaged in action and would not become operative until only after Plaintiffs established Aboriginal title within Claimed Lands? — Did courts below err in concluding that, while tests for joinder under Rule 6-2(7) of Supreme Court Civil Rules are met in respect of competing assertion of Aboriginal title, same tests are not met in respect of competing Aboriginal title and other rights that are recognized under modern treaty? — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, S.C., 2000, c. 7, ss. 3, 4, 5, 20 — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, ss. 2, 3, 5, 8 — Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 6-2(7). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Gitanyow Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title over certain lands in British Columbia, and has advanced claims against the federal and provincial Crown. Another Aboriginal group with a modern treaty covering an overlapping geographic area, the appellant, the Nisga’a Nation, sought to be added as a defendant in the Gitanyow action. A case management judge at the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s application to be added as a defendant. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s appeal from the first decision. Argued Date 2025-12-08 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal title — Aboriginal rights — Treaty rights — Aboriginal group advancing rights and title claims against Crown — Second group seeking to join action as defendant, given its modern treaty governing rights in overlapping territory — Case management judge declining to add second group as defendant in first group’s action — Court of Appeal upholding case management judge’s order — What is potential effect of declaration of Aboriginal title in favour of Indigenous claimant in respect of lands over which different Indigenous nation has existing section 35 rights under modern treaty, including modified Aboriginal title? — Did courts below incorrectly interpret Nisga’a Treaty by ruling that Treaty Party Provisions were not engaged in action and would not become operative until only after Plaintiffs established Aboriginal title within Claimed Lands? — Did courts below err in concluding that, while tests for joinder under Rule 6-2(7) of Supreme Court Civil Rules are met in respect of competing assertion of Aboriginal title, same tests are not met in respect of competing Aboriginal title and other rights that are recognized under modern treaty? — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, S.C., 2000, c. 7, ss. 3, 4, 5, 20 — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, ss. 2, 3, 5, 8 — Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 6-2(7). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents, Robert Vrbanic and Sarah Josipovic, were jointly charged with possession of significant quantities of four different drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime. They sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. The appellant Crown did not dispute that the delay in this case was over the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, for a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, but argued that this delay was justified by the complexity of the case. The application judge concluded that the delay was not justified as an exceptional circumstance on the basis of the complexity of the case, and ordered a stay of proceedings. The Crown appealed the application judge’s order. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It found that the application judge’s assessment of the complexity of the case was free of legal error and entitled to deference. Roberts J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings on the basis that the application judge’s miscalculation of the net delay and misapplication of the governing principles respecting exceptional circumstances materially affected his ultimate decision as to whether the delay was unreasonable. Argued Date 2025-12-04 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Exceptional circumstances — Complexity of case — Remedy — Stay of proceedings — Whether the application judge misapplied the governing principles on s. 11(b) Charter litigation by miscalculating the net delay and failing to properly assess complexity — Whether the determination of complexity, for the purposes of an exceptional circumstance under the s. 11(b) framework, ought to be evaluated within the context of the case as a whole — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b). Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant was acquitted at trial of transmitting sexually explicit material to a person under the age of 16 for the purpose of facilitating the commission of either a sexual assault or the indecent act of exposing his genital organs to a person under 16 years of age for a sexual purpose. The trial judge accepted that the appellant sent sexually explicit material to a minor, but he was left with a reasonable doubt on two elements : the identity of the appellant in a sexually explicit video and the specific intent to transmit the material for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an enumerated offence. The trial judge concluded that the transmission of the material could have been “flirtation” and was left with a doubt as to whether the appellant personally intended to commit one of the enumerated offences.The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in acquitting the appellant. The Crown was not required to prove the identity of the appellant in the transmitted video, nor was it required to prove that the appellant personally intended to commit one of the enumerated offences. The conduct referred to by the trial judge as “flirtation” is a tool used to facilitate the commission of sexual offences against children. In its view, but for the trial judge’s errors, the appellant would have been convicted. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction. Argued Date 2025-11-14 Keywords Criminal Law —Transmit sexually explicit material to a person under age of 16 for purpose of facilitating commission of sexual assault or indecent act — Elements of offence — Powers of Court of Appeal — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded jurisdiction by allowing appeal and quashing acquittal under Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 171.1(1)(b), because alleged errors were errors of fact — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded jurisdiction by substituting conviction for acquittal under s. 171.1(1)(b) based on its own findings of fact. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, SGS Canada Inc. (SGS), is a subsidiary of a foreign company that offers inspection, analysis, certification and quality control services with respect to Canadian grain destined for interprovincial trade and international export. On November 22, 2019, the intervener Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs des industries manufacturières – CSN filed a petition for certification with the Administrative Labour Tribunal (ALT) under the Labour Code, CQLR, c. C 27. The union wanted to represent inspectors and grain graders employed by SGS in Quebec, who work mainly at grain elevators located in Quebec ports along the St. Lawrence River. In December 2019, SGS notified the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, that it intended to challenge the ALT’s jurisdiction. It argued that the certification of the employees in question did not fall under provincial jurisdiction, but rather under direct federal jurisdiction with respect to the regulation of labour relations because the employment relates to a work, undertaking or business within the legislative authority of Parliament within the meaning of the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada and therefore that it was up to the Canada Industrial Relations Board to dispose of the petition for certification in accordance with the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L 2. In July 2020, SGS gave its agreement on the composition of the proposed bargaining unit, whose representative character was also established. On February 26, 2021, the ALT refused the petition for certification under the Labour Code. The ALT found that the unit contemplated in the union’s petition for certification was subject to derivative federal legislative jurisdiction and that consequently the petition was refused. The Superior Court dismissed the application for judicial review, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-02 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Labour relations — Direct and derivative federal jurisdiction — Works declared “for the general advantage of Canada” — Company operating “elevators” within meaning of Canada Grain Act — Whether SGS’s labour relations fall directly under federal jurisdiction over works declared for the general advantage of Canada pursuant to s. 92(10)(c) of Constitution Act, 1867 by reason of its inspection activities — Whether SGS’s labour relations fall derivatively under federal jurisdiction over works declared for the general advantage of Canada pursuant to s. 92(10)(c) of Constitution Act, 1867 by reason of its inspection activities — Canada Grain Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. G 10, s. 55 — Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91(29) and 92(10)(c). Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was accused of beating a person to death with an axe. Prior to his death, the deceased socialized with the respondent and a number of other persons. At some point, many people left to another venue but the respondent and the deceased remained. The deceased made a phone call to a third party in which he referred to having to fight someone. That person testified to the time of the phone call and the words used by the deceased; she also testified to hearing sounds consistent with the deceased having been beaten to death.The respondent was convicted of second-degree murder following a trial by judge alone. The trial judge referred to the statement of the deceased by phone in her decision. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge improperly used the statement for a hearsay purpose rather than only the fact that the statement was made. The majority allowed the appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial. Crighton J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the trial judge did not err in her treatment of the statement of the deceased. Argued Date 2025-11-12 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Hearsay — Statement of deceased shortly before death — Use of statement of the deceased by trial judge — Whether statement by deceased was used for a hearsay purpose — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in holding that trial judge improperly admitted statement for truth of its content —Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in setting aside conviction for murder Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Jacques-Taylor and a co-accused were jointly charged with firearms offences. On July 6, 2022, each co-accused’s defence counsel, Crown counsel, and a trial coordinator appeared in court to set a trial date. Mr. Jacques-Taylor’s counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022 or for any date in August but was not available in September. Crown counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022. Counsel for Mr. Jacques-Taylor’s co-accused was not available for any date in August. Counsel agreed on trial dates from October 2 to 4, 2022. Time from laying of charges to the anticipated start of trial was 22 months and 2 weeks. Mr. Jacques-Taylor filed a motion to stay the proceedings against him for unreasonable delay in breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time guaranteed by s. 11 (b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The motions judge, after attributing delay, calculated net delay to be 2 weeks over the 18-month presumptive ceiling. The motions judge declined to attribute 25 days of the delay following the appearance to schedule trial dates that were caused only by the unavailability of counsel for the co-accused as defence delay. Had those 25 days been attributed to the defence, the net delay would have been below the presumptive ceiling. The motions judge granted a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-07 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Co-accused being tried jointly — Delay for accused, including period of delay caused only by unavailability of co-accused’s counsel for available court dates, exceeding presumptive Jordan ceiling — Where it is in the interests of justice to pursue a joint prosecution, how is the Jordan framework to be applied as to each accused — What is the scope and proper application of the contextual approach to delay set out in R. v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On the advice of the Prime Minister of Canada, the Privy Council Office recommended that the Governor General issue an Order in Council appointing a Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick who was not bilingual. At trial, that appointment was found inconsistent with the bilingualism requirements in ss. 16(2), 16.1(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal set aside that decision on the basis that the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor who was not bilingual did not infringe ss. 16(2), 16.1(1), 18(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. Argued Date 2025-11-13 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Language rights — Role of Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Language requirement for Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Whether Order in Council 2019 1325 dated September 4, 2019, infringes ss. 16(2), 16.1, 18(2) and 20(2) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, if so, what would be appropriate remedy. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada’s appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-06 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament’s power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution’s own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada’s appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-05 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament’s power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution’s own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents are owners of lots that border three lakes in Ville d’Estérel. Following the renewal of the cadastre of Ville d’Estérel in 2016, the respondents discovered that they were not owners of a submerged strip of land that goes around each of the lakes and is situated in front of their respective lots. The appellant claimed to own that strip of land, immatriculated separately in the cadastre as several lots, whereas the respondents stated that they own it. Through an application for a declaratory judgment, the respondents sought a declaration confirming that they are respectively owners of the submerged lots adjacent to the lands they own. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed their application, finding that the submerged lots are the property of the appellant. The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the respondents’ appeal in part. It found that the submerged strip of land is accessory to the riparian lots pursuant to the doctrine of accessory. Argued Date 2025-11-10 Keywords Property — Immovables — Submerged lots — Extent of right of ownership near watercourses and lakes — Doctrine of accessory — Whether doctrine of accessory is applicable to lots submerged as result of construction of dam — If so, whether doctrine should apply only in residual manner, if doubt persists as to common intention of parties — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interfering, without identifying palpable and overriding error, with findings at trial concerning interpretion of words [TRANSLATION] “bounded by the lake” and common intention of parties. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)Canadian Patent No. 2,655,335 (“’335 Patent”), which was issued to Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. for INVEGA SUSTENNA, involves a suspension of paliperidone palmitate for the treatment of schizophrenia and related disorders. The ’335 Patent teaches a dosing regimen to achieve an optimum plasma concentration-time profile. Its claims have been construed in previous litigation and are not in issue: Janssen Inc. v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2020 FC 593,; Janssen Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc., 2022 FC 62, aff’d 2024 FCA 10 (“PMS Paliperidone”)). Its disclosure indicated that “[t]hose of ordinary skill in the art will understand that the maintenance dose may be [adjusted] up or down in view of patients condition (response to the medication and renal function)”.Pharmascience Inc. has served two Notices of Allegation in respect of pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE, its proposed generic version of INVEGA SUSTENNA. In 2020, Janssen’s infringement action related to Pharmascience’s Abbreviated New Drug Submission No. 236094 was discontinued on consent. Shortly thereafter, Pharmascience served a Notice of Allegation and Detailed Statement in respect of a different Abbreviated New Drug Submission — No. 244641 — seeking approval to market and sell doses of pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE. Janssen again commenced an infringement action under s. 6(1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133. In that proceeding, Pharmascience moved for summary trial. It was found that if Pharmascience’s pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE was made, constructed, used or sold as set out in the Abbreviated New Drug Submission, it would influence prescribers to prescribe the dosing regimen claimed in the ’335 Patent, leading to direct infringement: PMS Paliperidone. The defence of invalidity went forward, with Janssen seeking a declaration that Pharmascience would infringe the ’335 Patent if it were to make, use or sell pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE in 50, 75, 100 and 150 mg doses.The Federal Court found that the Patent was not invalid based on obviousness or for lack of patentable subject matter. The claims provided specified dosing regimens meant to produce a concentration of the medication within the therapeutic range. If a physician chose to use a dose other than that claimed, to stop treatment or to change therapies, they would no longer be practicing the claimed invention. The Court of Appeal dismissed Pharmascience’s appeal, finding that the use of the invention did not require the exercise of skill and judgment. Argued Date 2025-10-09 Keywords Intellectual property — Patents — Validity — Lack of patentable subject matter — Method of medical treatment — Vendible product — Skill and judgment — Fixed or variable dosing regimen — Canadian Patent No. 2,655,335 teaches dosing regimen that includes first loading dose, second loading dose and monthly maintenance doses — Regimen incorporates dosing windows of +/- 2 days for the second loading dose and +/- 7 days for the maintenance doses — Whether patent is invalid in that it claims an unpatentable method of medical treatment. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant’s spouse went missing in 2008. In 2017, the appellant obtained a declaratory judgment of her spouse’s death pursuant to art. 92 of the Civil Code of Québec in a proceeding contested by the spouse’s life insurance company. After the spouse was declared deceased, the life insurance company applied to annul the declaration of death on the basis that there was evidence he was alive in another country as late as 2018. The application was not served on the party declared to have died.The Superior Court of Quebec judge granted the life insurance company’s application and annulled the declaration of death. She concluded that there was no prejudice flowing from the fact that the application was not served on the declared decedent. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal only with respect to application judge’s costs award but otherwise affirmed the Superior Court judge’s decision. Argued Date 2025-10-10 Keywords Status of persons — Absence — Return — Declaratory judgment of death — Life insurance company seeking to annul declaratory judgment of death — What proof of return is required to annul a declaratory judgment of death — Whether an application by a third party to annul a declaratory judgment of death must be served on the person declared to be deceased — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 92, 97, 98. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During the course of an investigation under the Traffic Safety Act, a police officer attempted to effect a warrantless arrest of the applicant for obstruction under s. 129(a) of the Criminal Code. In a pre-trial application, the trial judge found that the police officer was not executing a lawful arrest, and therefore breached the applicant’s s. 9 Charter right not to be arbitrarily detained by attempting the arrest. The trial judge acquitted the applicant of assault causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-10-17 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Can a police officer arrest an individual for obstruction under the Criminal Code, during the course of a regulatory (or municipal) investigation where the regulatory (or municipal) statute provides for a lesser enforcement remedy — Does the discretion referenced in Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46 allow police officers to engage the more serious Criminal Code provisions during the course of an investigation for less serious regulatory or municipal offences? Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

A police investigation into the production of marijuana led to criminal proceedings against 11 individuals. A stay of proceedings was entered for the respondents in light of unreasonable delays. The Court of Québec dismissed the motion to dismiss the motion for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) of the Cr. C. and s. 16(2) of the CDSA. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the motion for prohibition and certiorari in aid. The Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the Superior Court judge’s decision and stated that the Court of Québec did not have the jurisdiction required to deal with motions for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) of the Cr. C. and s. 16(2) of the CDSA. Argued Date 2025-10-16 Keywords Criminal law — Proceeds of crime — Offence related property — Restraint order — Jurisdiction of provincial court — Appropriate procedural vehicles — Whether property included in application for forfeiture pursuant to s. 462.37(2) of Criminal Code and s. 16(2) of Controlled Drugs and Substances Act must be related to offence for which there was conviction — Whether stay of proceedings prevents prosecutor from proving facts forming basis for charges in context of motion for forfeiture of offence related property or of proceeds of crime — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 462.37(2) — Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 16(2). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Anglin was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta from 2012 until 2015, when he was unsuccessful in his re-election bid. He accepts the result of the election, but alleges that the Chief Electoral Officer interfered with the fairness of the election and, by doing so, injured his chances of being elected. He seeks damages for the alleged loss of the chance to be elected. During the election, the Chief Electoral Officer, Mr. Resler, investigated problems with Mr. Anglin’s election signs and his handling of the list of electors. After the election, the Chief Electoral Officer assessed two administrative penalties against Mr. Anglin, who appealed both penalties. One penalty was overturned due to the Chief Electoral Officer’s failure to provide Mr. Anglin with the investigation report, but the basis for assessing the fine was not found to be problematic. Mr. Anglin then commenced this action against the Chief Electoral Officer and others alleging that the Chief Electoral Officer should not have commenced the investigations and that he should have known that his actions would injure Mr. Anglin. The Chief Electoral Officer denied the factual allegations and invoked ss. 5.1 of the Election Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-1, which provides a general immunity when the Chief Electoral Officer acts in good faith, and s. 134(5), which authorizes the Chief Electoral Officer to remove non-compliant signs. Later, he applied to strike the claim for failure to disclose a cause of action or for abuse of process, with an alternative request for summary judgment due to lack of merit.Finding that the claim was a collateral attack on the validity of the election, the chambers judge struck the entire statement of claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action or as an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstated the claim other than the allegations of malicious prosecution, and remitted the Chief Electoral Officer’s claim for summary judgment application to trial court. Argued Date 2025-10-14 Keywords Elections — Jurisdiction — Chief Electoral Officer — Chief Electoral Officer required candidate to remedy inappropriate elements of signs — Candidate losing election — Candidate sued Chief Electoral Officer for damages for loss of chance to win election — Candidate did not challenge result of election — Chief Electoral Officer moved to strike claim for failure to disclose a cause of action, abuse of process or lack of merit — Whether an unsuccessful candidate for election can bring a private action against an election officer for the loss of chance of being elected. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

11368 NL Inc. was the owner of commercial real estate known as Kenmount Terrace. Patrick Street Holdings Limited is part of a group of related companies that, through loans secured by mortgages, financed development projects undertaken by a group of related companies including 11368 NL Inc. In early 2016, two mortgages known as Mortgage 608132 and Mortgage 708519 went into default and notices of power of sale were issued under the Conveyancing Act, RSNL 1990, c. C-34. These power of sale proceedings halted when 11368 NL Inc., as the mortgagee, gave a third mortgage known as Mortgage 759678. Mortgage 759678 is a collateral mortgage registered against Kenmount Terrace to a limit of $4,000,000 in support of 11368 NL Inc.’s guarantee of Mortgage 608132. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. reactivated power of sale proceedings under Mortgage 708519 and obtained Kenmount Terrace at public auction. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. provided an accounting of the proceeds of the power of sale to all encumbrancers of Kenmount Terrace stating that specific charges including Mortgage 759678 took priority and exhausted the power of sale proceeds such that not all encumbrancers could be paid. Two unpaid encumbrancers commenced an application challenging the accounting. 11368 NL Inc. filed an interlocutory application claiming entitlement to any surplus funds from the power of sale plus interest, but also advancing a claim of priority for another encumbrancer, Ms. Cheeke. On October 3, 2017, Handrigan J. determined the two encumbrancers’ application but not 11368’s interlocutory application. Handrigan J. held there was a surplus on the power of sale of approximately $4.2 million. He accepted most of Patrick Street Holdings Ltd.’s accounting but did not include its claim to $4,000,000 under Mortgage 759678 in his accounting. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed, The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. paid the two applicant encumbrancers’ claims and withheld the balance of the surplus of the power of sale proceeds. On July 16, 2022, Handrigan J. determined the interlocutory application filed by 11368 NL Inc. Handrigan J. held Ms. Cheeke’s encumbrance took priority and was due from the remaining surplus. He held that his conclusion on October 3, 2017, that Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. had not established what was owing under Mortgage 759678 had been accepted on appeal and nothing had been shown to cause him to change his mind on this issue. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. was ordered to pay the surplus remaining after payment to Ms. Cheeke to 11368 NL Inc. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-10-15 Keywords Civil procedure — Res judicata — Estoppel — Abuse of process by re-litigation — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in finding res judicata may be raised for first time on appeal — If so, whether requirements of res judicata satisfied — Whether doctrine of abuse of process by re-litigation applied beyond permissible limits — Whether abuse of process for purchaser to rely on collateral mortgage — Amount due and payable under a mortgage at the time of power of sale proceedings. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective’s record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee’s counsel that records relating to the detective’s past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective’s credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted. Argued Date 2025-10-08 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective’s record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective’s past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused’s prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown’s office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective’s record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee’s counsel that records relating to the detective’s past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective’s credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted. Argued Date 2025-10-07 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective’s record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective’s past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused’s prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown’s office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

B.F., a surgical nurse, has a child, E. B.F. and E.’s father are separated and, in 2019, were engaged in litigation about parenting rights. An interim ruling in that case in early June 2019 granted E.’s father supervised access, which B.F. resisted. At this time, B.F. was residing with her mother, I.F.On June 12, 2019, after the interim ruling, a neighbour found B.F., I.F., and E., then 19 months old, in B.F.’s home. All three were unconscious in B.F.’s bedroom; E. was in her crib. First responders found five empty insulin pens at the scene, each of which originally contained many times the normal adult dose. There were nine visible injection marks on E.’s body and evidence that E. had resisted the injections; no injection marks were visible on B.F. or I.F. The first responders also located a handwritten letter at the scene that they characterized as a suicide note. Due to the quantity of insulin injected into her system, E. suffered serious and permanent brain damage, as well as permanent damage to other organs. She was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and spasticity, and suffers from seizures. She requires constant medical care. B.F. and I.F. have since fully recovered. B.F. was arrested and charged with two counts of attempted murder by administering a noxious substance (a potentially lethal amount of insulin by injection), and two counts of aggravated assault.The jury convicted B.F. of the attempted murder of E. and I.F., and of the aggravated assault of E. The jury acquitted B.F. of the aggravated assault of I.F.B.F. appealed her conviction and sentence. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of E. was dismissed. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of I.F. was allowed and a new trial ordered. Argued Date 2025-05-22 Keywords Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Charge to jury — Party liability — Attempted murder and aiding suicide — Suicide pact defence — Whether victim of a crime may also be a principal of an offence — Whether accused may be liable as a party to an offence without a principal offender being found guilty — Whether trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the scenario presented by counsel for B.F. — Whether jury instructions were misleading to the point of error — Whether jury instructions raise a reasonable apprehension of biais — Whether suicide pact defence available — Whether Court of Appeal erred in approach to causation — Whether Court of Appeal incorrectly required additional elements that must be satisfied for an act that may assist suicide to also constitute murder Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was arrested without warrant by the police 11 days after the date of an alleged crime. At his trial, he brought a motion in which he claimed that his arrest and his detention following his arrest were unlawful pursuant to s. 495(2)(b), (d) and (e) of the Criminal Code and s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He argued that the power to arrest and detain without warrant for a hybrid offence is lawful only if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed or is about to be committed and that such measures are necessary in the public interest.The trial judge summarily dismissed the motion on the ground that it had no chance of success. The police officers could, pursuant to s. 495(3) of the Criminal Code, proceed solely on reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed. There was nothing unlawful about his arrest. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred in refusing to hold a voir dire on the motion, because the motion was not bound to fail. The right to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is guaranteed by the terms of s. 495(3) in accordance with a viable interpretation of the limitations imposed on the power of arrest without warrant set out in s. 495(2). The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-21 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Police — Powers — Arrest without warrant — Whether s. 495(2) of Criminal Code modifies peace officer’s power to arrest person without warrant — Whether s. 495(3) of Criminal Code excuses non compliance with s. 495(2) — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that trial judge had erred in summarily dismissing motion in which unlawfulness of arrest by reason of non compliance with s. 495(2) was alleged — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 495. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On December 6, 2021, S.A. was charged with assault and sexual assault. He elected to be tried by judge and jury. A trial date of April 17, 2023 was set but, on April 17, 2023, the trial could not commence because no judge was available. A trial date was set for February 12, 2024. Forestell J. held that delay of 6 to 10 months was unreasonable and breached s. 11(b) of the Charter. Notwithstanding that net delay was below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months set in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, she stayed the proceedings. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2025-05-16 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to tried in reasonable time — How should delay caused by judicial vacancy be treated under s. 11(b) of the Charter? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2019, Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah both applied for transfer to a minimum security institution. At the time, Mr. Dorsey, a dangerous offender, was incarcerated at a medium security facility; Mr. Salah was sentenced to concurrent life sentences and is incarcerated at a different medium security facility. Mr. Dorsey’s case management team, his Manager of Assessment and Intervention, and his Warden all agreed that he met the criteria for reclassification to minimum security but, because of his dangerous offender status, his transfer request had to be approved by the Regional Deputy Commissioner and then the Assistant Commissioner of Correctional Operations and Programs. In September 2019, the Regional Deputy Commissioner assessed Mr. Dorsey’s public safety rating as moderate. His request was denied.Mr. Salah’s case management team, his parole officer, and his Manager of Assessment and Intervention recommended reclassification and transfer to a minimum security facility, but, in October 2019, a new Manager of Assessment and Intervention and Intervention was assigned to his file. He assessed Mr. Salah as a moderate escape risk, so the Warden wrongly denied his transfer request.Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah each applied under the Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-1, for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid. Although they did not apply under the Charter, they alleged that the denial of their transfer requests engaged ss. 7, 9, 10(c) and 12 of the Charter. On consent, the applications were joined for the purpose of determining a common threshold legal issue: whether Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah could resort to habeas corpus to challenge the denials of their applications for transfer to lower security prisons.The applications were dismissed on the grounds that habeas corpus was not available for denials of reclassification, which were not deprivations of residual liberty. After the application judge’s decision, Mr. Dorsey was reclassified and transferred to a minimum security institution, but he continued his appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-05-13 Keywords Prerogative writs — Habeas corpus — Prisons — Deprivation of residual liberty — Security classification — Transfer — Denial of reclassification — Denial of transfer to lower security institution — Whether denial of reclassification and transfer to lower security institution is deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent is a criminal defence lawyer whose client was the subject of a wiretap authorization under the Criminal Code. The authorization did not permit live monitoring of phone calls with a lawyer; such calls could be recorded, but a judge’s order was required to access them. During the surveillance operation, the respondent called her client, which was automatically recorded. A civilian employee also listened to a portion of the call before disconnecting.A reviewing judge concluded that an initial portion of the telephone call was not subject to solicitor-client privilege and it was released to the Crown. The recording revealed the respondent informed her client that a third party had been arrested and that the police would likely be obtaining search warrants for places where the third party had been. The respondent was charged with wilfully attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by interfering in an ongoing police investigation, contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the respondent’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter were not breached with respect to the civilian employee listening to her phone conversation. However, she also concluded that her rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter had been breached due to her inability to access the second, privileged portion of the recording. She ordered the entire recording excluded under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Crown called no evidence and the respondent was acquitted.A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the acquittal and the trial judge’s decision with respect to the breaches of the respondent’s rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. However, it also concluded that her rights under s. 8 had been breached, and it therefore would have excluded the evidence of the telephone call under s. 24(2) of the Charter rather than s. 24(1). The dissenting judge would have held that the respondent’s ss. 7 and 11(d) rights were not breached. He agreed with the majority that there was a breach of her s. 8 rights, but he would have held that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2). He would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-20 Keywords Criminal Law — Charter of rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Full answer and defence (ss. 7 and 11(d) — Solicitor-client privilege — Wire-tap authorization — Interaction between solicitor-client privilege and an accused’s lawyer’s Charter rights — Wire-tap monitoring and recording of phone call between defence counsel and client — Whether the respondent’s right to make full answer and defence was breached by not having access to the full recording of a phone call protected by solicitor-client privilege — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-15 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-14 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Rousselle was arrested for impaired driving and administered a breathalyser test. Based on the results of the test, he was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours of ceasing to operate a motor vehicle. At trial, a Certificate of Qualified Technician from the officer who administered the breathalyzer test was admitted into evidence but the trial judge refused to admit two certificates of analysts who had certified the target value of the alcohol standard used by the qualified technician to conduct a required system calibration check of the breathalyzer device. The trial judge held the Certificate of Qualified Technician was not evidence of the target value of an alcohol standard and proof of the target value of an alcohol standard was a pre-condition to the Crown relying on the presumption in s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code that breathalyzer test results are conclusive proof of blood alcohol concentration. The trial judge acquitted Mr. Rousselle. A summary conviction appeal was allowed, the acquittal was set aside and a conviction was entered. The Court of appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-04-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Breathalyser test results — Target value of alcohol standard — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interpretation of s. 320.31(1)(a) of Criminal Code as permitting Crown to prove alcohol standard was certified by an analyst through hearsay evidence of qualified technician? Notes (New Brunswick) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The complainant was at that time, a grade 7 student at an all-male boarding school in Alberta. The respondent was a teacher at the school. After a trial by judge and jury, the respondent was found guilty of sexual interference (count 1), invitation to sexual touching (count 2), and sexual assault (count 3) of a person under the age of 14 years. The offences occurred in 1993 and 1994. In view of the multiple incidents in this case, the sentencing judge was satisfied that it was appropriate to sentence the respondent on counts 1 and 2. Convictions were entered on counts 1 and 2. The charge of sexual assault was stayed in accordance with Kienapple. The respondent was sentenced to a six year prison term with the counts to be served concurrently. A majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal (Wakeling and Feehan JJ.A.) allowed the respondent’s sentence appeal reducing the sentence to 47 months. Crighton J.A., dissented and would have upheld the six year sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. Argued Date 2025-04-23 Keywords Criminal law – Sentencing – Did the Alberta Court of Appeal err in law in finding the sentencing judge’s reasons for sentence to be insufficient? Do the principles articulated in R. v. Friesen apply to historic offences? Did the Alberta Court of Appeal err in interfering with the sentence imposed at trial? Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a trial by judge alone, the appellant, Buddy Ray Underwood, was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, unlawful confinement and murder. The trial judge acquitted the appellant of first degree murder but entered a conviction for the included offence of second degree murder instead. The respondent Crown appealed the acquittal and the appellant cross-appealed the conviction. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal, quashed the acquittal on first degree murder and substituted a conviction for first degree murder under ss. 231(2) and (5) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. First, the court agreed with the Crown that the trial judge erred in law in his analysis of constructive first degree murder by narrowing the causation analysis to focus exclusively on the direct medical cause of death. Second, the court concluded that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending the time frame for assessing planning as well as the meaning of “planned” more generally. The appellant’s cross-appeal, not at issue, was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-04-17 Keywords Criminal law – Appeals – Murder – First degree murder – Elements of offence – Constructive first degree murder – Planning and deliberation – Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in convicting the appellant of first degree murder by concluding that his actions satisfied the elements of s. 231(2) and (5)(e) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2020 the Chief Medical Officer of Health for Newfoundland and Labrador issued certain orders under the province’s Public Health Protection and Promotion Act, in an effort to curtail the spread of COVID-19. These orders restricted travel, by limiting the circumstances in which non-residents were permitted to enter the province. Appellant Kimberley Taylor resides in Nova Scotia. Her mother, a resident of Newfoundland and Labrador, passed away suddenly in 2020. Ms. Taylor sought an exemption from the travel restrictions in order to attend her mother’s funeral. Her request was denied. Ms. Taylor brought an application seeking a declaration that the travel restriction orders, and the provision of the Act under which they were issued, were beyond the legislative authority of the province and of no force and effect. Ms. Taylor also argued that the travel restrictions violated her rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador dismissed the application. The application judge held that the legislation at issue was constitutional, but that the right to remain in Canada, protected by s. 6(1) of the Charter, included a right of mobility simpliciter within Canada. The decision to deny Ms. Taylor entry into the province infringed her s. 6(1) right to mobility, but the infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter. By the time the appeal and cross-appeal from that judgment came before the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador, the travel restrictions were no longer in effect. The Court of Appeal declined to hear the appeal and cross-appeal on the basis that they were moot. Argued Date 2025-04-16 Keywords Charter of Rights – Mobility rights – Public health – COVID-19 – Chief medical officer of health issuing orders pursuant to provincial legislation to restrict travel into province during public health emergency – Appellant seeking to enter province to attend funeral – Appellant denied entry – Whether travel restriction order unconstitutional – Whether travel restriction order violates s. 6(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – Whether travel restriction order violates s. 6(2)(a) of Charter – Whether s. 6 violation justified by s. 1 of Charter – Whether Court of Appeal correct to reject appeal as moot – Public Health Protection and Promotion Act, S.N.L. 2018, c. P-37.3, s. 28(1)(h). Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Shamar Meredith, and a co-accused were charged with first degree murder. The victim was shot multiple times in the washroom area of a restaurant. Prior to the trial, the Crown brought a motion to have a video admitted as prior discreditable conduct evidence. The trial judge ruled that the video was admissible. After the written ruling was released and before the video was played for the jury, the appellant and the co-accused brought a motion to have the trial judge reconsider his decision on the prior discreditable conduct motion, which was dismissed. The appellant was eventually found guilty of second-degree murder by a jury. The appellant appealed his conviction. He raised, among other grounds of appeal, that the trial judge erred in admitting the video as evidence of prior discreditable conduct and/or failed to properly instruct the jury on the permissible use of such evidence. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. The majority found that the trial judge applied the correct legal test in deciding to admit the video, and that his assessment of the probative value and prejudicial effect of the video was reasonable. Further, the majority found that trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the permitted and prohibited uses of the video. In dissent, van Rensburg J.A., would have allowed the appeal and directed a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder. She found that the trial judge erred in law (1) in concluding that the video was probative of whether the appellant and the co-accused were engaged in a joint enterprise to kill the victim, and admitting the video for this purpose; (2) in admitting the video for any purpose after the appellant and the co-accused offered to make certain admissions under s. 655 of the Criminal Code; and (3) in his instructions to the jury about the permitted and prohibited uses of the video, which were internally inconsistent, specifically instructed the jury to use the video for an improper purpose, and did not alleviate the significant prejudice to the appellant and the co-accused that resulted from the admission of this evidence. Argued Date 2025-03-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Prior discreditable conduct evidence— Charge to jury — Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct as probative of whether the appellant and his co-accused were involved in a joint enterprise to kill the victim — Whether the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of prior discreditable conduct after the appellant and his co-accused proposed to make admissions covering and negating its probative value — Whether the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the permitted and prohibited uses of the prior discreditable conduct and failed to alleviate the prejudice to the appellant and his co-accused. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, P.B., was charged with sexual assault for having allegedly sexually assaulted the complainant on three occasions in the course of one night. At trial, the complainant was the only witness called. The appellant argued that the complainant’s testimony was not sufficiently credible or reliable to prove the case against him beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, he alleged that her evidence was unreliable because she claimed that her memory of the relevant events was based on “flashbacks”. The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence and found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his decision, in that he failed to make concrete factual findings about which parts of the complainant’s evidence he accepted and which he did not, and that the trial judge erred in evaluating the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence, notably her “flashback” memory. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed the appeal. On the first issue, the majority found that the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient. Having read the trial judge’s reasons in a functional and contextual manner, the majority concluded that there is no difficulty discerning what the trial judge decided, from a factual standpoint, and why. The majority found the reasons also contained enough detail to permit appellate review for error. As for the second issue, the majority found that the trial judge’s conclusion on the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence is one that a reasonable view of the evidence supports. As such, the majority concluded that there was no proper basis to interfere. In dissent, Barrington-Foote J.A. would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. He concluded that the trial reasons are insufficient to permit effective appellate review and that the trial judge’s analysis on the reliability issues arising from the evidence was very brief and was not enough in the circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2025-03-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Credibility — Sufficiency of reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to identify and apply the correct approach to the analysis of the reliability of evidence of recovered memories based on flashbacks. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 1978, the appellant, R.A., was babysitting the then five-year-old complainant at his home. In a statement made to the police, he explained that he asked the complainant to touch him and she did so. The appellant was charged with one count of indecently assaulting the complainant contrary to s. 149 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Following a trial in the Provincial Court, the appellant was acquitted on the basis that there had been no “assault” under the Criminal Code. There had been no direct, intentional application of force to the complainant and no attempt or threat by an act or gesture to apply force to the complainant.On appeal, the Crown submitted that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the elements of assault and holding that the sexual touching had to be physically initiated by the accused. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the acquittal. It concluded that the appellant touched the complainant in a manner constituting an assault and that any intentional contact with a child by an adult that is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature constitutes a direct and intentional application of force by the adult to the child’s person, regardless of whose physical movement initiated the contact. Considering that the only issue was whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to an assault and that the question had been answered in the affirmative, the court entered a conviction for indecent assault and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court for the appellant to be sentenced. Argued Date 2025-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Indecent assault — Elements of offence — Intentional application of force — Did the Court of Appeal for British Columbia err in holding that in order to ground the offence of indecent assault in 1978, the element of assault did not require the intentional application of force by an accused? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 149. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During a roadside stop, the police found a handgun in the fanny pack belonging to the appellant, Mr. Amari Donawa. The handgun was sent to the Centre of Forensic Sciences, but for reasons that were not explained, the police did not send the magazine or the ammunition.At trial, the expert testified that the handgun could not be fired easily without the magazine. The trial judge, Justice Edward of the Ontario Court of Justice, found that the handgun was not a firearm because making it operational, according to the expert, required special expertise, considerable time, and part not readily available. The Crown appealed Mr. Donawa’s acquittals entered by the trial judge on the various firearm offences. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge was correct in his finding that the handgun was not a firearm as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal and set aside the acquittals. It entered convictions on two counts (careless storage of a firearm and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number) and ordered a new trial on other counts. In its view, the trial judge made a number of errors in reaching his conclusion. He failed to consider whether the handgun, as found, was operable, based on the evidence. The failure to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence was an error of law. Argued Date 2025-03-26 Keywords Criminal Law —Firearm — Definition of firearm in Criminal Code — Evidence — Assessment — Does the definition of a “firearm” under s. 2 of the Criminal Code always dispense with proof of the availability of a functional magazine? — Did the Court of Appeal for Ontario err in finding that the trial judge had failed to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 2 “firearm”. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents are various professionals who obtained judgments against the appellant in 2004, to which a ten-year prescriptive period applies under art. 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec. Certain actions interrupted prescription between 2005 and 2007, after which prescription started running again.A bailiff served a notice of execution on the appellant in 2016, which authorized the bailiff to seize the appellant’s movable property. However, the bailiff concluded that the appellant’s movable property was exempt from seizure pursuant to section 89 of the Indian Act. The bailiff later had discussions with the appellant’s Grand Chief and was informed that there was no property outside of its land base. The bailiff did not prepare and file minutes of seizure. Subsequently, the appellant informed the respondents that it held a property outside of its land base but that it was exempt from seizure. The respondents registered a legal hypothec against that property.The appellant sought a declaration that the prescriptive period applicable to the judgment had expired before the respondents registered the hypothec. The trial judge concluded that prescription had been interrupted in November 2016 when the respondents served a notice of execution on the appellant. The actions of the respondents amounted to a judicial application that interrupted prescription per article 2892 C.C.Q. Although the seizure was unfruitful, it had not been dismissed or annulled by a court, in which case prescription would not have been interrupted, per article 2894 C.C.Q. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial judge’s decision. Argued Date 2025-03-19 Keywords Prescription — Extinctive prescription — Interruption of prescription — Whether service of notice of execution interrupted prescription — Whether service of notice of execution amounts to unsuccessful seizure if there are no assets available to seize — Whether section 89 of the Indian Act applies so as to render appellant’s movable property unseizable — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 2892, 2894 — Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 89. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Stephen and Claudette Emond lived in a home on the Ottawa River that was located in the catchment area of the Mississippi Valley Conservation Authority (“MVCA”). They had purchased a standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy from Trillium Mutual Insurance Company. The Emonds’ home was deemed a total loss as a result of flooding in April 2019. Although the insurer acknowledged coverage for the loss under the policy, the parties could not agree on what, if any, costs of replacement of the insureds’ home were excluded from coverage under the policy. The Emonds claimed that the Guaranteed Rebuilding Cost (“GRC”) coverage endorsement fully guaranteed their rebuilding costs. Trillium acknowledged that the GRC coverage applied to replace the insureds’ home, but took the position that the costs to be incurred to comply with the MVCA’s regulation policies and other by-laws and regulations enacted after the original building of the home were excluded from coverage by an exclusion in the policy. The application judge accepted the Emonds’ position that the GRC coverage was intended to guarantee the costs of rebuilding their home, without any limitation of coverage resulting from the operation of any rule, regulation, by-law, or ordinance. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the insurer’s appeal and concluded that the exclusion applied to exclude coverage for increased costs to comply with any law, including by-laws and regulations such as the MVCA regulation policies. Argued Date 2025-03-18 Keywords Insurance — Homeowner’s insurance — Home deemed total loss as a result of flooding — Home insured through standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy including endorsement for guaranteed rebuilding cost — Policy containing exclusion for increased costs of replacement due to operation of any law regulating construction of buildings — Insurer disputing homeowners’ claim for coverage for costs of complying with regulatory policies to rebuild home — Application judge concluding coverage included and Court of Appeal concluding coverage excluded — What is the correct interpretation of the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement? — Whether an exclusion clause in the basic policy can be used to deny expanded coverage granted by the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Judge Gagnon of the Court of Québec acquitted the appellant, Frédéric Rioux, of the offence of sexual assault committed between August 1 and 2, 2019, in Bonsecours. Although the Crown had laid only one charge for a sexual assault that occurred in Bonsecours, the Crown’s evidence related to two instances of sexual intercourse, one in Magog and the other in Bonsecours. With regard to the first sexual act, which took place in a park in Magog, the judge found that the accused’s evidence was probative of the complainant’s consent and had not been contradicted by the complainant, who had no memory of the incident. The actus reus was therefore not established beyond a reasonable doubt. As for the second instance of sexual intercourse, which occurred at the accused’s house in Bonsecours, the judge found that the Crown had met its burden but that Mr. Rioux’s version raised a doubt concerning his honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s consent.For the reasons given by Bachand J.A. and concurred in by Hamilton J.A., the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered a new trial, but only with respect to Mr. Rioux’s criminal liability for the events that took place in the park in Magog on the evening of August 1, 2019, since the Crown had decided not to challenge the trial judge’s conclusion that Mr. Rioux had no criminally liability for the events in Bonsecours. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had made errors of law in analyzing the issue of the complainant’s capacity to consent to the sexual acts that had taken place in Magog. Those errors of law on the issue of the consensual nature of the sexual acts made it necessary to hold a new trial. Mainville J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, as he was of the view that the trial judge had considered all the circumstantial evidence but had found that Mr. Rioux could nevertheless be acquitted based on the probative value of his testimony. Mainville J.A. expressed serious reservations about the validity of the Crown’s appeal with regard to events that were not part of the charge, given that the accused had been acquitted of the offence directly covered by the indictment. He added that it was not appropriate to order a new trial when Mr. Rioux would be tried again for an offence of which he had been finally acquitted. Argued Date 2025-01-22 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Capacity to consent — Absence of direct evidence from complainant — Consideration of all evidence — Appeal — Powers of Court of Appeal — Charge — Order limiting scope of new trial — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had failed to consider all evidence on ultimate issue of guilt or innocence — If trial judge made error of law, whether majority erred in law in failing to address question of whether respondent had shown with reasonable degree of certainty that verdict would not necessarily have been same without that error in light of trial judge’s conclusion that he believed appellant. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Roger Patrick Bilodeau, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of manslaughter for the shooting deaths of two men. He was found liable as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, for having formed an intention to carry out an unlawful purpose common with his son, who shot the deceased. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the jury was improperly instructed, including regarding the common unlawful purpose. The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It concluded that many errors identified benefited the appellant, often by imposing on the Crown an unduly onerous burden. No substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred: s. 686(1)(b)(iii) should be applied. Pentelechuck J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In her view, there were additional legal errors in the charge not identified by the majority, one or more of which were not harmless, precluding a route under s. 686(1)(b)(iii). There was a real risk that the common unlawful purpose alleged by the Crown merged into the secondary offence of murder. The dissenting judge was not convinced that the evidence was so overwhelming that, notwithstanding the serious nature of the error, a reasonable and properly instructed jury would inevitably have convicted. Argued Date 2025-02-19 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Party liability — Common unlawful purpose — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in determining that the instruction to the jury with regard to the appellant’s alleged liability as a party, pursuant to s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, contained no prejudicial error — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 21(2). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a jury trial before Blanchard J. of the Superior Court, the appellant, Maxime Chicoine-Joubert, was convicted of one count of second degree murder and one count of assault with a weapon. On appeal, Mr. Chicoine-Joubert argued that the judge had erred in his instructions regarding manslaughter and in his answer to questions from the jury by failing to mention the necessary mens rea.The Quebec Court of Appeal, for the reasons of Vauclair J.A., Hamilton J.A. concurring, dismissed Mr. Chicoine-Joubert’s appeal. It found that the instructions to the jury were correct in the context of the case. Since Mr. Chicoine-Joubert conceded his guilt for the manslaughter verdict, the question from the jury on that offence did not require that the judge address it. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge had not adequately answered the questions from the jury and that there was a reasonable possibility that the jurors had misunderstood the requisite mens rea for second degree murder. Although the dissenting judge agreed with the majority that the initial instructions contained no error warranting the court’s intervention, he found that the trial judge had not fulfilled his obligation to answer questions from the jury clearly, correctly and comprehensively. He did not instruct the jurors on manslaughter or provide them with an example. Argued Date 2025-02-20 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Questions from jury — Manslaughter — Whether trial judge erred in his instructions and in his answer to questions from jury regarding offence of manslaughter, offence that appellant does not acknowledge having committed — Whether majority of Court of Appeal made reviewable error in declining to order new trial. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was found not guilty of sexual assault following a jury trial. Consent was the central issue. The Crown appealed the respondent’s acquittal, submitting that the trial judge erred in law by restricting Crown counsel’s examination of the complainant on her prior statements (text messages that were exchanged between the complainant and the respondent after the event) and erred in law in rulings related to the admission of evidence about the complainant’s prior sexual history. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s appeal. It concluded that although the trial judge placed restrictions on the text messages exhibit during direct examination of the complainant in excess of what was necessary to prevent the jury from improperly using the text messages, his interventions were within the reasonable exercise of his trial management power. The majority also concluded the trial judge made no error in finding that the prior sexual history evidence was capable of being admissible. There was no error regarding the judge’s finding of an inconsistency between the complainant’s evidence on cross-examination and her prior statement to the police. The trial judge did not err in admitting the prior sexual history evidence and in refusing to allow Crown counsel to question the complainant about the inconsistency on re-examination. Knickle J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She concluded that the trial judge erred in his treatment of the text messages conversation evidence and therefore improperly restricted the Crown’s direct examination of the complainant. The trial judge also erred in admitting evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual history for the purpose of cross-examining her on alleged inconsistencies, because the complainant’s testimony was not inconsistent with what she had stated to police and she had not put her previous sexual history with the respondent in issue. The trial judge also erred by denying Crown counsel’s re-examination of the complainant. These errors had a material bearing on the verdict of acquittal rendered by the jury. Argued Date 2025-01-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Complainant’s prior sexual history — Text messages — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the prior sexual history evidence of the complainant was properly admitted by (i) deferring to the trial judge’s finding that there was an inconsistency; (ii) finding that the evidence met the threshold of legitimate relevance; and (iii) finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion by prohibiting the Crown from asking the complainant questions on redirect about the prior sexual history — Whether the majority erred in holding that the trial judge’s restrictive treatment of text messages was a reasonable exercise of his trial management powers — Whether the errors had a material bearing on the acquittal and the test in R. v. Graveline, 2006 SCC 16, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 609, has been met — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 276. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On March 20, 2019, at approximately 11:00 p.m., police officers received a tip that Mr. Singer was driving a truck and the caller believed that he was intoxicated. More than an hour later, an officer observed a vehicle matching the vehicle description given by the caller. The truck was parked on a residential driveway. Its lights were on and its ignition was running. Officers could not see anyone in the vehicle from the road. They entered the driveway and approached the vehicle. They observed a single occupant sleeping in the driver’s seat. They knocked on the driver’s window and got no response. They opened the front doors and immediately smelled a strong odour of alcohol. The officers reached into the vehicle and shook Mr. Singer awake. Mr. Singer had red, bloodshot eyes and there was a strong odour of alcohol coming from his breath. Cst. Lapointe detained Mr. Singer and administered a roadside breath sample. Mr. Singer failed the roadside breath test. He was arrested for care or control of a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol level. At a police station, he declined to provide a breath sample. Mr. Singer was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand for a breath sample made by a peace officer. At trial, Mr. Singer argued that his s. 8 Charter rights were breached and the evidence should be excluded. The trial judge dismissed the Charter application and convicted Mr. Singer of failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample. The Court of Appeal held that the police officers’ conduct constituted a search in breach of s. 8 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, excluded the evidence and entered an acquittal. Argued Date 2025-02-18 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Criminal law — Exclusion of evidence — Implied license to knock — Does the driver of a vehicle parked in the driveway of a dwelling house have a privacy interest protected by s. 8 of the Charter such that police officers responding to a complaint of impaired driving are prohibited from approaching the vehicle, communicating with the driver and observing signs of impairment — If the police conducted a search within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, was that search unreasonable — If the police conducted an unreasonable search, should the evidence obtained from the search be excluded? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The parties were married in 1999 in India. During their sixteen years of marriage, they had two children. The trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia was abusive during the marriage. The trial judge accepted Ms. Ahluwalia’s evidence that the parties’ relationship was characterized by a pattern of emotional and physical abuse and financial control. Ms. Ahluwalia testified to three specific incidents of physical violence: in 2000, 2008, and 2013. Ms. Ahluwalia brought an action for statutory relief and also claimed damages for Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct during the marriage. Justice Mandhane, the trial judge, awarded Ms. Ahluwalia $100,000 in compensatory and aggravated damages for the new tort of family violence. She also awarded an additional $50,000 in punitive damages for a total of $150,000 in damages. Benotto J.A., for the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal in part and reduced the damage award by $50,000. The Court of Appeal declined to recognize the new torts of domestic violence or coercive control as defined in this case. Argued Date 2025-02-12 Keywords Family law – Tort of family violence – Was Justice Mandhane correct in recognizing a tort of family violence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The parties were married in 1999 in India. During their sixteen years of marriage, they had two children. The trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia was abusive during the marriage. The trial judge accepted Ms. Ahluwalia’s evidence that the parties’ relationship was characterized by a pattern of emotional and physical abuse and financial control. Ms. Ahluwalia testified to three specific incidents of physical violence: in 2000, 2008, and 2013. Ms. Ahluwalia brought an action for statutory relief and also claimed damages for Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct during the marriage. Justice Mandhane, the trial judge, awarded Ms. Ahluwalia $100,000 in compensatory and aggravated damages for the new tort of family violence. She also awarded an additional $50,000 in punitive damages for a total of $150,000 in damages. Benotto J.A., for the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal in part and reduced the damage award by $50,000. The Court of Appeal declined to recognize the new torts of domestic violence or coercive control as defined in this case. Argued Date 2025-02-11 Keywords Family law – Tort of family violence – Was Justice Mandhane correct in recognizing a tort of family violence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In the 1990s, Promotion M.G. Larochelle inc. (Promotion M.G.) was involved in real estate development in Ville de Sainte-Julie (City), the applicant/cross respondent. In December 2000, the total area of Promotion M.G.’s real estate projects was 760,926.3 m2. The municipal by law on parks and playgrounds required 76,092.63 m2, that is, 10% of that area, to be transferred free of charge to the City. However, Promotion M.G. had already transferred 3,898.27 m2 in excess to the City. In February 2001, the City and Promotion M.G. signed an agreement (Agreement) regarding land transfers for the purposes of parks or playgrounds. The Agreement included an undertaking by Promotion M.G. to transfer land with an area of 45,615 m2 to the City, 50% of that area (22,807.5 m2) being applicable, along with the 3,898.27 m2 already transferred in excess, to the creation of a total [TRANSLATION] “area bank” of 26,705.78 m2. The creation of that bank allowed the City to avoid having to compensate Promotion M.G. in money for the excess area transferred. In fact, the parties expressly agreed that the bank was to be applied in compensation for park fees to be paid to the City in the context of future real estate development by Promotion M.G. or companies related to it in the City. While at the time Promotion M.G. did not have any land to develop in the City, a company related to it, the respondent/cross applicant, Les Investissements Laroda inc. (Laroda), owned lots located in an agricultural zone that it intended to develop for real estate purposes. On two occasions, that is, in 2004 and 2008, the City filed an application with the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec (CPTAQ) to have part of the sector (called “Du Moulin”) where Lorada’s lots were located excluded from the agricultural zone, and each time, the application was rejected. The Administrative Tribunal of Québec dismissed the appeal from CPTAQ’s last decision in 2011. In December 2015, Laroda, which, since 2010, had had all the rights, titles and interest that belonged to Promotion M.G., sent a letter, through its representative, Éric Larochelle, to the City’s mayor requesting that she make it a monetary offer that corresponded to the present value of the area included in the bank provided for in the Agreement. After talks broke down, Laroda filed an originating application against the City asking the court to fix a term for the Agreement and to order the City to pay damages. The Superior Court dismissed the originating application and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-02-17 Keywords Contract — Transaction — Novation — Modalities of obligation — Compensatory prestation — Prescription of right of action — Insofar as Agreement P 5 dated February 19, 2001, constitutes transaction, whether Court of Appeal erred in not finding it to have novatory if not declaratory nature that modified pre existing obligations of parties — Whether Court of Appeal could order restitution of prestations where no situation set out in art. 1699 of Civil Code of Québec was alleged or proven and where parties had signed notarial acts by which Les Investissements Laroda transferred surplus parks free of charge — Whether Court of Appeal, in interpreting Agreement P-5, erred in characterizing City’s obligation to reimburse as being obligation with term; if not, whether it could simultaneously apply arts. 1510 and 1512 of Civil Code of Québec with direct effect on prescriptive period — Whether Court of Appeal erred in failing to apply performance by equivalence regime in context of this case after having previously recognized that City’s obligation had become exigible — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 1497, 1508, 1510, 1512, 1660, 1699, 1700, 2631, 2925. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Enrico Di-Paola, is a construction contractor committed for trial on four charges related to a corruption and fraud matter involving an official with whom he was doing business and with whom he had a friendship. The day before his trial, Mr. Di-Paola entered into a negotiated agreement with the prosecutor to plead guilty to a charge of having conferred a benefit on an official while having dealings with the government and without the written consent of the official’s superior (s. 121(1)(b)), and the prosecutor dropped the more serious charges. The prosecutor amended the indictment in accordance with the agreement. Following the guilty plea, the Superior Court imposed a 15-month conditional sentence of imprisonment on Mr. Di-Paola. The judge accepted as one of the aggravating factors the fact that Mr. Di-Paola had conferred advantages and benefits on the official in consideration of the awarding of lucrative contracts by the official. The Court of Appeal reduced the length of the conditional sentence of imprisonment imposed on Mr. Di-Paola from 15 months to 6 months, finding that the trial judge had erred in principle in accepting aggravating facts associated with another charge that had previously been laid and that had not been carried over in accordance with the agreement entered into between the parties. Argued Date 2025-02-13 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Consideration of facts forming part of circumstances of offence — Agreement entered into by prosecutor and accused regarding guilty plea — Whether evidence of facts that demonstrate offence with which offender was initially charged, but which is no longer pending and for which there was no verdict, is admissible as aggravating factor for sentencing pursuant to s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code — What are duties of fairness of prosecutor who intends to use s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code to prove such offence as aggravating factor in sentencing following guilty plea? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 725(1)(c). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After friends spent a night drinking heavily in a basement apartment, Mr. Boucher was fatally stabbed multiple times in a bedroom. No one witnessed the stabbing. Mr. Hussein was charged with second degree murder and tried before a jury. He testified at trial. Defence counsel brought an application to prevent or restrict the Crown from cross-examining Mr. Hussein on his extensive criminal record. The trial judge dismissed the application. In cross-examination of Mr. Hussein, Crown counsel raised his criminal record. The trial judge instructed the jury on the use it could make of Mr. Hussein’s criminal record. The jury convicted Mr. Hussein of second degree murder. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the conviction. Argued Date 2025-01-23 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Prior convictions — Should the test for admitting a testifying accused’s criminal record into evidence at trial be modified and if so, what is the appropriate test — Whether the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the accused’s criminal record? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants, the Attorney General of Quebec and His Majesty the King, obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the declaration of unconstitutionality made by the Quebec Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 with respect to the mandatory minimum sentences of 12 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code. According to the majority of the Court of Appeal, these provisions violate s. 12 of the Canadian Charter, namely, the guarantee provided against cruel and unusual punishment, and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter. That declaration of unconstitutionality resulted from appeals filed notably in respect of two decisions rendered by the Court of Québec regarding the sentences to be imposed on the respondents, Mr. Naud and Mr. Senneville. Mr. Naud was convicted of two counts relating to possession and distribution of child pornography. Sentences of 9 months’ imprisonment for possession and 11 months’ imprisonment for distribution pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (3) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, along with various consequential orders. Mr. Senneville was convicted of two counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography. Sentences of 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for possession and 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for accessing child pornography pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, also along with various consequential orders. Argued Date 2025-01-20 Keywords Charter of Rights — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — One-year minimum sentences — Child pornography — Counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography — Whether s. 163.1(4)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether s. 163.1(4.1)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12 and 1 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) Following their trial, the appellants, Mikhail Kloubakov and Hicham Moustaine, were convicted of obtaining a material benefit from sexual services (s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code) and of procuring, as parties (s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code). However, after entering the convictions, the trial judge determined that the provisions in question were overbroad and that they deprived certain sex workers of the right to security without being in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, thereby infringing s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She held that the infringements were not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and she accordingly declared ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) unconstitutional and suspended the declaration of invalidity for 30 days. She entered a stay of proceedings as a remedy. The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the declarations of invalidity concerning ss. 286.2 and 286.3 and the stay of proceedings, and entered convictions against Mr. Kloubakov and Mr. Moustaine. It referred the matter back to the Court of King’s Bench for sentencing. In its view, the impugned provisions did not infringe s. 7, and a s. 1 analysis was therefore unnecessary. Argued Date 2024-11-12 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to security of person — Criminal law — Commodification of sexual activities — Accused challenging constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions concerning offence of obtaining material benefit from sexual services and offence of procuring — Whether Court of Appeal erred in determining purpose of legislation and of relevant provisions — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that provisions were not overbroad in relation to their purpose, contrary to s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether it is possible to displace presumption that purposes articulated by Parliament are valid — If it is possible, whether presumption is displaced in this case — Whether ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) of Criminal Code infringe rights guaranteed in s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If so, whether these infringements can be justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If infringements are not justified under s. 1, what remedies are most appropriate in this case — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 286.2, 286.3. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants are owners of a residential property in the City of Toronto. They sought an order for adverse possession of a parcel of City parkland that their predecessors in title had fenced off with a chain link fence and enclosed into their backyard. The City acknowledged that the appellants’ evidence satisfied the traditional test for adverse possession. The issue was whether the disputed land was nevertheless immune to a claim for adverse possession by virtue of being City land. The application judge found that a private landowner could not acquire title by encroaching on public land and fencing off portions for their private use. This decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2025-01-16 Keywords Courts — Jurisdiction — Property — Real property — Adverse possession — Home owner fencing off part of municipal parkland for their own use and subsequent owners seeking to acquire that land by way of a claim for adverse possession — Does the statutory scheme or existing case law support the Court of Appeal’s decision to exempt municipal parkland from the real property limitations legislation? — Did the Court of Appeal have the jurisdiction to use the common law to provide that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from the real property limitations legislation? — If so, was it appropriate for the Court of Appeal to amend the law of adverse possession to find that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from claims of adverse possession? — Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, ss. 4, 15, 16. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Dov Markowich, is a shareholder of the appellant, Lundin Mining Corporation (“Lundin”). He sought leave under s. 138.8 of Ontario’s Securities Act, to bring a statutory cause of action against Lundin and its officers and directors for Lundin’s alleged failure to make timely disclosure of pit wall instability and a subsequent rockslide at a mine in Chile (“events”). He also sought to certify the action as a class action under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, advancing claims on behalf of certain shareholders of Lundin. Lundin did not publicly disclose the events at the time they occurred on October 25 and October 31, 2017, respectively. It advised investors about them approximately a month later, on November 29, in its regularly scheduled update. The next day, the price of Lundin’s securities fell 16 per cent on the TSX. The issue at the heart of the appeal involves the competing interpretations of whether there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Markowich’s action will be resolved in his favour at trial based on his claim that Lundin’s lack of disclosure was contrary to its obligations to disclose forthwith a “material change” in its “business, operations or capital”. Argued Date 2025-01-15 Keywords Securities — Civil procedure — Commencement of proceedings — Statutory cause of action for failure to make timely disclosure — Leave to proceed — Mining company disclosing occurrence of pit wall instability and subsequent rockslide in periodic disclosure rather than at time of occurrence — Shareholder seeking to institute class action for company’s failure to make timely disclosure — Commencement of action requiring leave of the court based on whether there is reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved in favour of the plaintiff at trial — Motion judge dismissing motion for leave — Court of Appeal allowing appeal and granting motion for leave — What is a “material change” for the purpose of Canadian securities law? — Should the leave requirement modify or lessen the burden to show a “material change”? — Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss. 138.3(4) and 138.8. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Section 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, provides that no person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of the offence of simple possession of a controlled substance if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene of the medical emergency. Mr. Wilson was with three other people when one overdosed on fentanyl and one of them called 911. Police responding to the 911 call arrested Mr. Wilson for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose. Police conducted a search of the group’s truck and, in a green backpack, discovered modified handguns, parts for firearms, ammunition and identification papers. Later at a police station, Mr. Wilson admitted he was the owner of the green backpack, the guns and the ammunition. He admitted that the identification papers did not belong to him. Mr. Wilson was charged with possession of identity documents, fraudulent impersonation and a number of firearms offences. He was not charged with possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge dismissed an application for a declaration that the evidence should excluded for breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and admitted the evidence. Mr. Wilson was convicted of firearms offences. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and entered acquittals on all counts. Argued Date 2025-01-14 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Arbitrary detention — Good Samaritan law — Police responding to 911 call reporting an overdose and arresting accused for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose — Police conducting search incident to arrest and discovering evidence of firearms offences and false identity offences — Whether police had authority to arrest accused for simple possession of a controlled substance — Whether arrest and search were unlawful and in violation of Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The appellant, an Indigenous man with significant cognitive difficulties, repeatedly sexually assaulted a worker at the group home where he resided. He remained in custody pending trial, including a period of detention in a psychiatric facility while temporarily unfit to stand trial. After resiling from three agreements to plead guilty, the appellant did so the fourth time. From charge to conviction, nearly four years elapsed. The sentencing judge imposed a nine-year custodial term. This term was lengthier than the one requested by the appellant, in part because his cognitive difficulties increase the amount of time required for rehabilitative programming. The sentencing judge considered the appellant’s repeated abandonment of agreements to plead guilty to be wrongful conduct and disallowed enhanced pre-sentence custodial credit for part of the appellant’s detention. The sentencing judge also relied on the relatively favourable conditions of detention in the psychiatric facility as a basis to deny enhanced credit. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal in part, due to an error in calculating the number of days the appellant spent in custody, but otherwise dismissed the appeal. It found that the length of time required to complete rehabilitative programming was one of multiple factors that the sentencing judge considered, and that she was entitled to do so. Furthermore, there was an evidentiary basis to conclude that the appellant’s repeated abandonment of guilty pleas was wrongful conduct, and that the appellant’s conditions of detention did not warrant enhanced credit for his entire period of pre-sentence custody. Argued Date 2024-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Whether anticipated time to complete rehabilitative programming may be considered when determining length of custodial sentence outside of dangerous offender regime — Whether delay caused by offender is wrongful conduct justifying denial of enhanced custodial credit — Whether offenders detained in mental health facilities prior to sentencing entitled to enhanced credit for those periods Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC) The appellant, Tammy Marion Bouvette, was babysitting a 19-month old baby who died while having a bath. An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Evan Matshes. The appellant was charged with second degree murder. The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death. The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that a body of relevant information was within the possession of the Crown and/or police and was not disclosed to the appellant’s counsel. Most significantly, the undisclosed evidence pertained to the reliability of the evidence and opinions of Dr. Matshes. The Court of Appeal held that the conviction must be set aside as the product of a miscarriage of justice, as the evidence and circumstances establish a reasonable possibility that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death had full disclosure been made. The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, vacated the guilty plea, set aside the conviction and entered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2024-11-14 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Powers of the Court of Appeal — Setting aside guilty plea when there has been a miscarriage of justice — Scope of appellate courts’ remedial discretion under s. 686(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to enter an acquittal — Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the entirety of the record as amplified on appeal admits the reasonable possibility of a conviction on a theoretical retrial? — If there remains a reasonable possibility of a conviction on a retrial, does s. 686(2)(a) nevertheless permit a court of appeal to enter an acquittal and, if so, in what circumstances? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Opsis Airport Services Inc., is a federal company that operates the emergency call dispatch centre at Pierre Elliot Trudeau International Airport. The respondent the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions charged Opsis with operating an enterprise that carried on private security activities without holding an agency licence of the appropriate class, contrary to ss. 4 and 114 of the Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5 (“PSA”). Opsis admitted that, without holding an agency licence, it was carrying on activities related to electronic security systems, which are normally subject to the PSA. However, it challenged the PSA’s constitutional applicability. The Court of Québec held that the PSA applied to Opsis and therefore accepted the guilty pleas, convicted Opsis of the offences as charged and imposed fines on it. The court found that the PSA did not intrude on the core of a federal head of power because the PSA had no impact or only a very small impact on Opsis’s operations. The Superior Court allowed Opsis’s appeal, declared the PSA inapplicable to Opsis’s activities related to the operation of the emergency call centre pursuant to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, quashed the convictions and acquitted Opsis of the offences charged. The judge held that the PSA intruded on the core of the federal aeronautics power, which included airport security, and that the intrusion constituted an impairment of the core of the federal power. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the Superior Court’s judgment and affirmed the convictions entered by the Court of Québec. Although Opsis’s activities fell within the core of Parliament’s aeronautics power, the application of the PSA did not cause any actual impairment. A purely speculative or hypothetical impairment did not suffice. Ruel J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. He was of the view that if the PSA were applicable to Opsis’s operations, the provisions would impair the core of federal jurisdiction over aeronautics safety and security. Argued Date 2024-12-11 Keywords Constitutional law — Interjurisdictional immunity — Impairment — Evidence — Federal paramountcy — Conflict of purposes — Provincial offences — Licences — Application of provincial statute to airport security activities — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inapplicable to appellant pursuant to doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity on ground that it impairs Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inoperative in relation to appellant pursuant to doctrine of federal paramountcy on ground that there is conflict of purposes between it and federal legislative scheme relating to aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act and associated regulations apply to appellant’s airport security activities, which are essentially public and governmental in nature — Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) Mr. Kinamore, when he was 22-years old, and the complainant, when she was 16-years old, met at a motorcycle shop and they exchanged messages for a few months. They met for dinner and a movie at Mr. Kinmore’s apartment. Afterwards, Mr. Kinamore was charged with sexual assault. Both the complainant and Mr. Kinamore testified at trial. The complainant described a sexual assault. Mr. Kinamore described a consensual sexual encounter. Both the Crown and the defence tendered evidence of prior messages between the complainant and Mr. Kinamore. In many text messages, the complainant repeatedly stated that she did not intend to have a sexual relationship with Mr. Kinamore. However, the defence led evidence of communications of a sexual nature and some prior communications entered into evidence by Crown counsel contain content that was sexual in nature or that the defence argued was sexual in nature. No voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by Crown counsel and no application was made pursuant to s. 276 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by the defence. Mr. Kinamore was convicted of sexual assault. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2024-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Complainant’s sexual activity — Text messages — Accused charged with sexual assault — Whether prior text messages between accused and complainant were of a sexual nature — If so, whether voir dire was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by Crown counsel — Whether application under s. 276 of Criminal Code was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by defence counsel — Whether complainant’s prior text messages were relevant to whether she consented to sexual activity? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The parties were married in June 2015. They lived in Japan until 2016 when they moved to the United Arab Emirates. They separated for a period in 2017, but reconciled in 2018 and then lived together in Oman until March 2020 when they travelled to Ontario for a number of reasons, including to visit Mr. Dunmore’s parents. They had planned to return to Oman in early April 2020 however, the pandemic precluded them from doing so and they stayed with Mr. Dunmore’s parents in Ontario until January 2021. In the meantime, Ms. Mehralian became pregnant and their son M was born in Ontario in December 2020. The parties and M returned to Oman in January 2021 but came back to Ontario in April 2021. The parties then separated in May 2021. Mr. Dunmore moved to the United Arab Emirates and later Oman, while Ms. Mehralian remained in Ontario with M. Ms. Mehralian commenced proceedings in Ontario in June 2021, seeking a divorce, corollary relief and equalization of property. At the same time, Mr. Dunmore commenced a court proceeding in Oman seeking a divorce and joint custody. Ms. Mehralian contested the jurisdiction of the Omani courts, but in March 2022, the Omani Court of Appeal found that Oman had jurisdiction. In subsequent litigation in which both parties participated, an Omani lower court as well as the Omani Court of Appeal found that the parties had been validly divorced in accordance with Omani law and awarded primary custody of M to Ms. Mehralian. Mr. Dunmore brought a motion in the Ontario Superior Court seeking an order recognizing the validity of the Omani divorce in Ontario and an order returning M to Oman. The two issues were heard separately by two different judges. One judge found that the Omani divorce should be recognized in Ontario. The second judge found that M should not be ordered returned to Oman. Ms. Mehralian appealed the first order and Mr. Dunmore appealed the second. Both appeals were dismissed. Argued Date 2024-12-09 Keywords Family law — Custody — Habitual residence — How should Canadian courts determine the habitual residence of children allegedly abducted from or withheld from a non-Hague Convention signatory state — How should courts balance the countervailing policy objectives outlined in s. 19 of Ontario’s Children’s Law Reform Act — Whether the statutory definition of habitual residence should apply to cases involving non-Hague Convention signatory countries or should the reformulated hybrid test for habitual residence set out in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev apply — If the statutory definition applies, whether shared parental intention should be the focus of the analysis — Whether the lower courts erred in finding that Ontario has jurisdiction — Whether the lower courts erred in law in exercising jurisdiction over the child in the face of the respondent’s attornment to the jurisdiction of the Omani courts — Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, the appellant was charged with the second degree murder of his spouse. Before his trial, a Quebec Superior Court judge allowed his motion for the trial to take place before a judge alone, in accordance with s. 473(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, despite the absence of consent from the respondent prosecutor. The judge was of the opinion that a prosecutor’s decision to consent to a trial before a judge alone does not fall within the core of prosecutorial discretion but is instead a tactical decision subject to a court’s authority to control its own processes. Considering the particularities of the case, the judge was of the view that the accused had discharged his burden of demonstrating that the prosecutor’s decision was unreasonable or unfair in the circumstances. After a trial without jury, the accused was acquitted of second degree murder, but he was convicted of manslaughter. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent prosecutor’s appeal and ordered, among other things, that a new trial be held before a jury on the charge of second degree murder. The court was of the opinion that the trial judge had erred by applying the unreasonableness standard in her review of the prosecutor’s refusal to consent despite the fact that the accused had to prove that this refusal constituted an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal found that the accused had failed to prove this and that the impugned judgment was therefore vitiated by an error of law that had the effect of granting the Superior Court jurisdiction that it did not have. The accused’s trial was therefore a nullity. Argued Date 2024-12-06 Keywords Criminal law — Courts — Jurisdiction — Procedure — Trial — Trial without jury — Trial judge allowing appellant’s motion for trial without jury despite absence of consent of prosecutor — Discretion of prosecutor to consent to trial without jury — Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in finding that trial judge had held appellant’s trial “without jurisdiction” — Whether prosecutor’s appeal of order made by trial judge was governed by s. 676(1)(a) of Criminal Code — If trial was held without jurisdiction, whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in finding that irregularity could not be corrected through application of s. 686(4) of Criminal Code while denying stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 686(8) — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 473, 686(4), (8). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Section 63(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) provides foreign nationals who hold a permanent resident visa with the right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division (“IAD”) against a decision to make a removal order against them made under s. 44(2) or made at an admissibility hearing. In March 2018, the appellant, Dorinela Pepa, came to Canada while in possession of a permanent resident visa as an accompanying dependent child of her father. However, before she came to Canada, Ms. Pepa married. On her arrival in Canada, she advised the point of entry officer of her marriage. Because of the change in her circumstances, Ms. Pepa was admitted for further examination and was not landed. The further examination occurred in the next month, followed by two reports under s. 44 of the IRPA. An admissibility hearing before the Immigration Division (“ID”) of the Immigration and Refugee Board commenced in September 2018. Her visa had expired earlier that month. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ID issued an exclusion order against her. She appealed the decision to the IAD, but the IAD concluded that she had no right to appeal under s. 63(2) because, when the removal order was issued, her visa had expired and so was no longer valid. Ms. Pepa’s application to the Federal Court and appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal were dismissed, with those courts concluding that the IAD’s decision was reasonable. Argued Date 2024-12-04 Keywords Administrative law — Boards and Tribunals — Jurisdiction — Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration Appeal Division – Permanent resident visa expiring after its holder arrived in Canada without being landed but before removal order issued — Visa holder appealing to Immigration Appeal Division — Immigration Appeal Division interpreting statutory provision at issue as not conferring it jurisdiction — Application for judicial review to Federal Court and appeal to Federal Court of Appeal dismissed on basis that interpretation by Immigration Appeal Division was reasonable — What is the appropriate standard of review to the decision of the Immigration Appeal Division regarding the statutory right of appeal under statutory provision at issue? — Whether the Immigration Appeal Division erred in construing statutory provision at issue by determining that the appellant lost her right of appeal because the validity date of her permanent resident visa had passed prior to the issuance of the exclusion order — Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 63(2). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Two people robbed a restaurant with their faces completely covered. The incident was captured on security cameras. The crime remained unsolved for several years until an unsavoury third-party witness implicated the appellant as one of the robbers. The appellant was charged with robbery and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence under the Criminal Code. The appellant elected to be tried by a provincial court judge. The sole issue at trial was the appellant’s identity, and the Crown’s evidence on that element was limited to evidence of the unsavoury witness. The trial judge determined that the witness was able to provide recognition evidence. The witness then testified to multiple ways he was able to identify the appellant in the video despite his face being covered. The trial judge accepted the witness’s evidence and concluded that some of the evidence at trial corroborated his testimony. The trial judge convicted the appellant of robbery and having his face masked while committing an indictable offence. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal from his conviction and affirmed the conviction. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that there was no error in the trial judge’s application of Vetrovec. The trial judge recognized the dangers of relying on the unsavoury witness’s evidence and provided reasons that explained how those challenges were resolved. The dissenting justice would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She concluded that the trial judge had erred in the treatment of the evidence of the Crown’s unsavoury witness. The trial judge’s Vetrovec errors were errors of law that warranted appellate intervention. Argued Date 2024-11-08 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Assessment —Unsavoury Crown witnesses — Sufficiency of Vetrovec scrutiny — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by affirming the trial judge’s reliance on the identification evidence of the Crown’s unsavoury witness — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by affirming the trial judge’s application of the principles set out in Vetrovec v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants, Duncan and Michelle Sinclair, and their son were on a European holiday and were injured in an accident in Venice, Italy. They were passengers on a water taxi that crashed into a wooden structure. The appellants were both injured. The appellants had arranged their travels through Amex Canada Inc., operating under the name Centurion Travel Service which engages third-party travel suppliers for the provision of travel services such as car services, flights and hotel accommodations, at the request and on behalf of Centurion Card members. The day before flying to Venice, Mr. Sinclair booked transportation from the airport in Venice to their hotel, which included a water taxi ride. The water taxi was dispatched by the respondent, Venizia Turismo, and owned by the respondent, Venice Limousine S.R.L. After returning to Canada, the appellants commenced an action seeking damages arising out of the accident. The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the action against them for want of jurisdiction. The motion judge dismissed the motion. The respondents appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. A majority of the court found that there was no Ontario contract connecting the dispute to Ontario and allowed the appeal, staying the appellants’ action. Argued Date 2024-11-07 Keywords Private international law — Jurisdiction — Presumptive connecting factors — Whether the court below failed to identify the operative contracts — Was the majority right to overturn the motion judge’s finding of a connection with an Ontario contract — Was the Court of Appeal right to rule that the connection was rebutted? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents, Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, and Métis Nation – Saskatchewan Secretariate Inc. (collectively, “the Métis respondents” or “MNS”), have long claimed Aboriginal title and rights (including commercial rights) to large areas of the Province of Saskatchewan. The appellant, Government of Saskatchewan, has consistently opposed the existence or recognition of such rights. In 1994, MNS (along with other plaintiffs) brought an action against Saskatchewan and Canada, seeking declarations that the Métis respondents have existing title and rights within the claimed land area, including use of resources for commercial purposes (the “1994 Action”). In 2005, Justice Koch stayed the 1994 Action, in response to a dispute between the parties with respect to the disclosure of certain documents, but granted permission to the MNS to apply for leave to lift the stay in future; to date, MNS has not applied to have the stay lifted. In 2020, MNS commenced a second action against Saskatchewan, challenging a 2010 policy document issued by the Province which had reiterated that claims to Aboriginal title and commercial rights would not be “accepted” by the provincial government, and would not be subject to the Crown’s duty to consult (the “2020 Action”). This action remains ongoing. In March 2021, a resource company (NexGen Energy Ltd.) applied to the Government of Saskatchewan for permits to complete a field mineral exploration program on certain lands that fell within the MNS claim area. In May 2021 and during the early summer of 2021, Saskatchewan met with MNS to consult the Métis about the NexGen permit applications. In July 2021, the Government of Saskatchewan issued three uranium exploration permits to NexGen. In August 2021, MNS filed an originating application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Environment to grant the permits. In December 2021, Saskatchewan filed a notice of application for an order to strike portions of MNS’s originating application for judicial review, relying on Rules 1-4(3) and 7-9(2)(b) of The Queen’s Bench Rules, and arguing that certain paragraphs of the originating application should be struck as vexatious or an abuse of process, given that they addressed matters already covered by the 1994 Action and the 2020 Action. The chambers judge granted the application. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Métis respondents’ appeal, reinstating the impugned paragraphs in MNS’s originating application. Argued Date 2024-11-06 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal rights — Aboriginal title — Crown’s duty to consult — Civil procedure — Abuse of process — Aboriginal group bringing application for judicial review of provincial government decision to issue mining permits to resource company — Aboriginal group alleging failure to fulfill duty to consult — Provincial government moving to strike portions of originating application in light of two other ongoing actions involving same Aboriginal rights and title claims — Chambers judge striking portions of originating application, based on abuse of process doctrine — Court of Appeal setting aside chambers judge’s decision — Whether it is an abuse of process for a claimant to bring multiple actions against the Crown raising the same legal issue in relation to the duty to consult — Whether Haida Nation decision allows claimants to bring duty to consult claims against the Crown based on asserted rights without pursuing the proof of those rights — Queen’s Bench Rules (Saskatchewan), rr. 1-4, 7-9. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Between September 1987 and October 1994, the appellant, Izabela Piekut, obtained a series of student loans through a federal government program. She graduated in 1994 and obtained her teaching diploma the following year. The appellant received two further student loans in 2002 and 2003, when she earned a master’s degree. In 2008, the appellant enrolled in part-time studies, earning her second master’s degree in 2009. That time, she funded her studies herself, with no student loan. In October 2013, the appellant made a consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. A certificate of full performance of that proposal was granted. In June 2019, the appellant applied to the court for a declaration that, by operation of law, she had been released from all debt and interest associated with her government student loans. Her application was dismissed. Her subsequent appeal was also dismissed. Argued Date 2024-11-05 Keywords Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Procedure — Appellant seeking to have student loan debt released through the proposal process — What is the correct interplay between the phrase “date on which the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-time student” under BIA s. 178(1)(g)(i) and the scheme of the regulations under the CSLA and/or the CSFAA specifically noting that under those regulations it is specifically contemplated that a student may cease to be full- or part-time numerous times throughout studies, or afterward, and then apply to be reinstated to that status — Whether, or when she may have been reinstated to that status, or when she again ceased to have that status never to be reinstated to it, the courts below lacked a basis in fact on which to fix a date under s. 178(1)(g)(i) for purposes of determining whether BIA s. 178(1)(g) applied to her consumer proposal or not — Whether a creditor has the onus to prove by evidence that a person who has had a consumer proposal approved by her creditor and the court is by BIA s. 66.28 nevertheless subject to s. 178(1)(g). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC) The appellant participated in a planned robbery with intent to steal a firearm from a seventeen year old youth. He and his co-assailants attacked the victim outside his residence. They beat him and stabbed him. Their victim died from his wounds. The appellant and his co-assailants then entered the victim’s home, pistol-whipped the victim’s mother, and searched the home for firearms. The appellant was charged with first degree murder. He was seventeen years old at the time of the offence and was tried before a jury in Youth Justice Court. He conceded at trial that he was guilty of manslaughter because he willingly participated in a planned robbery. The jury convicted the appellant of first degree murder. The Crown applied to have the appellant sentenced as an adult. The sentencing judge granted the application and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 10 years. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentencing decision. Argued Date 2024-10-15 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Young person sentenced as adult — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in sentencing a young person as an adult on the basis that Crown counsel rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Armed men entered the home of Jennifer Pan and her parents. They shot and killed Mrs. Pan. They shot and seriously injured Mr. Pan. Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Mylvaganam and Mr. Carty were charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. They were tried before a jury. Mid-trial, proceedings against Mr. Carty were severed. The jury convicted Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford and Mr. Mylvaganam on both counts. They appealed from their convictions. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals from the convictions for the attempted murder of Mr. Pan. It allowed the appeals from the convictions for the first degree murder of Mrs. Pan and ordered a new trial in relation to her death. Argued Date 2024-10-17 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Evidence — Remitting counts for retrial — Jurors — What is the test for placing alternative theories of liability for a homicide to a jury, what deference is due to trial judge’s determination of whether an alternative has an air of reality, and whether the curative proviso ought to have been applied to decision not to put alternatives to the jury — Whether appellate courts should remit associated counts for retrial where doing otherwise risks inconsistent trial verdicts, whether the tainting doctrine is part of the test for remittance or for application of curative proviso, and which party bears the onus for establishing tainting and remittance — Scope of the trial judge’s duty in a multi-person complex prosecution to tailor to an accused instructions to the jury on use of evidence of a co-accused’s propensity for violence — Whether trial judge failed to properly assess evidence in considering reasonable apprehension of bias or appearance of unfairness arising from juror interference, sufficiency of inquiry into juror issues and deference due to trial judge’s decisions on juror issues — Admissibility and use of presentations summarizing evidence, what rules and procedural requirements apply to determine admissibility and use by a jury of aids summarizing evidence supporting Crown counsel’s case, and whether PowerPoint presentation supporting Crown counsel’s case was improperly allowed to go into jury room? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In February 2019, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC” or “Commission”), issued Telecom Notice of Consultation 2019-57 for the purpose of initiating a broad review of mobile wireless services and their associated regulatory framework. The Commission indicated that the review would focus on three key areas, including the future of mobile wireless services in Canada, with a focus on reducing barriers to infrastructure deployment. In inviting comments on the matter, an access issue arose which asked whether the CRTC’s jurisdiction over access to municipal infrastructure extended to the installation of 5G small cells. This required the Commission to interpret the term “transmission line” in s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38. The term “transmission line” is found in the Act’s access regime. The access regime authorizes carriers like the appellants to go onto public property to construct, maintain, or operate “transmission lines” with the consent of municipalities. Where terms of access cannot be agreed upon, s. 43(5) accords the CRTC the essentially adjudicative role of considering applications from, and providing redress to, public service providers who cannot gain access to the supporting structure of a transmission line on terms acceptable to them. In the CRTC’s view, “transmission line” could not include small cells or any technologies that transmit telecommunications wirelessly such that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve disputes in this area by way of the access regime. The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed this interpretation, and dismissed the appeal brought by Telus Communications Inc. Argued Date 2024-10-16 Keywords Administrative law — Appeals — Boards and tribunals — Regulatory boards — Jurisdiction — Wireless services — Deployment of 5G network — Access regime to public and other property — Transmission lines — CRTC determining that it lacks jurisdiction over carriers’ access to municipal infrastructure for the installation of 5G small cells — Application of access regime to 5G small cells turning on interpretation of “transmission line” under Act — Does wireless transmission infrastructure (e.g., 5G small cells) constitute, or is it an integral part of, a “transmission line” within the meaning of s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c. 38? Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During a search incident to arrest, a man told police that he had a firearm in his backpack. The officers subsequently seized a loaded prohibited firearm. The Crown ultimately stayed the charges from the initial arrest and proceeded to trial on firearms offences only. In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the police had breached the man’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights and that his arrest and the subsequent search were unlawful. However, under s. 24(2), she found that the officers would have had a legal basis to detain the man for investigative purposes and that the firearm would have been discoverable during a search incident to such a detention. The discoverability of the firearm mitigated the seriousness of the breaches. She admitted the firearm into evidence and the man was convicted. A majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan held that the trial judge erred in concluding that there was a reasonable suspicion that would justify an investigative detention, which is a question of law reviewable on a standard of correctness. That error undermined the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis. The majority conducted the s. 24(2) analysis afresh, excluded the firearm from evidence and substituted an acquittal. In dissent, Tholl J.A. would have dismissed the appeal and would have held that there was no error in the trial judge’s conclusions with respect to a reasonable suspicion for investigative detention. Argued Date 2024-10-11 Keywords Criminal Law – Charter of Rights – Arrest – Investigative detention – Search and Seizure – Whether arresting officers had reasonable suspicion to detain for investigative purposes – Whether concealed firearm was discoverable – Whether evidence of the firearm seized incident to arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter – Whether the Court of Appeal afforded the correct degree of deference to the trial judge’s conclusions – Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 8, 9, 24(2). Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After several years of deteriorating mental health, the appellant moved into a basement apartment with other tenants. Five days later, the appellant attacked one of the other tenants by striking her with a fireplace poker and then strangling her to death. The appellant called 9-1-1 saying that he wanted to turn himself in because he had just “killed a girl.” When police arrived at the scene, he reiterated his desire to turn himself in, surrendered into custody, and he was interrogated by police. He admitted to killing the victim and explained how he had hit and strangled her. In May 2016, a jury found the appellant unfit to stand trial and he was sent to an in-patient treatment facility to see if he could become fit. At a second hearing in August 2016, after spending over three months in hospital, a second jury reversed the first, finding the appellant fit to stand trial. After a trial by judge and jury, the appellant was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction appeal was dismissed. Argued Date 2024-10-10 Keywords Criminal law — Defence — Unfit to stand trial — Not criminally responsible — Under s. 2 “unfit to stand trial” of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, should the test articulated in R. v. Taylor (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 323, be replaced by a test that requires that a mentally disordered defendant have the ability to make rational decisions in the conduct of their defence? — Under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code, what is the proper meaning of the test in R. v. Oommen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 507, in regard to the inability of a mentally disordered defendant to apply their knowledge of moral wrongfulness? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

When an inmate is charged with a disciplinary offence in a Saskatchewan provincial correctional centre or remand centre, s. 68 of The Correctional Services Regulations requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the inmate committed that offence in order to find them responsible. Some of the penalties imposed may deprive inmates of their liberty as that term is used in s. 7 of the Charter. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan sought an order declaring that s. 68 of the Regulations is contrary to s. 7 of the Charter as it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan dismissed the application, holding that s. 68 of the Regulations does not violate s. 7 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2024-10-09 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to liberty — Fundamental justice — Inmate discipline hearings — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in concluding that provincial legislation mandating that inmate discipline hearings operate on a balance of probabilities complies with s. 7 of the Charter — Whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings — The Correctional Services Regulations, 2013, R.R.S. c. C-39.2 Reg 1, s. 68. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

When an inmate is charged with a disciplinary offence in a Saskatchewan provincial correctional centre or remand centre, s. 68 of The Correctional Services Regulations requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the inmate committed that offence in order to find them responsible. Some of the penalties imposed may deprive inmates of their liberty as that term is used in s. 7 of the Charter. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan sought an order declaring that s. 68 of the Regulations is contrary to s. 7 of the Charter as it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan dismissed the application, holding that s. 68 of the Regulations does not violate s. 7 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2024-10-08 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to liberty — Fundamental justice — Inmate discipline hearings — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in concluding that provincial legislation mandating that inmate discipline hearings operate on a balance of probabilities complies with s. 7 of the Charter — Whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings — The Correctional Services Regulations, 2013, R.R.S. c. C-39.2 Reg 1, s. 68. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) Mr. Agpoon was charged in December 2018 with offences relating to human trafficking in minors, possession of fentanyl, and a firearms offence. Mr. Flemmings was added to the Indictment in December 2019 on counts related to human trafficking and possession of fentanyl. The case came before the Ontario Court of Justice before the COVID-19 pandemic closed all Ontario courts on March 17, 2020 and thereafter led to varying province-wide and regional closures, capacity restrictions and operational limitations. The Crown preferred a direct indictment on May 19, 2021. Mr. Agpoon and Mr. Flemmings applied to stay proceedings on the basis of delay. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the application and stayed all charges. The Court of Appeal granted an appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2024-05-22 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Criminal law — What test should trial judges apply under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when deciding whether delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is reasonable? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case) The appellant, Emanuel Lozada, along with other individuals, participated in two fights, the second of which resulted in the fatal stabbing of the victim. At the appellant’s trial for manslaughter, the Crown argued that the appellant was liable for manslaughter either as a co-principal with the man alleged to have stabbed the victim, or as an aider and abettor of the stabber. The jury found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed the manslaughter conviction. He alleged, among other grounds of appeal, that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on the law of causation with respect to co-principal liability. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It concluded that read as a whole, the jury instructions accurately put the law of causation as it applied to the appellant. Paciocco J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. He found that the trial judge twice misdirected jurors by understating the standard of “reasonable foreseeability” they could use in determining whether the appellant’s unlawful act amounted to a “significant contributing cause” of the victim’s death. Argued Date 2024-02-13 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Co-principal liability — Law of causation — Whether the trial judge erred by misdirecting the jury with respect to the “causation” element of unlawful act manslaughter — Whether the doctrine of “intervening act” applies in the context of a group assault — Criminal Code, s. 21(1)(a) Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case) In July 2019, in two separate cases, the respondents appeared in the Court of Québec to answer charges for indictable offences that were punishable by a maximum of 14 years of imprisonment, but that had been punishable by a maximum of 10 years of imprisonment at the time they were allegedly committed. The respondents were thus entitled to a preliminary inquiry. On September 19, 2019, s. 535 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (“Cr. C.”), was amended and the right to a preliminary inquiry was abolished for an accused charged with an indictable offence punishable by less than 14 years of imprisonment. The respondents both requested a preliminary inquiry after September 19, 2019. Both requests were denied by the Court of Québec on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction followed the amendment to s. 535 Cr. C. The Quebec Superior Court denied judicial review in each case. The Quebec Court of Appeal determined that the amendment to s. 535 Cr. C. applies prospectively; it allowed both appeals and referred each case back to the Court of Québec for a preliminary inquiry. Argued Date 2024-02-14 Keywords Criminal law — Preliminary inquiry — Legislation — Prospective application of legislative amendments to preliminary inquiry rules — Interpretation — Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that right to preliminary inquiry depends on law in force at time of commission of offence with which accused is charged — Whether accused charged with indictable offence has right to preliminary inquiry even if not personally liable to 14 years or more of imprisonment — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 535. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2018, the Province of British Columbia (hereafter, “BC”) enacted the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (the “ORA”). The ORA allows BC to recover health care costs caused or contributed to by “opioid-related wrongs” committed by manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs. Section 11 of the ORA applies to proceedings relating to opioid-related wrongs that were ongoing as of the date that it came into force; such proceedings are continued in accordance with the ORA. Section 11(1)(b) states that for the purposes of s. 4 of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (the “CPA”), BC may “bring an action” on behalf of a class consisting of one or more of the governments of Canada and the provinces or territories of Canada (a so-called “multi-Crown” proceeding). Section 11(2) preserves the right of those governments to opt out of the proceeding in accordance with s. 16 of the CPA. Appellants Sanis Health Inc., Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., Sandoz Canada Inc., and McKesson Canada Corporation (collectively, “Sanis”), are named as defendants in the proposed “multi-Crown” class proceeding which underlies this appeal. The underlying proceeding was commenced before s. 11 of the ORA came into force, and it is the only proceeding to which s. 11 applies. Sanis sought, by way of summary trial, an order striking s. 11 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The summary trial judge held that the s. 11 was within the legislature’s authority, and dismissed Sanis’ applications for a declaration of constitutional invalidity. A unanimous Court of Appeal held that the summary trial judge did not err in upholding the constitutional validity of s. 11 of the ORA, and dismissed Sanis’ appeal. Argued Date 2024-05-24 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Civil procedure — Class actions — Multi-Crown proceedings — Provincial legislation providing province may bring an action on behalf of a class consisting of governments of Canada and the provinces and territories of Canada — Whether s. 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35 is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35, s. 11 Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2018, the Province of British Columbia (hereafter, “BC”) enacted the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (the “ORA”). The ORA allows BC to recover health care costs caused or contributed to by “opioid-related wrongs” committed by manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs. Section 11 of the ORA applies to proceedings relating to opioid-related wrongs that were ongoing as of the date that it came into force; such proceedings are continued in accordance with the ORA. Section 11(1)(b) states that for the purposes of s. 4 of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (the “CPA”), BC may “bring an action” on behalf of a class consisting of one or more of the governments of Canada and the provinces or territories of Canada (a so-called “multi-Crown” proceeding). Section 11(2) preserves the right of those governments to opt out of the proceeding in accordance with s. 16 of the CPA. Appellants Sanis Health Inc., Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., Sandoz Canada Inc., and McKesson Canada Corporation (collectively, “Sanis”), are named as defendants in the proposed “multi-Crown” class proceeding which underlies this appeal. The underlying proceeding was commenced before s. 11 of the ORA came into force, and it is the only proceeding to which s. 11 applies. Sanis sought, by way of summary trial, an order striking s. 11 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The summary trial judge held that the s. 11 was within the legislature’s authority, and dismissed Sanis’ applications for a declaration of constitutional invalidity. A unanimous Court of Appeal held that the summary trial judge did not err in upholding the constitutional validity of s. 11 of the ORA, and dismissed Sanis’ appeal. Argued Date 2024-05-23 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Civil procedure — Class actions — Multi-Crown proceedings — Provincial legislation providing province may bring an action on behalf of a class consisting of governments of Canada and the provinces and territories of Canada — Whether s. 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35 is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35, s. 11 Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case concerns the third party spending limits most recently added to the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (“EFA”), in 2021, and whether they infringe the informational component of the right to vote (i.e., a citizen’s right to exercise their vote in an informed manner), which is protected by s. 3 of the Charter. The amendments to the EFA sparked constitutional challenges. The application judge heard and decided two sequential proceedings. In the first proceedings: Working Families Ontario v. Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4076, 155 O.R. (3d) 545 (“Working Families 1”), the application judge concluded that the extension of a 6-month pre-writ restricted period to one that was doubly restrictive was unjustifiable as it did not minimally impair the free expression rights of third party advertisers. In response to that ruling, the Ontario government announced its intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 of the Charter, and introduced Bill 307, which received Royal Assent five days later as the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 31 (“PEDDA”). Other than the addition of the notwithstanding clause, the PEDDA amendments to the EFA are identical to the amendments that were invalidated in Working Families 1. In the second proceedings, which give rise to these appeals, the legislation was challenged as a violation of s. 3 of the Charter, and as an improper use of s. 33 of the Charter. The application judge concluded that the use of the notwithstanding clause in enacting PEDDA was not improper, and that the re-enacted spending limits on third party advertising during the pre-writ period did not infringe the right to vote under s. 3. The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that the notwithstanding clause was properly invoked. However, it concluded that the appeals should be allowed and declared the challenged spending restrictions invalid, but would suspend the effect of the declaration for 12 months. Argued Date 2024-05-22 Keywords Charter of rights — Constitutional law — Elections — Right to vote — Third party election spending limits — Constitutionality of limits imposed by Ontario Election Finances Act, on third party political advertising expenditures in Ontario during 12-month pre-writ period before a fixed date provincial election — Whether s. 37.10.1(2) of Election Finances Act, unjustifiably infringes s. 3 of Charter — What is appropriate standard of review — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred by reformulating test in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, to turn on two “proxies”, namely whether restrictions are “carefully tailored” and whether they permit a “modest information campaign”, and thereby conflating s. 2(b) and s. 3 analyses — Whether majority erred in importing justificatory analysis to s. 3, and in scrutinizing government’s rationale for where lines had been drawn for amount and duration of spending limits — Whether majority erred by failing to give deference to application judge’s factual findings — Whether majority erred by focusing on “change” in impugned spending restrictions as compared with earlier iterations of legislation — In alternative, is any breach of s. 3 justified under s. 1 — Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case concerns the third party spending limits most recently added to the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (“EFA”), in 2021, and whether they infringe the informational component of the right to vote (i.e., a citizen’s right to exercise their vote in an informed manner), which is protected by s. 3 of the Charter. The amendments to the EFA sparked constitutional challenges. The application judge heard and decided two sequential proceedings. In the first proceedings: Working Families Ontario v. Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4076, 155 O.R. (3d) 545 (“Working Families 1”), the application judge concluded that the extension of a 6-month pre-writ restricted period to one that was doubly restrictive was unjustifiable as it did not minimally impair the free expression rights of third party advertisers. In response to that ruling, the Ontario government announced its intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 of the Charter, and introduced Bill 307, which received Royal Assent five days later as the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 31 (“PEDDA”). Other than the addition of the notwithstanding clause, the PEDDA amendments to the EFA are identical to the amendments that were invalidated in Working Families 1. In the second proceedings, which give rise to these appeals, the legislation was challenged as a violation of s. 3 of the Charter, and as an improper use of s. 33 of the Charter. The application judge concluded that the use of the notwithstanding clause in enacting PEDDA was not improper, and that the re-enacted spending limits on third party advertising during the pre-writ period did not infringe the right to vote under s. 3. The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that the notwithstanding clause was properly invoked. However, it concluded that the appeals should be allowed and declared the challenged spending restrictions invalid, but would suspend the effect of the declaration for 12 months. Argued Date 2024-05-21 Keywords Charter of rights — Constitutional law — Elections — Right to vote — Third party election spending limits — Constitutionality of limits imposed by Ontario Election Finances Act, on third party political advertising expenditures in Ontario during 12-month pre-writ period before a fixed date provincial election — Whether s. 37.10.1(2) of Election Finances Act, unjustifiably infringes s. 3 of Charter — What is appropriate standard of review — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred by reformulating test in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, to turn on two “proxies”, namely whether restrictions are “carefully tailored” and whether they permit a “modest information campaign”, and thereby conflating s. 2(b) and s. 3 analyses — Whether majority erred in importing justificatory analysis to s. 3, and in scrutinizing government’s rationale for where lines had been drawn for amount and duration of spending limits — Whether majority erred by failing to give deference to application judge’s factual findings — Whether majority erred by focusing on “change” in impugned spending restrictions as compared with earlier iterations of legislation — In alternative, is any breach of s. 3 justified under s. 1 — Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Appellants TransAlta Generation Partnership and TransAlta Generation (Keephills 3) (collectively, “TransAlta”) own coal-fired electrical power generation facilities in Alberta. The value of those properties is assessed as “linear property” for municipal taxation purposes. The Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, defines the term “linear property” and authorizes the Minister of Municipal Affairs to establish guidelines for assessing its value. In 2016, TransAlta entered into off-coal agreements with the province pursuant to which they agreed to cease coal-fired emissions by December 31, 2030; in exchange, the province agreed to pay TransAlta substantial sums annually for 14 years. On December 19, 2017, the Minister established the 2017 Alberta Linear Property Assessment Minister’s Guidelines (the “Linear Guidelines”), which set out the procedure for calculating all linear property assessments. The Linear Guidelines do not allow for off-coal agreements to be considered in assessing depreciation. TransAlta applied for judicial review which, among other things, challenged provisions of the Linear Guidelines that prevented the off-coal agreements from being considered in the assessment of depreciation as being ultra vires. The application judge found that the Linear Guidelines, including the impugned provisions, were within the Minister’s authority and lawfully enacted. She dismissed the application for judicial review. The Court of Appeal dismissed TransAlta’s appeal. Argued Date 2024-04-25 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Whether 2017 Alberta Linear Property Assessment Minister’s Guidelines discriminate without statutory authority — Either way, whether they are consistent with intent of Municipal Government Act, as required by s. 322(1)(i) — What standard of review applies — Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, ss. 322, 322.1. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-24 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-23 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The respondent, T.J.F., was charged with human trafficking and obtaining a financial or material benefit from human trafficking during a period from 2006 through 2011. The trial judge accepted that the respondent had engaged in threats, intimidation and injury towards the complainant; he characterized this as “past discreditable conduct” but not part of the actus reus of the offences alleged. The complainant testimony included evidence of exploitation and attempted exploitation, but the trial judge did not accept the complainant’s evidence due to issues with her credibility. The respondent was acquitted. On appeal by the Crown, a majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in treating the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct,” but it held that the error had no impact on the acquittal because exploitation and attempted exploitation depended upon the complainant’s testimony which the judge did not accept. The appeal was therefore dismissed. The dissenting judge would have held that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending critical evidence and also concluded that the Crown would have been able to rely on the evidentiary presumption in s. 279.01(3), which was enacted in 2019. The dissenting judge concluded that there is a reasonable degree of certainty the verdict would not have been the same but for the judge’s error. She would have allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2024-03-27 Keywords Criminal Law — Offences — Evidence — Trafficking and obtaining financial or material benefit from trafficking — Credibility — Evidentiary presumption — Temporal application — Whether the trial judge’s erroneous characterization of the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct” rather than part of the actus reus raised a reasonable certainty that the verdict would not have been the same but for the error — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would be triggered in this case — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would apply retrospectively — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 279.01, 279.02, 279.04. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After consuming alcohol, Mr. Wolfe drove his vehicle on the wrong side of a divided highway for a considerable distance at night. He caused a head-on collision that seriously injured Mrs. Niazi and killed her husband and daughter. Mr. Wolfe was convicted on two counts of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing death under s. 220(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and on one count of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm under s. 221 of the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration with a global term of six years. The sentencing judge additionally ordered a driving prohibition for 10 years for each count of criminal negligence causing death and a driving prohibition for 7 years for the count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentence. Argued Date 2024-03-26 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Driving prohibition — Can a driving prohibition be imposed following conviction for criminal negligence causing death through the operation of a conveyance or criminal negligence causing bodily harm through the operation of a conveyance? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case involves a challenge to the validity of regulations adopted by the Agency to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in the course of international air travel. Parliament adopted the Transportation Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c. 10 (“TMA”), which amended the CTA by creating the new s. 86.11. This new provision requires the Agency, after consulting with the Minister of Transport, to make regulations imposing certain obligations on air carriers, notably in relation to flight delays, flight cancellations, denial of boarding, and loss of or damage to baggage. Pursuant to s. 86.11(2) of the CTA, the Minister issued the Direction Respecting Tarmac Delays of Three Hours or Less, S.O.R./2019-110 (the Direction) requiring the Agency to adopt regulations imposing obligations on air carriers to provide timely information and assistance to passengers in cases of tarmac delays of three hours or less. Around the same time, the Agency adopted the Regulations, imposing obligations, including liability, on air carriers with respect to tarmac delays, flight cancellations, flight delays, denial of boarding and damage or loss of baggage in the context of domestic and international air travel. The appellant airlines challenged numerous provisions of the new Regulations on the basis that they exceed the Agency’s authority under the CTA. They claim that the Regulations contravene Canada’s international obligations, in particular the Montreal Convention and many of the Regulations’ provisions are ultra vires because they have impermissible extraterritorial effects, which violate fundamental notions of international law. These matters went directly to the Federal Court of Appeal. It dismissed the appeal, except with respect to s. 23(2) of the Regulations which it found ultra vires of the CTA (this section deals with liability for temporary loss of baggage). Argued Date 2024-03-25 Keywords Transportation law — Air transport — Validity of Air Passenger Protection Regulations, SOR/2019-150 (“Regulations”) adopted by Canadian Transportation Agency (“Agency”) to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in course of international air travel — Whether liability provisions of Regulations, when applied to international carriage by air, are inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (“Montreal Convention”), and ultra vires Agency’s regulation-making power under s. 86.11 of Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 (“CTA”), and therefore invalid — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred by deciding that expert evidence on issues of international law is inadmissible as a matter of law, and by striking those parts of appellants’ expert evidence addressing whether “state practice” relied upon by Attorney General of Canada (“AGC”) is “in the application of”, and consistent with Montreal Convention? Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Police seized a cellphone during a search incident to the arrest of a known drug dealer. The phone was displaying incoming text messages on its screen. The police believed the messages revealed a transaction for heroin, which would likely be laced with fentanyl, was in progress. The police impersonated the drug dealer by responding to the text messages, and arranged to have the drugs delivered to the dealer’s residence. Applicant Dwayne Alexander Campbell arrived at the residence and was arrested. Mr. Campbell was charged under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). At trial, Mr. Campbell brought a motion to exclude evidence, claiming that his rights under s. 8 of the Charter had been infringed by the police action in using the dealer’s phone to communicate with him. The trial judge rejected Mr. Campbell’s claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, and concluded that the likelihood that the drugs were laced with fentanyl created exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless use of the drug dealer’s cellphone. Mr. Campbell was convicted and sentenced. The Court of Appeal held that Mr. Campbell did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his electronic communications, but that the police action was justified by the exigent circumstances doctrine. Consequently, there was no breach of Mr. Campbell’s s. 8 rights. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Campbell’s appeal. Argued Date 2024-03-21 Keywords Charter of Rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Enforcement (s. 24) — Exigent circumstances — Police seizing cellphone in search incident to the arrest of a known drug dealer — Incoming text messages from appellant visible on its screen — Police believing messages concerned impending drug deal involving fentanyl — Police impersonating drug dealer, facilitating drug transaction with the appellant via text message — Whether police breached appellant’s s. 8 rights by warrantless use of drug dealer’s cellphone to impersonate drug dealer and engage in electronic conversation with accused — Whether police action justified by exigent circumstances because the police reasonably believed the drug transaction may have involved fentanyl — Whether police breached the appellant’s s. 8 rights by intercepting private communications without authorization — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded — Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 11; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Part VI Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Following a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Gabriel Boudreau, was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm as a result of a collision between him and the complainant. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge had erred by finding that he had taken part in a race with another driver, by improperly assessing the complainant’s testimony and by failing to consider some of the evidence. The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, as it was of the view that the verdict was not unreasonable, illogical or irrational. The trial judge, who had direct evidence on some aspects and circumstantial evidence on others, could convict the appellant of the offence based on that evidence. The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. In her view, the trial judge had made two errors that undermined the reasonableness of the verdict. She had rejected the testimony on the basis of an illogical inference even though the appellant’s version was consistent with the site of the damage and was confirmed by the complainant’s testimony. In addition, the judge’s finding that the complainant had been driving in the left lane well before the impact was contradicted by the complainant’s testimony. Argued Date 2024-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Unreasonable verdict — Evidence — Whether trial judge arrived at unreasonable verdict by drawing illogical inferences and by drawing inferences that were clearly contradicted by evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Trevor Ian James Lindsay, is a constable with the Calgary Police Service. While processing an arrestee, an altercation occurred between the appellant and the arrestee that left the latter with serious injuries. The appellant was charged with aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code. At trial, the appellant’s defence included s. 25 of the Criminal Code, which protects peace officers from liability related to their lawful use of force. The trial judge concluded that s. 25 did not protect the appellant from criminal liability for his actions. A majority of the Court of Appeal agreed. However, Wakeling J.A., in dissent, would have held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant’s actions constituted an assault, and also that the trial judge erred in concluding that s. 25 did not apply. Wakeling J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2023-12-14 Keywords Criminal Law — Defences — Use of force by peace officer — Protection of peace officers — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in upholding the trial judge’s decision that s. 25 of the Criminal Code did not protect the appellant from criminal liability — Whether the majority of the Court of the Appeal erred in upholding the trial judge’s decision that the prosecution had proven the elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt — Criminal Code, s. 25. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant engaged in a sexual encounter with two other men in a park. A number of hours later, the body of one of those men was found in the park; he had died due to external neck compression. The appellant had mental health difficulties and had consumed both psychiatric medication and alcohol around the time he was in the park with the victim and the third man. The appellant had made several statements both before and after the victim’s death that he wanted to harm and kill gay men, and that he had at times carried a rope and a knife to do so. In the days following the killing, the appellant searched the internet for news with respect to the discovery of a body in the park. A jury found the appellant guilty of first-degree murder. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury had been appropriate. In dissent, Nordheimer J.A. would have allowed the appeal on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the appellant’s mental health as it relates to the intent required for murder and (2) that the trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence. Nordheimer J.A. would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2023-12-15 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Non-direction amounting to misdirection — Need to review mental health evidence with jury — Need to include limiting instruction for after-the-fact conduct evidence — Whether Court of Appeal erred by holding that trial judge did not err in not relating mental health evidence to intent required for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred by holding that the trial judge did not err in not providing a limiting instruction for after-the-fact conduct evidence Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The appellant, a police officer, was temporarily off work because of medical problems. During a meeting with a physician-arbitrator who was to determine whether his disability was permanent, the appellant misrepresented his work activities with his former spouse’s travel agencies. The physician-arbitrator found that his disability was permanent, and the appellant was therefore entitled to permanent disability benefits from his employer. The employer knew of some of the appellant’s work activities but did not tell the physician-arbitrator about them. The trial judge found that all the elements of the offence of fraud over $5,000 had been established. The appellant was convicted of one count of fraud. The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, while the minority would have substituted a verdict of attempted fraud. Argued Date 2024-01-17 Keywords Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Fraud — Deprivation — Concurrence between actus reus and mens rea — Proof of causation — Whether Court has jurisdiction to hear appeal as of right under s. 691(1)(a) of Criminal Code — Whether majority of Court of Appeal interpreted essential element of deprivation too broadly — Whether victim’s prior knowledge of scheme prevents deprivation from being shown — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 380(1). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Appellant Daniel Hodgson was charged with second-degree murder following a death at a house party. The victim, a large man, had become aggressive towards the house owner and refused to leave. Mr. Hodgson, who had been sleeping in a nearby bedroom, was asked by a guest to help remove the victim from the house. The victim died after Mr. Hodgson applied a one-arm choke hold on him. Mr. Hodgson was acquitted at trial. The trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Hodgson had the requisite intent for murder. On the lesser included offence of manslaughter, the trial judge concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hodgson did not act in self-defence pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2024-02-15 Keywords Criminal Law — Defences — Self-Defence — Appellant charged with second-degree murder following an altercation at party — Trial judge finding no intent to murder, and Crown failing to disprove self-defence on the lesser included offence of manslaughter — Appellant acquitted — Court of Appeal setting aside acquittal and ordering new trial — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction in concluding that the trial judge’s failure to infer intent for murder was a reviewable legal error — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge was required to infer the intent for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erroneously approached the issue of the reasonableness of the Appellant’s response from a purely subjective perspective — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 34. Notes (Nunavut) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case) In the Court Martial, a military judge acquitted the respondent, Private D.T. Vu, of sexual assault under s. 130 of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5 (“NDA”), that is to say, s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. It is alleged that the respondent performed a sex act on the complainant who was incapable of consenting to the act by reason of advanced intoxication. The judge concluded that the Crown did not prove part of the actus reus (being a lack of subjective consent) beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant Crown appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court. It submitted that the military judge erred in finding that the prosecution failed to prove a lack of consent or capacity to consent. Its submission rested on the proposition recognized in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, that the judge committed a legal error by failing to consider the entirety and cumulative effect of the evidence in reaching his conclusion on the issue. A majority of the appeal court (per Bell C.J. and Trotter J.A.) dismissed the appeal. It held the military judge did not err in law in his analysis leading to the respondent’s acquittal. Any findings the military judge made that the majority took issue with were held to have no bearing on the verdict reached. The majority further held that in the event it was incorrect on this point, it would rely upon s. 241 of the NDA, which states that “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Division, the Court Martial Appeal Court may disallow an appeal if, in the opinion of the Court, to be expressed in writing, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice”. In dissent, McVeigh J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In her view, the military judge erred in law by failing to consider all of the evidence cumulatively, which led him to speculate improperly about alternative theories. These errors might have reasonably had a material bearing on the verdict. Further, the military judge erred by relying on improper inferences which, in effect, amounted to an insistence that the complainant’s intoxication had to be corroborated beyond the available evidence in this case. Argued Date 2024-01-16 Keywords Criminal law — Armed forces — Military Offences —Sexual Assault — Evidence — Whether the military judge failed to consider all of the evidence cumulatively — Whether the military judge assessed the evidence based on the wrong legal principles. Notes (Federal) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Yves Caleb Jr. Charles, was convicted of assault with a weapon, using an imitation firearm in the commission of assault, and uttering threats. During the trial, a prosecution witness refused to cooperate, and the trial judge allowed the prosecution to introduce an out of court statement made by the witness into evidence as hearsay. In the judge’s view, the statement had features of substantive reliability in light of the corroborative evidence and the circumstances in which the statement had been made. The Court of Appeal, for the reasons of Doyon and Cournoyer JJ.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, as he was of the view that the out of court statement in issue did not satisfy the threshold reliability requirement for being admitted into evidence. He found that the corroborative evidence was not relevant in analyzing the threshold reliability of the assertion made by the witness concerning the appellant’s conduct and words, and that the circumstances in which the statement had been made did not provide sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability. Argued Date 2024-01-18 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Out-of-court statement — Corroborative evidence — Circumstances in which statement made — Whether results of search were considered as corroborative evidence, in accordance with principles enunciated in R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, for purpose of admitting K.A.’s statement into evidence — Whether circumstances of K.A.’s statement provided sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC) On March 23, 2022, the Quebec Court of Appeal issued a redacted version of its reasons, which it had originally delivered on February 28, 2022, allowing the respondent Named Person’s conviction appeal and staying the criminal proceedings brought against Named Person, a police informer. The trial judgment under appeal had not been made public, and all the details of the proceedings, which were held in camera, were unknown to the public. The Court of Appeal ordered that the original version of its judgment and all information in its record be sealed. After the Court of Appeal issued the redacted judgment, the media appellants filed a motion to have the confidentiality orders concerning the appeal record and the trial record lifted in whole or in part. The appellant the Attorney General of Quebec filed a motion to vary the sealing order applicable to the appeal record. The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions. Argued Date 2023-12-12 Keywords Criminal law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Procedure - Criminal law — Charter of Rights — Procedure — Informer privilege — Order that proceedings be held in camera and sealing order — Whether trial judge can proceed outside justice system, completely and totally in camera, without putting together record or revealing very existence of court proceedings, contrary to open court principle protected by s. 2(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether, even though police informer privilege is absolute, its unrestrained interpretation may displace constitutional principle of open court proceedings, as Court of Appeal suggested — In addition to identity and list of information that would automatically identify informer, for which there is absolute protection, what test and framework should apply to permit adversarial proceeding in order to decide what other information might identify police informer — When determining facts that may be published while still protecting police informer’s identity, whether judge who hears application should order that interested third parties be notified and have opportunity to be heard on these matters — Whether Court of Appeal erred in refusing to partially unseal its record on ground that this exercise seemed unworkable. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Respondent Joseph Power was convicted of two criminal offences in the 1990s. He served a term of imprisonment. In 2010 Mr. Power made inquiries about the process to obtain a pardon, but did not apply for one. In 2011, Mr. Power’s employer learned of his criminal record. He was suspended from work. Mr. Power applied for a pardon — now called a record suspension — in 2013 in order to continue working in his chosen field. However, two enactments since 2010 — the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act — had amended the Criminal Records Act. Transitional provisions in both of the amending acts gave them retrospective application to offences that had occurred before their coming into force. The combined effect of these enactments and their transitional provisions was to render Mr. Power permanently ineligible for a record suspension. Mr. Power lost his job and became ineligible for membership with provincial bodies governing his field of employment. The transitional provisions of both the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act, which gave them retrospective application to offences committed prior to their enactment, were later declared unconstitutional. Mr. Power brought an action against the Crown, alleging that the adoption and application of the transitional provisions constituted conduct that was clearly wrong, undertaken in bad faith, and abusive of government power. He sought damages pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Prior to trial, the appellant Attorney General of Canada sought a determination of questions of law, concerning whether the Crown could ever be held liable in damages in respect of the enactment of legislation that is later declared unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal of New Brunswick upheld the application judge’s determination of those questions, and dismissed the Attorney General’s appeal. Argued Date 2023-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Remedy (s. 24), Damages - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Remedy (s. 24) — Damages — Respondent convicted of criminal offences prior to certain amendments to regime for obtaining pardons, but transitional provisions applied the amendments retrospectively — Respondent seeking pardon after employer learned of criminal record, but amendments rendered respondent permanently ineligible for a pardon — Respondent losing his employment — Respondent seeking damages after transitional provisions declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for government officials and Ministers preparing and drafting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for Parliament enacting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act, S.C. 2010, c. 5 — Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 — Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, British Columbia Securities Commission found that the appellants, Thalbinder Singh Poonian and Shailu Poonian, breached the Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, by engaging in conduct that resulted in the misleading appearance of trading activity in, or an artificial price for, a corporation’s shares. It then imposed both a disgorgement order and an administrative penalty against the Poonians. The Commission applied to the BCSC for an order declaring that the amounts owed to it by the Poonians were debts that would not be released by an order of discharge under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The BCSC granted the Commission’s application. It concluded that the debts fell within two exemptions to the discharge of debts outlined at s. 178(1) of the BIA: the debts were fines, penalties or restitution orders imposed by a court (s. 178(1)(a)) and they resulted from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation (s. 178(1)(e)). The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the appeal. While it disagreed that the sanctions had been imposed by a court, it concluded that the BCSC had not erred in finding that the sanctions in this case fell within the exemption defined in s. 178(1)(e) of the BIA. The fact that the misrepresentation was not made to the creditor, in this case, the Commission, did not preclude the Commission from relying on the exemption. Argued Date 2023-12-06 Keywords Bankruptcy and insolvency - Securities - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Debts not released by discharge — Securities Commission finding appellants breached Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, and imposing disgorgement order and administrative penalties — Courts below granting declaration that amounts appellants owe Securities Commission are not to be released by any order or discharge granted under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding Commission’s administrative monetary penalties and disgorgement orders survived Poonian’s discharge from bankruptcy — If so, whether Court of Appeal erred in finding creditors seeking to avail themselves of s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act did not have to prove they were same party debtor made direct representations to by fraud or fraudulent pretense — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 178(1). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, John Aquino, was the directing mind of Bondfield Construction Company Limited (“BCCL”) and its affiliate, 1033803 Ontario Inc., commonly known as Forma-Con (“debtor companies”). He and the other appellants carried out a false invoicing scheme over a number of years by which they siphoned off tens of millions of dollars from both debtor companies. The respondents challenged the false invoicing scheme and sought to recover some of the money under s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and s. 36.1 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. They asserted that the false invoicing scheme was implemented by means of transfers at undervalue by which Mr. Aquino and the debtor companies intended to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor. The appellants asserted that the principles of the common law doctrine of corporate attribution set out in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, did not permit the imputation of Mr. Aquino’s intention to either debtor company. The application judge imputed the fraudulent intention of Mr. Aquino to the corporate debtors. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeals. Argued Date 2023-12-05 Keywords Bankruptcy and insolvency - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Doctrine of corporate attribution — Interpretation of requirement that debtor have intent to defraud, defeat or delay creditor, set out in provision of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that permits courts to declare transfers at undervalue void — Courts below holding intent requirement met by attributing intent of companies’ directing mind to the corporate debtors — Whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to reframe the common law corporate attribution doctrine, as formulated in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, and its progeny, within the bankruptcy context — Whether the Court of Appeal made an extricable error in law when it upheld the applications judge’s ruling to the effect that the true financial condition of the corporate debtors, at the time of the impugned transactions, was not “determinative” of whether its directing mind, as a matter of fact, had the requisite intent to defraud, defeat or delay the third-party creditors — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 96. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) Mr. Tayo Tompouba was charged with sexual assault. On his first appearance, he was not advised of his right to apply for a trial in French, despite the court’s obligation to inform him of that right under s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code. He was convicted following a trial in English. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that not advising Mr. Tayo Tompouba of his right was an error, but it applied the curative proviso to dismiss his appeal. It held that the right provided for in s. 530(3) is a procedural right, not a substantive right. Argued Date 2023-10-11 Keywords Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Language of accused — French-speaking accused not advised of his right to be tried in official language of his choice — Whether curative proviso in s. 686 of Criminal Code can apply to violation of s. 530(3) of Criminal Code — Whether new trial must be ordered — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 530(3), 686(1)(b). Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The appellants are members of the Canadian Armed Forces who had various charges laid against them. They each filed a preliminary application in the Court Martial seeking a stay of proceedings because of an alleged infringement of their constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They argued that their right was infringed by an order by the Chief of Defence Staff dated October 2, 2019 regarding the designation of a commanding officer for purposes of considering disciplinary matters for military judges (“impugned order”). Captain Crépeau, in her application, also asked the tribunal to declare ss. 12, 18 and 60 of the National Defence Act to be of no force or effect, alleging that their combined effect was to allow the Chief of Defence Staff to issue an order, like the impugned order, relating directly to discipline for military judges and thus to permit the military hierarchy to exert pressure on a military judge presiding at a court martial. In a series of decisions, military judges concluded that there was an infringement of the accused’s right guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Charter. In each of the proceedings, they made a similar declaration to the effect that the impugned order was an infringement of the right set out in s. 11(d) of the Charter. They also stayed the proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada allowed the Crown’s appeals, ruling that no informed person would conclude that there was an apprehension of bias or that the independence of courts martial was compromised. It dismissed Captain Crépeau’s cross-appeal. This appeal will be heard jointly with the appeals in files 39822, 40046, 40065 and 40103. Argued Date 2023-10-16 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law, Judicial independence, Armed Forces, Military offences - Charter of Rights — Right to be tried by independent and impartial tribunal — Constitutional law — Judicial independence — Courts martial — Armed forces — Military offences — Since R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, does the military status of military judges still raise a reasonable apprehension of bias? — Since Généreux, has there been significant societal change which dissipates this Court’s concern that the military status of military judges is a matter of practical necessity? — If so, does the military status of military judges, prescribed under the National Defence Act’s legislative scheme, lead an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, to conclude that there is an apprehension of bias contrary to s. 11(d) of the Charter? — If so, is this violation justified under s. 1 of the Charter? — If not, what is the appropriate constitutional remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(d) — National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5, s. 165.21(1) . Notes (Federal) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 1991, Newfoundland and Labrador reorganized its northeast Avalon municipalities, expanding St. John’s boundaries and triggering a new planning process for St. John’s. The Lynch property and others were zoned as “watershed” because they fall within the Broad Cove River Watershed, which feeds St. John’s municipal water supply. In 2011, the Lynches asked the City what sort of residential, agricultural, forestry or public utility uses the property could be put to. They were informed verbally that no development would be permitted. They then applied to develop a ten-lot residential subdivision. In a letter dated February 1, 2013, the City Manager rejected their application as being contrary to ss. 104 and 106 of the City of St. John’s Act and the development regulations which established the watershed zoning. The municipal water supply had been subject to statutory protection through limits on development since before the Crown Grant in 1917. In 1959, the City of St. John’s Act was amended to add the Broad Cove Watershed to the area within St. John’s control, even though it was not within the city itself. As a result, the Lynch property was subject to St. John’s pollution control and its powers of expropriation, and its use and development were restricted. Residential building was not expressly prohibited until 1964, when St. John’s amended the City of St. John’s Act to prohibit the erection of most buildings in the controlled area unless they were associated with existing private family dwellings. In 1978, these restrictions were softened to allow the City Manager to grant permission to build on the land. In 1992, St. John’s boundaries were expanded to include the Lynch property, so St. John’s general land use zoning applied to the property. The watershed zoning came into effect in 1994, and the resulting management plan, which included keeping St. John’s watersheds “as pristine as possible”, was adopted in 1996. The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal held that the City Manager’s decision to prevent any development in any manner, set out in the February 1, 2013, letter, constituted constructive expropriation: Lynch v. St. John’s (City), 2016 NLCA 35, at paras. 66-67 (“Expropriation Decision”). The Court of Appeal remitted the issue of compensation to the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities. In the course of determining compensation, the Board referred the following question to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador under the Expropriation Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. E-19, s. 26(3), by special case: Whether the Lynches’ compensation should be assessed based on the uses permitted by the existing zoning, which are agriculture, forestry and public utility uses, or whether the existing zoning should be ignored and the value determined as if residential development were permissible. The applications judge granted compensation for constructive expropriation of property based on existing watershed zoning. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, ordering that compensation be determined without reference to watershed zoning. Argued Date 2023-11-16 Keywords Expropriation - Expropriation — Constructive expropriation — Compensation — Causation — How compensation for constructive expropriation should be assessed — Proper causation analysis for determining loss to landowner — Pointe Gourde principle — Whether regulations sufficiently linked to expropriation of property to justify application of Pointe Gourde principle. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Appellant Ummugulsum Yatar was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Ms. Yatar applied to her insurer, TD Insurance Meloche Monnex (hereafter, “TD”) for housekeeping and home maintenance benefits, as well as income replacement benefits (IRB). TD initially paid those benefits. About a year later, following insurance medical examinations, TD denied Ms. Yatar’s claim for housekeeping and home maintenance benefits. Several months after that, TD denied her IRB claim. Ms. Yatar brought an application before the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) to challenge the denial of her insurance benefits claim. The application was dismissed. She requested a reconsideration of the LAT decision, which was also dismissed. Ms. Yatar then brought an appeal on questions of law and an application for judicial review of the LAT reconsideration decision before the Divisional Court. The court dismissed both the appeal and the application. The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms. Yatar’s appeal from the Divisional Court’s decision. Argued Date 2023-11-15 Keywords Administrative law - Boards and tribunals, Appeals, Judicial review - Administrative law — Boards and tribunals — Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) — Appeals — Judicial review — Appellant injured in motor vehicle accident, insurer denying claim for benefits — LAT dismissing appellant’s benefits claim — Appellant simultaneously appealing on questions of law and seeking judicial review on questions of fact and mixed fact and law — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the legislature’s decision to limit the right of appeal to pure questions of law restricted the availability of judicial review concerning other questions to rare or unusual cases — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding the adjudicator’s decision was reasonable — Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. G — Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 — Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Bombardier inc. entered into a procurement contract with the respondent branch of the Greek government (HMOD) for ten firefighting amphibious aircraft. There was also an Offsets contract by which Bombardier committed to offset programs inviting Greek suppliers as subcontractors for the work, for a total credited value of 110% of the main contract. Bombardier was to pay up to 10% of this amount as liquidated damages if the Offsets contract was not fulfilled, which was secured by a letter of guarantee with the appellant. Bombardier arranged a corresponding letter of counter-guarantee issued by National Bank of Canada in favour of the appellant. A dispute arose under the Offsets contract. Bombardier filed a request for arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. It later amended its request to include the issue of whether the Offsets contract was null and void for violating the principle of the free movement of goods under the laws of the European Union. Although at one point HMOD made an undertaking not to seek payment under the letter of guarantee while arbitration was pending, it later demanded payment of the US $13,868,354 from the appellant under the letter of guarantee. Bombardier sought and received interim injunctions against payment from Quebec courts and through an Interim Order of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal, and the appellant obtained an interim injunction from a Greek court. When a further injunction was denied by a Greek court, and with the imminent release of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal Award, HMOD served the appellant with an Extrajudicial Invitation Protest, ordering it, under penalty of law, to make payment under the letter of guarantee. Shortly after the appellant paid HMOD, the Final Award of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal was released, ruling that the Offsets Contract, including its terms pertaining to the liquidated damages and to a letter of guarantee, violated EU law and was null and void ab initio. When National Bank refused payment to the appellant under the letter of counter-guarantee, the appellant sought recovery through the courts of Quebec. The Superior Court of Quebec confirmed its jurisdiction and rejected the appellant’s demand for payment under the letter of counter-guarantee on the basis of the fraud exception. It held that the letter of counter-guarantee was unenforceable and enjoined National Bank from paying pursuant to it. The court homologated the ICC Arbitral Tribunal Final Award and ordered the HMOD to comply with it. The Quebec Court of Appeal confirmed the trial court decision, except to strike out that part of the trial judgment ordering HMOD to comply with the Final Arbitral Award. Argued Date 2023-11-14 Keywords Commercial law - Commercial law — Banks and banking operations — Letters of credit — Bank’s obligation to pay on presentation of letter of guarantee and counter-guarantee — Fraud exception — Scope and availability of exception — Jurisdiction of Quebec courts — What are the proper limits to the fraud exception to the autonomous nature of letters of credit — Could the Quebec courts rule that the appellant’s conduct amounted to bad faith when it abided by the judgments rendered by the court of competent jurisdiction — How is risk to be apportioned between the parties to a complex commercial transaction scheme utilizing letters of credit — Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R 59. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 1850, the respondents, the Anishinaabe of the northern shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, entered into two treaties with the Crown: the Robinson-Huron Treaty and the Robinson-Superior Treaty (“Treaties”). The Treaties provided for cessation of a vast territory in northern Ontario, and for payment, in perpetuity, of an annuity to the Anishinaabe. The initial agreed-upon sum was paid and an Order-in-Council declared them ratified and confirmed. In 1875, the annuity was increased to $4 (£1) per person, and, in 1877, the Huron and Superior chiefs petitioned successfully for arrears on the increase since the conditions for increasing the annuity had been met long before the increase. The annuity has not changed since. The Huron respondents initiated an action against Canada and Ontario seeking declaratory and compensatory relief related to the interpretation, implementation and alleged breach of the annuity provisions in the Robinson-Huron Treaty; the Superior respondents made the same claims under the Robinson-Superior Treaty. The actions were tried together, split into three stages. At Stage One, the Treaties were interpreted, at Stage Two, the defences of Crown immunity and limitations were addressed, and, at Stage Three, the remaining issues (inter alia, damages and the allocation of liability) stood to be addressed. This appeal relates to Stages One and Two. Stage Three of the trial commenced in February 2023, but a settlement of that stage was reached. Argued Date 2023-11-08 Keywords Aboriginal law - Treaty rights, Fiduciary duty, Appeals, Standard of review - Aboriginal law — Treaty rights — Interpretation of treaty promises— Fiduciary duty —Appeal — Standard of review — Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850 — Robinson-Superior Treaty of 1850 — Duty of diligent implementation — Proper approach to interpretation of treaties — Appropriate standard of review for interpretation — Proper interpretation of augmentation provision in Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 —Whether Crown’s obligation to implement augmentation promise mandates specific outcomes capable of judicial determination — Whether Crown’s failure to implement augmentation promise in accordance with honour of Crown is appropriately remedied by a declaration — How limitations legislation is to be viewed given Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 polycentric exercise of discretion — Whether fiduciary duty can coexist with duty of diligent implementation — Whether trial judge erred in finding “procedural” ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether elements of sui generis fiduciary duty present. Aboriginal law —Appropriate standard of review — Existence of fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court was correct to overturn finding of ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court erred in failing to find existence of sui generis fiduciary duty — Whether majority on appeal was correct in observing that generalized fiduciary obligation has been largely replaced by honour of Crown. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

A corporate taxpayer requested that the Minister of National Revenue exercise her discretionary power under s. 247(10) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (“ITA”) to adjust the value of a non-arm’s length transaction downward, which would, in turn, reduce the amount of the taxpayer’s assessment. The Minister declined to do so. The taxpayer wished to challenge the Minister’s decision, but it was unclear whether the Tax Court or Federal Court had jurisdiction to do so. The parties put a stated question to the Tax Court to determine the jurisdictional issue: Where the Minister of National Revenue has exercised her discretion pursuant to s. 247(10) of the ITA to deny a taxpayer’s request for a downward transfer pricing adjustment, is that a decision falling outside the exclusive original jurisdiction granted to the Tax Court of Canada under s. 12 of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2 and s. 171 of the ITA? The Tax Court judge determined that the Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction to review the Minister’s decision. She held that the decision directly affected the computation of income, and was therefore part of the assessment. Appeals of assessments are within the Tax Court’s jurisdiction. The Federal Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion and allowed the Crown’s appeal. The decision is part of the process of the assessment, and the Tax Court only has the power to hear appeals of the product of that process. Furthermore, correcting an error in the Minister’s decision requires a power to quash or issue an order of mandamus, and the Tax Court does not have those powers. Argued Date 2023-11-09 Keywords Courts - Jurisdiction, Income tax - Courts —Jurisdiction — Income tax — Whether review of exercise of Minister’s power under subsection 247(10) of Income Tax Act is within Tax Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 1850, the respondents, the Anishinaabe of the northern shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, entered into two treaties with the Crown: the Robinson-Huron Treaty and the Robinson-Superior Treaty (“Treaties”). The Treaties provided for cessation of a vast territory in northern Ontario, and for payment, in perpetuity, of an annuity to the Anishinaabe. The initial agreed-upon sum was paid and an Order-in-Council declared them ratified and confirmed. In 1875, the annuity was increased to $4 (£1) per person, and, in 1877, the Huron and Superior chiefs petitioned successfully for arrears on the increase since the conditions for increasing the annuity had been met long before the increase. The annuity has not changed since. The Huron respondents initiated an action against Canada and Ontario seeking declaratory and compensatory relief related to the interpretation, implementation and alleged breach of the annuity provisions in the Robinson-Huron Treaty; the Superior respondents made the same claims under the Robinson-Superior Treaty. The actions were tried together, split into three stages. At Stage One, the Treaties were interpreted, at Stage Two, the defences of Crown immunity and limitations were addressed, and, at Stage Three, the remaining issues (inter alia, damages and the allocation of liability) stood to be addressed. This appeal relates to Stages One and Two. Stage Three of the trial commenced in February 2023, but a settlement of that stage was reached. Argued Date 2023-11-07 Keywords Aboriginal law - Treaty rights, Fiduciary duty, Appeals, Standard of review - Aboriginal law — Treaty rights — Interpretation of treaty promises— Fiduciary duty —Appeal — Standard of review — Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850 — Robinson-Superior Treaty of 1850 — Duty of diligent implementation — Proper approach to interpretation of treaties — Appropriate standard of review for interpretation — Proper interpretation of augmentation provision in Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 —Whether Crown’s obligation to implement augmentation promise mandates specific outcomes capable of judicial determination — Whether Crown’s failure to implement augmentation promise in accordance with honour of Crown is appropriately remedied by a declaration — How limitations legislation is to be viewed given Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 polycentric exercise of discretion — Whether fiduciary duty can coexist with duty of diligent implementation — Whether trial judge erred in finding “procedural” ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether elements of sui generis fiduciary duty present. Aboriginal law —Appropriate standard of review — Existence of fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court was correct to overturn finding of ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court erred in failing to find existence of sui generis fiduciary duty — Whether majority on appeal was correct in observing that generalized fiduciary obligation has been largely replaced by honour of Crown. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The private communications of two teachers, recorded on their personal, password-protected log were read and captured by screenshots taken by their school principal, and then used by the respondent school board (“Board”) to discipline them. The union filed a grievance against the written reprimand issued to the teachers (“Grievors”) claiming the Board violated the Grievors right to privacy by assessing private digital information without reasonable cause and using that information as the basis for an investigation that led to the discipline. By the time the grievance was heard, the written reprimands had been removed from the Grievors’ records. But the parties agreed to move forward with the issue of the alleged breach of the right to privacy. The arbitrator dismissed the grievance against the Board. The majority of the Divisional Court upheld the arbitrator’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the award of the arbitrator. Argued Date 2023-10-18 Keywords Canadian charter (Non-criminal) - Charter of Rights — Unreasonable search and seizure — Reasonable expectation of privacy — Private communications of teachers captured by screenshots taken by school principal and used for discipline purposes — What standard of review applies to labour arbitrator’s decision adjudicating employee’s privacy claim — Whether Charter applies to school boards — Scope and content of employee’s privacy rights in workplace, either under s. 8 of Charter or common law. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Don Johnson, was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder by a jury. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed his appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to leave party liability with the jury. Nordheimer J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. In his view, there was an insufficient evidentiary foundation to leave the route of party liability with the jury, as there was no air of reality to the suggestion that, if the appellant was not the shooter, he aided the actual shooter in the commission of the murders. The instructions were also inadequate, as the trial judge did not adequately set out the requirements that had to be met to prove that route. Argued Date 2023-10-13 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Party liability — Did the majority of the Court of Appeal err in finding that party liability was properly left to the jury as a route to conviction? — In the alternative, did the majority of the Court of Appeal err in finding that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury on party liability were adequate?. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Pine Valley Enterprises Inc. (“PVE”) contracted with Earthco Soil Mixtures Inc. (“Earthco”) for the supply of topsoil for use in a project. After reviewing dated test results for “R Topsoil,” it placed an order for 3,678 cubic yards of “Screened topsoil with extra Organics added.” The contract included exclusion provisions that allowed PVE to test the soil prior to shipment, and that, if PVE waives its right to testing, Earthco is not responsible for the “quality” of the material. PVE waived its right to test the soil. After delivery, testing revealed that the topsoil significantly differed from the earlier test results. PVE was forced to remove the topsoil and then sought compensation from Earthco, which in turn disclaimed responsibility because PVE had waived its right to test the soil before shipment. PVE brought an action against Earthco for damages. The trial judge found that the contract was for a “sale by description” within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.1. He held that the topsoil delivered did not correspond to the description in the contract, contrary to s. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act. The trial judge also found, however, that the parties had expressly agreed to absolve Earthco of liability for variations in soil composition that amount of discrepancies in the description of the goods, as permitted by s. 53 of the SGA. Therefore, he dismissed PVE’s action. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the contract was for a “sale by description” and that there was a discrepancy between the description of the goods in the contract and the goods delivered. However, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in using the factual matrix of the contract to determine that the exclusion clauses ousted s. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed PVE’s appeal. Argued Date 2023-10-17 Keywords Sale of goods - Sale of goods — Sale by description — Implied condition as to description — Goods described with reference to quality — Whether statements as to quality can form part of an item’s description Appeals — Courts — Standard of review — Contractual interpretation — Standard of appellate review applicable to trial judge’s interpretation of exclusion clauses — Did the trial judge err in law by relying on the factual matrix of the contract to interpret the exclusion clauses? — Did the Court of Appeal err in reviewing the trial judge’s decision on a standard of correctness? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On September 22, 1877, the Blackfoot Confederacy and the Crown executed Treaty 7, which established Reserve No. 148, the largest reserve in Canada. It is the home of the Kainai, or Blood Tribe. Under the Treaty, the size of the reserve was to be established through a formula promising “one square mile for each family of five persons, or in that proportion for larger and smaller families”. The Blood Tribe has long claimed that the actual size of its reserve did not accord with that promised by the Treaty and, in 1980, commenced an action in the Federal Court. For decades the action sat in abeyance. In 2016, the court held phase I of the trial of the action, for the purpose of receiving oral history evidence from aging members of the Blood Tribe. Phase II commenced in 2018 to hear fact and expert witness evidence, and to make a determination on liability. At the completion of phase II, the trial judge found that the Blood Tribe’s claims were discoverable more than six years before the action was commenced in 1980 and, with the exception of a claim for breach of treaty, were therefore time-barred through the operation of The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 209 and s. 39 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7. The trial judge held that an action for breach of a treaty commitment could not be pursued in a Canadian court prior to the advent of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Therefore, for the purposes of the limitations statute, time for a breach of treaty claim only began to run in 1982. The trial judge found that Canada was in breach of its treaty commitment, and that the size of the Reserve was understated by 162.5 square miles. The Crown appealed. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the Federal Court’s judgment to state that all claims of the Blood Tribe were time-barred. Argued Date 2023-10-12 Keywords Aboriginal law - Treaty rights, Limitation of actions - Aboriginal law — Treaty rights — Treaty 7 — Limitation of actions — Breach of treaty as cause of action —Whether breach of treaty was actionable in Canadian courts prior to the coming into force of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Whether limitation periods for breach of treaty claims began to run prior to the passage of s. 35 — Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 209; Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 . Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC) A journalist with the CBC made an application under the Act for disclosure of the mandate letters addressed from the Premier of Ontario to each minister setting out’s the Premier’s policy priorities for the minister’s mandate. The Cabinet Office opposed the disclosure on the basis of s. 12(1) of the Act, the introductory language of which provides that a government head shall refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure would reveal the substance of deliberations of the Executive Council or its committees. In Order PO-3973, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario ordered disclosure of the mandate letters to the CBC. He determined that a record not listed at subparagraphs (a) to (f) will qualify under the opening words of s. 12(1) if the context or other information would permit accurate inferences to be drawn as to actual Cabinet deliberations at a specific Cabinet meeting. The words do not encompass the outcome of the deliberative process, such as policy choices. The Commissioner found that Cabinet Office must provide sufficient evidence to establish a linkage between the content of the record and the actual substance of Cabinet deliberations, and concluded that neither the content and context of the letters nor the evidence and representations of Cabinet Office met the test under section 12(1). The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review and the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, with Lauwers J.A. dissenting. Argued Date 2023-04-18 Keywords Access to information - Exemptions, Mandate, Legislation, Interpretation - Access to Information – Access to records – Exemptions – Cabinet records – Mandate letters – Legislation – Interpretation – Whether confidential communications in respect of policy initiatives and development, prepared by the Premier of Ontario for his Cabinet ministers, are protected by the Cabinet records exemption – Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 31, s. 12(1). Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN) After a trial in the Court of Québec, the respondent, Olivier Chatillon, was convicted of one count of sexual assault of a child. The trial judge held that the prosecution’s case could be based on the admissions made to the professionals who had assessed him, although he had met with them during an entirely voluntary therapeutic process to receive treatment for problems associated with substance abuse and sexual deviance. The Court of Appeal, for the reasons given by Vauclair J.A. and concurred in by Healy J.A., granted the motion for leave to appeal, allowed the appeal and acquitted the respondent. It declared that the admissions were inadmissible in evidence based on its analysis of the Wigmore criteria for privilege. Mainville J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the respondent’s appeal on the ground that the admissions were admissible because they were not privileged. By consenting to the disclosure of his admissions, the respondent had expressly waived their confidentiality. Argued Date 2023-03-15 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility - Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Admissions — Wigmore test — Whether majority of Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in finding respondent’s admissions inadmissible on ground that they were privileged under Wigmore test. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) Following a judge-alone trial, the appellant, Mr. Hay, was acquitted of one count of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The appellant conceded that the complainant did not consent to anal intercourse on September 13, 2019. The only issue on appeal was whether Mr. Hay had an honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s communicated consent. Following a s. 276 voir dire, the trial judge admitted evidence of a previous sexual encounter on August 24, 2019. The trial judge found there was an air of reality to the appellant’s defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent. She concluded that the Crown had failed to prove the necessary mens rea and acquitted him. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal, quashed the acquittal and entered a conviction for sexual assault. It found the trial judge erred in law both by admitting the evidence of previous sexual conduct and by finding there was an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent. Argued Date 2023-05-19 Keywords Criminal law - Offences, Evidence, Defences - Criminal law — Offences — Sexual assault — Consent — Evidence — Defence — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred by conflating the actus reus for sexual assault (consent) with the mens rea (belief in communicated consent or a mistaken belief in communicated consent) — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred by reversing the trial judge’s decision admitting evidence of previous sexual acts on the s. 276 application — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred by reversing the criminal standard of proof to place an onus on the appellant to establish his innocence — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in substituting its own view of the facts contrary to the trial judge’s findings in relation to the testimony of the appellant — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred by requiring proof of explicit consent as a prerequisite for the defence of mistaken belief in communicated consent to apply. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The complainant was intoxicated, and eventually passed out or fell asleep in the respondent’s bedroom. She testified that she woke up to find the respondent on top of her with his penis inside her vagina. The respondent denied having sex with the complainant. The respondent was convicted of sexual assault. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2023-05-18 Keywords Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Judgments — Sexual assault — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge relied on speculative reasoning in accepting the complainant’s evidence — Whether there was no merit to the respondent’s alternate argument regarding alleged misapprehensions of evidence, and the appropriate remedy was to restore the conviction. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) An accused was charged with several offences. Before the jury selection process began, a ban on publication was imposed on all pre-trial applications in the proceedings pursuant to s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code. A consortium of major media outlets applied to have the ban clarified and declared applicable only after the jury is empaneled. The motion judge dismissed the application. Argued Date 2023-05-17 Keywords Criminal law - Publication bans - Criminal law — Publication bans — Whether a publication ban pursuant to s. 648 of the Criminal Code applies to proceedings before a jury is empaneled? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC) The respondent Frédérick Silva was charged with four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder based on incidents that occurred on February 21, 2017, and December 20, 2018. On November 22, 2019, the prosecution laid five charges by direct indictment. On August 2 and October 15, 2021, respectively, the Superior Court dismissed Mr. Silva’s motion for a stay of proceedings and Garofoli motion. It also made orders under s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Cr. C.), prohibiting publication, broadcasting and transmission in relation to the two judgments. Further to those judgments, and by consent of the parties, Mr. Silva was tried by a judge alone, without a jury, on four of the five counts. On November 16, 2021, he formally recognized that the prosecution had discharged its burden on each essential element of the four offences through a nolo contendere proceeding. On January 27, 2022, Mr. Silva was convicted on the four counts. The parties agreed that the last count, which was for second degree murder, would be separated from the indictment and that Mr. Silva would have a trial by judge and jury on that count in May 2022. Before the trial began, La Presse brought a motion to lift the orders prohibiting publication, broadcasting and transmission in relation to the two judgments. On March 11, 2022, the Superior Court dismissed the motion. On May 6, 2022, Mr. Silva filed a nolo contendere proceeding on the last count, leading to the cancellation of the jury trial. Argued Date 2023-05-16 Keywords Criminal law - Publication bans - Criminal law ? Publication ban ? Orders prohibiting publication, broadcasting and transmission in relation to judgments on voir dire ? Whether s. 648 of Criminal Code applies prior to jury selection ? Whether Superior Court erred in applying Dagenais/Mentuck test ? Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 648. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, George Zacharias, was convicted under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, for possession of 101.5 pounds of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking. The main issue at trial was whether Cst. MacPhail, who conducted a traffic stop of Mr. Zacharias’ truck, had reasonable suspicion to enter into an investigative detention and deploy a sniffer dog. The trial judge found that the initial investigative detention and the sniffer dog search were unlawful and breached the ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights of Mr. Zacharias to be free from unreasonable search and arbitrary detention. Applying the test in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, the trial judge then found that the first two factors did not strongly favour exclusion of the evidence and that the third one favoured inclusion. The evidence was therefore admitted. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Zacharias’ appeal, declining to consider his arguments regarding the additional breaches that were neither included in his Charter notice nor argued at trial, as it would have been unfair for an appellate court to make findings of fact of new breach arguments. Further, the majority concluded that while the trial judge did not expressly include the s. 9 Charter breach in her consideration of the second stage of the Grant analysis, her failure to do so did not affect the result. In dissent, Khullar J.A. would have allowed Mr. Zacharias’ appeal, excluded the drug evidence and other evidence seized, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal. In her view, while there was no reviewable error at the first and third stage of the Grant test, the second Grant factor strongly favoured exclusion of the evidence. The trial judge only considered the exterior search of the vehicle by the sniffer dog, but there were several more Charter breaches. Balancing the three factors together, Khullar J.A. found that admitting the evidence would undermine the reputation of the criminal justice system in the eyes of a reasonable person informed of all the relevant circumstances. Argued Date 2023-05-15 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Arbitrary detention (s. 9), Search and seizure (s. 8), Enforcement (s. 24) - Constitutional Law — Charter of Rights — Arbitrary detention — Search and seizure — Enforcement — Exclusion of evidence — Whether the trial judge properly considered all the relevant Charter-infringing state conduct. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, the Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec (Association), was formed in 1997 under the Professional Syndicates Act, CQLR, c. S-40. Seventy percent of the operations supervisors assigned to the gaming tables at Casino de Montréal are members of the Association. The supervisors are the fifth level of management and are front-line managers at the appellant employer, Société des casinos du Québec inc. (Société). The Société is a subsidiary of the Société des loteries du Québec responsible for four casinos, including Casino de Montréal. Given that each casino’s operations are divided into three areas — gaming tables, slot machines and poker rooms — the Association’s members make up a majority of the supervisors in all three areas combined. Since its creation, the Association’s goal has been to secure recognition from the employer so that it can represent the supervisors and negotiate their conditions of employment. In November 2009, the Association filed a petition for certification with the Commission des relations du travail (which in 2016 became the Administrative Labour Tribunal (ALT)) under ss. 25 et seq. of the Labour Code, CQLR, c. C-27. The filing of that petition allegedly arose out of numerous failed attempts by the parties to negotiate changes to a memorandum of understanding entered into in 2001. In the petition, the Association also asked that the exclusion of managers from the definition of “employee” in s. 1(l)(1) of the Labour Code be declared constitutionally inoperable against the Association and its members on the ground that the provision infringed the freedom of association guaranteed in s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12 (Quebec Charter). The ALT declared that s. 1(l)(1) infringed the freedom of association guaranteed by the two charters to the persons covered by the Association’s petition for certification and that the section was of no force or effect in the context of the petition. The Superior Court allowed the application for judicial review filed by the Société, and the Court of Appeal allowed the Association’s appeal. Argued Date 2023-04-20 Keywords Canadian charter (Non-criminal) - Freedom of association, Labour relations, Certification - Charters of Rights - Freedom of association - Labour relations - Certification - Association of managers - Casino - Definition of employee in Labour Code of province of Quebec - Whether s. 1(l)(1) of Labour Code infringes s. 2(d) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and s. 3 of Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12 (Quebec Charter) - If so, whether infringement constitutes reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society within meaning of s. 1 of Canadian Charter and s. 9.1 of Quebec Charter - Whether reviewing court must defer to administrative tribunal’s findings of mixed fact and law where constitutional validity of statute is challenged - Labour Code, CQLR, c. C-27, s. 1(l)(1) - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(d) - Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12, ss. 3, 9.1. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual interference committed against a minor under the age of 16 between August 1, 2013 and July 19, 2015. During that period, he and the complainant had full sexual intercourse four times. He also pleaded guilty to a charge of child luring arising from interaction with the complainant on social media between February 25 and September 13, 2015. The trial judge sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for 10 months on the count of sexual interference and for 5 months concurrent on the count of child luring. She also found that the mandatory minimum sentence of one year of imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(a) Cr. C. for the offence of child luring was disproportionate in view of the circumstances in which it had been committed in this case and the respondent’s own circumstances, and that it was therefore contrary to s. 12 of the Charter. As a result, she declared it to be of no force or effect with respect to the respondent. The majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the sentence of imprisonment for child luring and from the declaration that the minimum sentence was of no force or effect. Levesque J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, increased the sentence for child luring from 5 to 12 months and set aside the declaration that the minimum sentence was of no force or effect. Argued Date 2023-02-15 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Sentencing - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Sentencing — Mandatory minimum sentence — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in downplaying gravity of offence of child luring based on considerations not relevant for sentencing purposes — Whether majority erred in law in finding that once underlying offence (in this case sexual interference) has been committed, subsequent interaction is less serious, even though it has same objective — Whether s. 172.1(2)(a) Cr. C. is contrary to s. 12 of Charter — If so, whether it is appropriate and reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society in accordance with s. 1 of Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 172.1(2)(a). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On December 24, 2015, the appellant was charged with crimes relating to the shooting of two individuals. The appellant’s jury trial for second degree murder, attempted murder and assorted firearm charges was scheduled to commence on November 5, 2018. However, it was adjourned to October 28, 2019. The appellant applied for a stay of proceedings for violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The trial judge dismissed his application holding that, although the net delay exceeded the ceiling of 30 months under Jordan, it was justified because this was a transitional case where the transitional exceptional circumstance applied. The appellant was acquitted of second degree murder and convicted of manslaughter in connection with the victim who died. He was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of discharging a firearm with intent to wound in connection with the second victim and of possession of a restricted firearm without a license. The appellant appealed the convictions and alleged that the trial judge erred in dismissing the s. 11(b) application and in his instructions to the jury on how they should approach the evidence in this case. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It found that the delay was justified by the transitional exceptional circumstance and that the trial judge’s assessment of the entire delay under the Morin framework was required as part of the transitional exceptional circumstance analysis. Further, the majority concluded that the impugned passages of the jury charge did not reveal error. Nordheimer J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a stay of proceedings. He found that the trial judge erred on his reliance of the transitional exceptional circumstance to excuse the delay and that the Crown had ample time to adapt to the Jordan framework. Moreover, he found that there was a serious error in the trial judge’s instructions to the jury. Argued Date 2023-04-17 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), Charge to jury - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Trial delay — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Transitional exceptional circumstance — Charge to jury — Whether the trial judge erred by concluding that the transitional exceptional circumstance justified the presumptively unreasonable delay in the appellant’s trial — Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury with respect to the presumption of innocence and burden of proof — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b). Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Government of Alberta sought the Court of Appeal of Alberta’s opinion on the constitutionality of the Impact Assessment Act, S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1 (“IAA”) (found in Part 1 of Bill C 69, entitled An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28) and one of its associated regulations, the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”). The questions posed via Order in Council 160/2019 were as follows: 1. Is Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28, unconstitutional in whole or in part, as being beyond the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada? 2. Is the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285, unconstitutional in whole or in part by virtue of purporting to apply to certain activities listed in Schedule 2 thereof that relate to matters entirely within the legislative authority of the Provinces under the Constitution of Canada? The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta was of the opinion that the IAA is ultra vires Parliament, and that the IAA and Regulations are unconstitutional. Greckol J.A., dissenting, was of the opinion that the IAA and Regulations are a valid exercise of Parliament’s authority to legislate on the matter of the environment. Argued Date 2023-03-22 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Environmental law - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Environment — Whether Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28 (“IAA”), is intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”), are intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its characterization of the pith and substance of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its classification of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to disapply the IAA and Regulations. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Government of Alberta sought the Court of Appeal of Alberta’s opinion on the constitutionality of the Impact Assessment Act, S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1 (“IAA”) (found in Part 1 of Bill C 69, entitled An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28) and one of its associated regulations, the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”). The questions posed via Order in Council 160/2019 were as follows: 1. Is Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28, unconstitutional in whole or in part, as being beyond the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada? 2. Is the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285, unconstitutional in whole or in part by virtue of purporting to apply to certain activities listed in Schedule 2 thereof that relate to matters entirely within the legislative authority of the Provinces under the Constitution of Canada? The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta was of the opinion that the IAA is ultra vires Parliament, and that the IAA and Regulations are unconstitutional. Greckol J.A., dissenting, was of the opinion that the IAA and Regulations are a valid exercise of Parliament’s authority to legislate on the matter of the environment. Argued Date 2023-03-21 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Environmental law - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Environment — Whether Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28 (“IAA”), is intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”), are intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its characterization of the pith and substance of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its classification of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to disapply the IAA and Regulations. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN) The respondent was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, two offences perpetrated on the complainant when she was between six and eight years old. The convictions were based on the complainant’s unsworn, videotaped police statement, which the trial judge admitted into evidence by application of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, based on the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal, concluding that the trial judge erred in law by admitting the out-of-court statement into evidence. MacPherson J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal from conviction. Argued Date 2023-01-10 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law – Evidence – Admissibility – Hearsay – Videotaped out-of-court statement given by complainant – Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out-of-court statement by (i) finding that the statement met the requirements of threshold reliability; and (ii) finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate the allegations. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The respondent, H.V., pleaded guilty to a child luring offence committed between July 31 and August 9, 2017, which was prosecuted summarily. During sentencing, the respondent argued that the 6-month mandatory minimum sentence provided for in s. 172.1(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, was unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In his view, a sentence of imprisonment would be unjustified. The prosecution sought a term of imprisonment of between 9 and 12 months along with probation. The Court of Québec declared that the 6-month mandatory minimum sentence was of no force or effect in relation to the accused, suspended the passing of sentence and imposed 2 years of probation with an obligation to perform 150 hours of community service. The Superior Court allowed the appeal and affirmed that the mandatory minimum sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(b) Cr. C. was of no force or effect in relation to the accused under s. 12 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1; it declared the mandatory minimum sentence to be invalid and of no force or effect and set aside the sentence imposed at trial. It sentenced the accused to 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently and 3 years of probation, including 150 hours of community service. It maintained the other terms and conditions imposed and orders made at trial. The Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal, upholding the 90-day sentence of imprisonment and the declaration that the minimum sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(b) Cr. C. was invalid. It held that the Superior Court had not imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence that did not reflect the objective and subjective seriousness of the crime committed and that the Superior Court had not erred in law in finding s. 172.1(2)(b) to be constitutionally invalid. Argued Date 2023-02-16 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Sentencing - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Sentencing — Mandatory minimum sentence — Child luring — Whether s. 172.1(2)(b) of Criminal Code infringes s. 12 of Charter — If so, whether it constitutes reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 172.1(2)(b) — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 12. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

At trial, the appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder. The appellant had refused to retain counsel subsequent to the preliminary inquiry and was adamant that he wanted to represent himself. Two separate amicus curiae were appointed to assist the court at different times; however, he refused to co-operate with either. The appellant appealed the convictions and alleged that the perceived fairness of the proceedings had been tainted due to the trial judge’s failure to appoint a partisan amicus curiae at an early stage of proceedings, with instructions to take on the key responsibilities of defence counsel. A majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta found that there was no trial unfairness arising from the role of the amicus curiae in this case, and dismissed the appeal. It held that the appellant made the full answer and defence he wanted to. In dissent, O’Ferrall J.A. found that there was a miscarriage of justice. He would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial at which the appellant would be represented by defence counsel or an amicus curiae conferred with sufficient authority to advocate on his behalf, independent of the appellant’s wishes. Argued Date 2023-03-14 Keywords Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Appointment of amicus curiae — Role of amicus curiae — Self-represented accused — Trial fairness — Did the trial judge’s failure to appoint amicus curiae with a sufficient adversarial mandate result in a miscarriage of justice. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant was charged with multiple offences in relation to a home invasion robbery that took place on or about June 24, 2017. After stealing the homeowner’s possessions, the intruders drove off in his truck. The truck was located 11 hours later. A cigarette butt was seized by police from underneath the driver’s seat and tested for DNA, which returned a single profile matching the appellant. The trial judge convicted the appellant of breaking and entering to steal a firearm, two counts of robbery, and disguise with intent. Various other charges were conditionally stayed. The appellant appealed the convictions, but the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta dismissed his appeal. The majority held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence related to the appellant’s recent possession of the stolen truck, or err in relying on the doctrine of recent possession to infer the appellant’s guilt for the home invasion robbery. It also held that the verdicts of guilt were reasonable. Veldhuis J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and substituted verdicts of acquittals on all counts. She concluded that the trial judge erred in his application of the law of the doctrine of recent possession and that the verdicts of guilt were unreasonable. Argued Date 2023-02-14 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Assessment, Reasonable verdict - Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Doctrine of recent possession — Reasonable verdict — Whether the verdicts of guilt were unreasonable — Whether the lower courts erred in the application of the law of the doctrine of recent possession — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in law in drawing a negative inference on appeal because the appellant did not testify at trial. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2018 and 2019, the Minister of Education, Culture and Employment of the Northwest Territories denied six applications for admission to French-language schools made by non-rights holder parents. The ineligibility of their children was assessed according to the criteria established in the Ministerial Directive — Enrolment of Students in French First Language Education Programs developed by the government of the Territories. Because none of the criteria in the Directive applied in the circumstances, the parents asked the Minister to exercise her residual discretion to authorize the admission of the six children concerned, which was denied. The non-rights holder parents and the school board applied for judicial review of the Minister’s decisions. In two judgments, the Northwest Territories Supreme Court set aside the Minister’s decisions on the ground that there had been no proportionate balancing of the protections guaranteed by s. 23 of the Charter and the government’s interests. The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the Minister’s appeals and restored her decisions. The court found that the chambers judge’s reasoning on constitutional values had proceeded on the mistaken assumption that the case involved constitutional rights. The families in question did not qualify under s. 23 because they were not rights holders, and they therefore had no legal or statutory right or expectation to have their children attend the French-language schools. Argued Date 2023-02-09 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Administrative law - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Minority language educational rights — Ministerial directive — Administrative law — Discretion — Right to use French in court proceedings — Simultaneous interpretation — Children of non-rights holder parents — Minister denying applications for admission to French-language minority schools — Decisions set aside at first instance but restored on appeal — Whether Minister had to consider purpose of s. 23 in her decision-making process — Whether Minister’s denials were reasonable — Whether there was infringement of right to use French in courts protected by s. 19(1) of Charter and s. 9(1) of OLA — In alternative, whether right to natural justice was breached — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 19(1) and 23 — Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. O-1, s. 9(1). Notes (Northwest Territories) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants, who were charged with various offences related to the large scale trafficking of cannabis, were arrested at the same time in more than one judicial district. They were divided into four different groups for separate trials. The appellants in the first group brought a motion for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process based on a series of infringements of the rights of the accused, and primarily their right to counsel. On August 27, 2018, Dumas J. of the Superior Court entered a stay of proceedings on the ground that the police conduct had undermined the integrity of the justice system. He noted that the infringement of the right to counsel was the most serious infringement. On May 7, 2019, at a hearing before Dumas J., the parties agreed that the decision rendered concerning group 1 would apply to the accused in the other groups. The proceedings against all the other accused were therefore stayed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of August 27, 2018 and May 7, 2019 staying the court proceedings, and ordered a new trial. It found that the trial judge necessarily had to assess the situation of each accused individually, since a remedy could be granted only to a person whose own constitutional rights had been infringed. That error in itself justified a new hearing. Argued Date 2023-02-08 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Enforcement (s. 24), Abuse of process - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Enforcement — Stay of proceedings — Abuse of process — Residual category — Standing — Infringement of right to counsel — Given that infringement of personal right is not determinative in application for stay of proceedings based on residual category, what standing is required to seek remedy in this category through s. 24(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether Crown can appeal conclusion of judgment that ends proceedings even though Crown specifically asked trial judge to reach such conclusion. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Cindy Dickson, is a member of the respondent Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (“VGFN”) in the Yukon Territory; she resides in Whitehorse, instead of the VGFN’s Settlement Lands, approximately 800km away, for family medical reasons and other socio-economic reasons. Ms. Dickson sought to stand for election to the Council of the VGFN. However, the VGFN constitution specifies that any Councillor must reside on the Settlement Land (the “residency requirement”); it also states that if an eligible candidate for Chief or Councillor does not reside on Settlement Lands during the election, and wins their desired seat, they must relocate to the Settlement Lands within 14 days of election day. Given that Ms. Dickson was unwilling to move to the Settlement Lands, the VGFN Council declined to remove the residency requirement from the constitution, and rejected Ms. Dickson’s candidacy for the position of Councillor. Ms. Dickson then sought a declaration in the Yukon Supreme Court that the residency requirement was inconsistent with her right to equality protected and guaranteed by s. 15(1) of the Charter, could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and was therefore of no force or effect. The chambers judge issued a number of declarations, concluding that while the Charter applies to the VGFN Council and to the residency requirement in the VGFN constitution, the residency requirement at its core does not infringe s. 15(1) of the Charter. However, the time limit for relocation specified in the residency requirement — “within 14 days” — does infringe s. 15(1), and should be severed from the requirement and declared to be of no force and effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the declaration of invalidity was suspended for 18 months). Alternatively, if this was incorrect and the residency requirement does infringe the s. 15(1) equality right, even without the time limit, the chambers judge concluded that s. 25 of the Charter would apply so as to “shield” the residency requirement (albeit with severance of the words “within 14 days”) from a finding of infringement. Argued Date 2023-02-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Non-criminal), Application (s. 32), Right to equality (s. 15), Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Treaty rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Charter of rights — Application — Right to equality — Discrimination based on aboriginality-residence — Aboriginal peoples — Treaty rights — Self-government — First Nation constitution requiring elected Band councillors to relocate to settlement lands within 14 days of election — Appellant’s candidacy for councillor rejected for refusing to relocate if elected — Appellant challenging constitutional validity of residency requirement — Various declarations issued, including that Charter applies to First Nation’s residency requirement, that time limit in requirement infringes right to equality, but that s. 25 of Charter operates so as to shield requirement from review — Whether scope of “other rights and freedoms” that “pertain to aboriginal peoples of Canada” set out in s. 25 of Charter includes residency requirement — Whether court required to conduct full analysis of Charter right engaged, including s. 1, or whether application of s. 25 means collective rights need not be balanced with other interests — Whether Charter applies to residency requirement in constitution of self-governing First Nation — Whether residency requirement inconsistent with Charter, including whether analogous ground of “aboriginality-residence” rigidly applies in all circumstances of Indigenous governance — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15, 25, 32. Notes (Yukon Territory) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN) At trial, the appellant was acquitted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault respecting the complainant, a person under the age of 16 years. A majority of the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered a new trial. It held that the trial judge engaged in impermissible stereotypical reasoning when assessing the complainant’s credibility by relying on the stereotypes that a victim could not be happy to see her abuser regardless of her age and circumstances, and that a victim will exhibit avoidant behaviour around her abuser if she were truly being abused. In dissent, White J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. In his view, the trial judge did not rely on any myth or stereotype about sexual assault when assessing the complainant’s credibility. Argued Date 2022-12-01 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence - Criminal law — Evidence — Credibility — Stereotypical reasoning — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in ruling that the trial judge relied upon impermissible stereotypes of victims of sexual abuse when he assessed the complainant’s credibility. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Publication ban on party) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2017, the AMF brought an action before the FMAT alleging that the appellants participated in a transnational pump and dump scheme by improperly influencing or manipulating the price of a stock in contravention of the Quebec Securities Act, CQLR, c. V-1.1. According to the AMF, the appellants, who are residents of B.C., made financial transactions through offshore companies incorporated in several countries with bank accounts in Europe. AMF alleged that they acted in concert to acquire the shares of a Nevada company (Solo), give it a legitimate face and promote its business for the purpose of fraudulently increasing the value of its shares and then selling them for a profit, for distribution among themselves. Solo’s shares are traded on an over-the-counter market in New York. The AMF alleged that at all material times, Solo was under the direction of a Québec resident and was a reporting issuer in Québec with a business address in Montreal. It also alleged that the misleading press releases and promotional materials, a portion of which originated in Montreal, were accessible to Québec residents and that approximately fifteen investors in Québec lost a total of $5,000 as a result of the activities. AMF’s action sought to have the FMAT order the appellants to cease any activity in respect of a transaction in securities; prohibit them from acting as directors or officers of an issuer, dealer, adviser or investment fund manager for five years; and impose administrative penalties on them, all pursuant to ss. 265, 273.3, 195.2, 199.1(1) and 273.1 of the Securities Act. The appellants brought preliminary motions for declinatory exceptions arguing that the FMAT was without jurisdiction. The FMAT denied the appellants’ motions and confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the action. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the application for judicial review, and the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2023-01-18 Keywords Constitutional law - Private international law, Extraterritoriality, Legislation, Interpretation, Administrative law, Boards and tribunals, Jurisdiction - Constitutional law — Constitutional applicability — Private international law — Extraterritoriality — Jurisdiction of Québec Court — Legislation — Interpretation —Administrative law — Boards and Tribunals — Jurisdiction — Did the Court of Appeal err in deciding that the provisions of the C.C.Q. setting out the International Jurisdiction of Québec Authorities (articles 3134 to 3145) do not apply to administrative proceedings before the Financial Markets Administrative Tribunal (FMAT) — Did the Court of Appeal err in deciding that the FMAT can assert adjudicative jurisdiction over out-of-province defendants based on legislative or territorial jurisdiction — Did the Court of Appeal err in affirming the FMAT’s jurisdiction over the application by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) against Sharp — Are the provisions of the C.C.Q. governing the International Jurisdiction of Québec Authorities applicable to administrative proceedings before a Québec tribunal in the context of disputes relating to the implementation of provincial laws concerning property and civil rights — If the provisions of the C.C.Q. are not applicable, must the Court’s jurisdiction be founded on the presence of specific and predetermined presumptive connecting factors relating to the alleged violations or is it sufficient for the Court to find some form of connection deemed sufficient between Québec and the overall context within which the violations took place — Is the test met in the circumstances of this case — Can article 3148 C.C.Q. be applied by analogy to ground the jurisdiction of Québec courts and tribunals in proceedings of a different nature than a personal action of patrimonial nature — Can article 3136 C.C.Q. apply to the present action in the absence of a request to this effect before the FMAT and in the absence of any evidence as to the impossibility that the Appellants’ alleged conduct be adjudicated elsewhere. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2017, the AMF brought an action before the FMAT alleging that the appellants participated in a transnational pump and dump scheme by improperly influencing or manipulating the price of a stock in contravention of the Quebec Securities Act, CQLR, c. V-1.1. According to the AMF, the appellants, who are residents of B.C., made financial transactions through offshore companies incorporated in several countries with bank accounts in Europe. AMF alleged that they acted in concert to acquire the shares of a Nevada company (Solo), give it a legitimate face and promote its business for the purpose of fraudulently increasing the value of its shares and then selling them for a profit, for distribution among themselves. Solo’s shares are traded on an over-the-counter market in New York. The AMF alleged that at all material times, Solo was under the direction of a Québec resident and was a reporting issuer in Québec with a business address in Montreal. It also alleged that the misleading press releases and promotional materials, a portion of which originated in Montreal, were accessible to Québec residents and that approximately fifteen investors in Québec lost a total of $5,000 as a result of the activities. AMF’s action sought to have the FMAT order the appellants to cease any activity in respect of a transaction in securities; prohibit them from acting as directors or officers of an issuer, dealer, adviser or investment fund manager for five years; and impose administrative penalties on them, all pursuant to ss. 265, 273.3, 195.2, 199.1(1) and 273.1 of the Securities Act. The appellants brought preliminary motions for declinatory exceptions arguing that the FMAT was without jurisdiction. The FMAT denied the appellants’ motions and confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the action. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the application for judicial review, and the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2023-01-18 Keywords Constitutional law - Private international law, Extraterritoriality, Legislation, Interpretation, Administrative law, Boards and tribunals, Jurisdiction - Constitutional law — Constitutional applicability — Private international law — Extraterritoriality — Jurisdiction of Québec Court — Legislation — Interpretation —Administrative law — Boards and Tribunals — Jurisdiction — Did the Court of Appeal err in deciding that the provisions of the C.C.Q. setting out the International Jurisdiction of Québec Authorities (articles 3134 to 3145) do not apply to administrative proceedings before the Financial Markets Administrative Tribunal (FMAT) — Did the Court of Appeal err in deciding that the FMAT can assert adjudicative jurisdiction over out-of-province defendants based on legislative or territorial jurisdiction — Did the Court of Appeal err in affirming the FMAT’s jurisdiction over the application by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) against Sharp — Are the provisions of the C.C.Q. governing the International Jurisdiction of Québec Authorities applicable to administrative proceedings before a Québec tribunal in the context of disputes relating to the implementation of provincial laws concerning property and civil rights — If the provisions of the C.C.Q. are not applicable, must the Court’s jurisdiction be founded on the presence of specific and predetermined presumptive connecting factors relating to the alleged violations or is it sufficient for the Court to find some form of connection deemed sufficient between Québec and the overall context within which the violations took place — Is the test met in the circumstances of this case — Can article 3148 C.C.Q. be applied by analogy to ground the jurisdiction of Québec courts and tribunals in proceedings of a different nature than a personal action of patrimonial nature — Can article 3136 C.C.Q. apply to the present action in the absence of a request to this effect before the FMAT and in the absence of any evidence as to the impossibility that the Appellants’ alleged conduct be adjudicated elsewhere. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In September 2017, the police commenced an investigation related to the purchase of virtual gift cards with fraudulent credit card information. The police was told that the fraudulent online transactions used two IP addresses. The police obtained warrants to search the two residences associated with the IP addresses. The appellant was arrested and charged with 33 offences relating to the possession and use of third parties’ credit cards and personal identification documents, and firearms. The appellant filed a notice alleging the breach of his rights under s. 8 of the Charter as well as other rights. The trial judge found that it was not objectively reasonable to recognize a subjective expectation of privacy in an IP address used by an individual. She concluded that there was no breach of s. 8. The appellant was eventually convicted of 13 of the original 33 counts, which he appealed. The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta dismissed the appeal. It found that the trial judge correctly interpreted the scope of the law that governed her s. 8 analysis. The majority concluded that she applied the correct interpretation to her factual findings, which reveal no palpable or overriding error. Veldhuis J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She found that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP addresses and that his s. 8 rights were violated. Argued Date 2023-01-17 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Search and seizure (s. 8) - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Search and seizure — Investigation related to purchase of virtual gift cards with fraudulent credit card information — Police obtaining internet protocol (“IP”) addresses to locate residences — Whether reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to IP address — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants, Mr. Ponce and Mr. Riopel, served as presidents of three companies grouped together under the name “Le Groupe Excellence” controlled by the respondent shareholders, Mr. Rhéaume and Mr. Beaulne. Rhéaume and Beaulne founded Excellence in the late 1970’s, but their working relationship ultimately broke down due to a revenue share dispute. A few years later, the appellants bought the respondents’ interests in Excellence. Rhéaume and Beaulne were unaware, however, that the appellants had been negotiating the sale of Excellence to a third party, Industrial Alliance. Shortly after acquiring the shares of Rhéaume and Beaulne, the appellants sold their interests in Excellence for a significant profit. The respondents allege that the sale of Excellence by the appellants stripped them of a business opportunity. They applied to the courts and claimed joint and several damages against the appellants. The Superior Court granted the respondents’ action in part. The court determined that the appellants used their roles to obtain information for their own benefit, and breached duties of good faith, integrity and loyalty owing to Rhéaume and Beaulne as shareholders. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeal. Although it found that the trial judge made an error in determining that the duty of loyalty was owed to the shareholders, as opposed to the corporation, this error was not determinative since the judge also relied on the obligation of good faith and the duty to inform to conclude that the appellants were at fault towards the respondents. Argued Date 2023-01-12 Keywords Civil liability - Commercial law - Civil liability — Duty to inform — Duty of good faith — Loss of chance — Commercial law — Corporations — Directors of corporation buying out controlling shareholders — Subsequent offers by third party to buy interests of directors of corporation — Interest of third party not made known to former controlling shareholders — Former controlling shareholders alleging improper appropriation of business opportunity by directors — Scope of duties owing to controlling shareholders — Given its distinction in Quebec civil law with the duty of loyalty, whether the duty to inform, deriving from the duty to act in good faith, places the responsibility on a prospective buyer to inform a prospective seller about the market for the sale — Whether the Court of Appeal of Quebec erred in upholding the award of disgorgement in the absence of a duty of loyalty — Whether the Court of Appeal of Quebec erred in awarding damages for a loss of chance to negotiate in the absence of a basis for disgorgement. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

At trial before judge and jury, the appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi was convicted of various gun-related offences including one count of participation in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code. The charges resulted from a police investigation dubbed “Project Traveller”. A majority of the Court of Appeal (per Brown J.A. with Trotter J.A. concurring) dismissed the three grounds the appellant raised pertaining to his conviction appeal. First, the majority rejected his argument that the trial judge erred in admitting the opinion evidence of the Somali-language translator regarding portions of intercepted communications. Second, the majority held that the trial judge did not err in failing to charge the jury adequately on the definition of “criminal organization” in s. 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code. The appellant had submitted on appeal that the charge did not provide guidance on the requisite degree of structure and continuity mentioned in R. v. Venneri, 2012 SCC 33, to constitute a criminal organization. On this point, the majority concluded that defence counsel’s lack of objection was indicative of the legal adequacy of the trial judge’s instructions on this definition given the evidence heard by the jury and the positions taken by the parties in closing submissions. Third, the majority held the trial judge did not err in charging the jury that they could consider certain after the fact conduct. In dissent, Paciocco J.A. only disagreed on one ground of the conviction appeal: he would have concluded that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately charge the jury on the “criminal organization” definition in s. 467.1(1) and would have therefore set aside the appellant’s conviction for the count setting out the offence at s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code of “participating in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons” and ordered a new trial on that charge. Argued Date 2023-01-11 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury, Offences - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Definition — Participating in activities of criminal organization for purpose of trafficking weapons — What constitutes adequate jury instruction on definition of “criminal organization” under s. 467.1 (1) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, with respect to essential elements of structure and continuity? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

By Order in Council 1288 2019 of December 18, 2019, the Quebec government submitted the following question to the Quebec Court of Appeal: Is An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, ultra vires the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada? The Court of Appeal answered that the Act, which came into force on January 1, 2020, is constitutional, except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which are not. It found that the pith and substance of the Act is to ensure the well being of Indigenous children by fostering culturally appropriate services that will reduce their over representation in provincial child welfare systems. The well being of Indigenous persons is part of the essence of the federal head of power set out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the national principles stated in general terms in the Act are compatible with Quebec’s child welfare legislation. The Court of Appeal also held that the right of self government in relation to child and family services falls within s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Examining the framework established by the Act for circumscribing the exercise of this generic Aboriginal right, the court found that the aim of s. 21 is to make the doctrine of federal paramountcy applicable to Indigenous laws. Because this alters the fundamental architecture of the Constitution, s. 21 is ultra vires. The same is true of s. 22(3), which provides that Indigenous laws prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent provisions of provincial legislation. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to give absolute priority to an Aboriginal right. Argued Date 2022-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Aboriginal rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Pith and substance — Aboriginal peoples — Aboriginal rights — Self government — Child and family services — Whether An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, is ultra vires Parliament of Canada under Constitution of Canada — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Mikerlson Vernelus, was convicted of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. A vehicle with the appellant and two other individuals in it had been stopped by the police and the appellant had been arrested for possession of cannabis. During the search incident to the arrest, the police had found a firearm in a bag belonging to the appellant. Testing of that weapon had found DNA only from the vehicle’s other occupant. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s testimony, as she did not find it credible. She then held that the defence as a whole did not raise any reasonable doubt as to knowledge, control and possession of the weapon found, including the appellant’s consent. The judge also noted that the fact that the appellant was calm when the weapon was found confirmed his knowledge that the weapon was hidden in his bag, which was under his control. The Quebec Court of Appeal, for the reasons given by Moore J.A. and concurred in by Pelletier J.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal based on the unreasonableness of the verdict. The majority explained that the offence of possession of a firearm is grounded in control and knowledge. The trial judge had found from the evidence that these elements were established beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was open to her to make such a finding. First, the bag in which the weapon was found was the appellant’s bag, the weapon was not visible from the outside and was in the centre of the bag with clothing around it, and the bag was close to the appellant. These facts established the appellant’s control of the weapon. Second, the judge could infer from these indicia that the appellant knew of the weapon’s presence and thus that he was guilty. The fact that the appellant had not placed the weapon in the bag himself did not matter. The prosecution could establish, and had established here, that the weapon had not been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge. The majority explained that, at the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, a possible, speculative inference that amounts to pure conjecture is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt. Schrager J.A., dissenting, would have set aside the judgment and substituted acquittals on the offences of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. In his view, the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge had misapplied the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. In light of the possibility that the firearm had been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge, which was a reasonable inference from the evidence, the appellant had not been given the benefit of the reasonable doubt to which he was entitled because the evidence did not reasonably support the guilty verdict. Argued Date 2022-12-06 Keywords Criminal law - Appeals, Evidence, Unreasonable verdict - Criminal law — Appeals — Evidence — Reasonable inference — Verdict — Unreasonable verdict — Whether majority of Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had not made error and had not reached unreasonable verdict by finding that appellant had possession of firearm for which he was charged, even though that inference was not only reasonable one that could be drawn from evidence or from lack of evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The parties were married for three years. Both parties came into the marriage with considerable assets, including houses, vehicles, items of personal property, RRSPs, savings and pensions. Shortly after the parties separated, the respondent invited the applicant to a reconciliation meeting with mutual friends. At the end of the meeting, the respondent presented the applicant with a separation agreement she had drawn up. Neither party received independent legal advice, but they both signed the agreement. The agreement did not deal with all the family property issues as the family home was not specifically dealt with in a final way. Shortly thereafter, the respondent’s counsel drafted a formal interspousal agreement but the applicant refused to sign it or engage in any discussion with the respondent. The respondent issued a petition seeking a divorce and costs in December 2015 and the applicant issued a counter petition in May 2017 claiming for the first time a family property division as well as occupational rent. The trial judge ordered that the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $62,646.98 (this being the sum of the $70,646.98 equalization of non-taxable assets less the $8,000 equitable factor regarding the agreement), and either an RRSP rollover of $37,089.69 or a further cash payment of an additional $27,817.27. The Court of Appeal set aside the trial judgment and directed that the division of the family property should be made in accordance with the December 2015 values. The applicant was thus ordered to pay the sum of $4,914.95 to the respondent to equalize the distribution of their family property. Argued Date 2022-12-05 Keywords Family law - Family law — Division of property — Agreements — Whether an analysis under Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, should be applied when considering a non binding agreement — If the Miglin analysis is applied to a non binding agreement, whether it is open to the court to find the agreement is enforceable but depart from the terms of the agreement —Whether an appellate court must apply the correct standard of review. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, David Edward Furey, was convicted of breaking and entering into a dwelling, assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, possession of a knife for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and breach of an undertaking. At trial, the judge admitted, for the truth of its contents, a videotaped out of court statement given by one of the complainants, who subsequently died of unrelated causes. The statement was given to the police soon after the altercations. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Furey’s appeal from convictions, set aside the decision of the trial judge, including the voir dire decision regarding the admissibility of the complainant’s out-of-court statement, and ordered a new trial. The majority concluded that the trial judge applied an erroneous statement of the law — that where there is greater necessity, less reliability is acceptable. As a result of her reliance on this statement, the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out of court statement for the truth of its contents: she permitted the admissibility of the hearsay evidence without requiring that the requisite degree of reliability be established. In dissent, Knickle J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. In her view, the trial judge committed no error in her application of the principled approach to the hearsay evidence, as she engaged in the skeptical and cautious analysis that was required before admitting the statement, including that the two criteria of necessity and reliability must be assessed in tandem and with flexibility. Argued Date 2022-12-02 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Videotaped out of court statement given by complainant who died before trial — Whether the majority of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal erred in law in allowing the appeal, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial because the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal principles in assessing the “threshold” admissibility of an out of court statement. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Before the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, the appellant, Ryan David Clark, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The main issue at trial was the identity of the person who had beaten the deceased to death. On appeal, Mr. Clark argued that the trial judge erred by failing to address the frailties of eyewitness evidence in his instructions to the jury, particularly with regard to in-court identification by two witnesses. He also argued that the trial judge erred by allowing other witnesses to provide bad character and post-offence conduct evidence and by failing to adequately caution the jury in relation to that testimony and that the verdict was unreasonable. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The jury instructions properly equipped the jury to understand its task in evaluating all of the eyewitness identification evidence, including the in-court identification. It was adequately prepared to examine the frailties of the evidence of the two particular witnesses and to determine if it would accept their testimony as credible and reliable in accordance with the law. The trial judge also did not err in regard to post-offence conduct and bad character evidence and the verdict was not unreasonable. In dissent, Leurer J.A. would have allowed Mr. Clark’s appeal and ordered a new trial. In his view, the jury charge did not adequately equip the jurors to deal with the frailties of the in-court eyewitness identification evidence in this case. Argued Date 2022-11-30 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Eyewitness evidence — Identification — In-court identification — Caution — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution alerting jurors that a witness’s testimony had limited value for the purposes of identifying the assailant who killed the victim, and that this witness’s in court identification of the appellant had no evidentiary value — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution on the problematic nature of another witness’s in-court identification of the appellant, and that it would be dangerous to attribute to this identification any degree of certainty greater than what she had communicated to police prior — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law by concluding the instructions on eyewitness identification evidence did not give rise to reversible legal error. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Section 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (“IRPA”) provides that permanent residents or foreign nationals are “inadmissible on security grounds” for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada”. The Minister alleged that both appellants were foreign nationals who were inadmissible under s. 34(1)(e) of the IRPA. The issue before the Immigration Board and the Immigration Appeal Division was whether s. 34(1)(e) applied only where there is a connection to national security. Both agreed with the Minister that it did not. In their view, s. 34(1)(e) operates whether or not there is a connection to national security. On judicial review, the Federal Court quashed the decisions in the two cases. Both cases were heard together at the Federal Court of Appeal. It allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the Federal Court and dismissed the applications for judicial review. It found the administrative interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) was reasonable and answered the following certified question: Q.: Is it reasonable to interpret para. 34(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in a manner that does not require proof of conduct that has a nexus with “national security” or the “security of Canada”? A. Yes. Argued Date 2022-11-29 Keywords Immigration - Judicial review - Immigration — Inadmissibility on security grounds for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada” — Judicial review — Interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) — Whether reasonable interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA requires national security nexus — Whether s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA can apply to conduct that does not require a nexus to “national security” or “security of Canada” — How should reviewing courts determine whether a legislative provision can bear only one reasonable interpretation and what constraints will bear on this assessment — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred in overturning Federal Court’s findings that tribunal decisions were unreasonable. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication in case)(Sealing order) Since the 2004 agreement between Canada and the United States known as the Safe Third Country Agreement, the U.S. has been designated a safe country pursuant to s. 159.3 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2002 227. As a result, claimants arriving at a land port of entry to Canada from the U.S. are deemed to be ineligible for refugee protection in Canada pursuant to s. 101(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. The individual applicants are among those claimants who were deemed ineligible. The applicants ABC and her children are from El Salvador, claiming refugee status based on gang violence and gender-based persecution. The Homsi/Al Nahass applicants are a Muslim family from Syria who left the U.S. following the issuance of the first travel ban by the U.S. government. The applicant Ms. Mustefa is a Muslim woman from Ethiopia who was detained after her attempt to enter Canada from the U.S. The applicant organizations were granted the right to participate as public interest parties. The collective applicants challenged the Canadian government’s failure to review the ongoing designation of the U.S. under s. 159.3 of the Regulations as rendering that provision ultra vires and not in conformity with s. 101(1)(a), 102(2) ad 102(3) of the Act. They also claimed that the designation and their ineligibility to claim refugee status infringed their rights guaranteed under sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and were not justified under s. 1. The Federal Court rejected the ultra vires argument but held that s. 159.3 of the Regulations and s. 101(1)(e) of the Act infringed s. 7 of the Charter and were not justified under s. 1. The court found it unnecessary to consider whether the provisions also infringed s. 15. The appellate court allowed the appeal, dismissed a cross-appeal on the ultra vires and s. 15 issues, set aside the Federal Court decisions, and dismissed the applications for judicial review. Argued Date 2022-10-06 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Non-criminal), Right to security of person (s. 7), Fundamental justice (s. 7), Right to equality (s. 15), Reasonable limits (s. 1), Immigration, Inadmissibility and removal, Judicial review - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to security of the person — Fundamental Justice — Right to equality — Reasonable limits — Immigration — Inadmissibility and removal — Judicial review — Appellants seeking judicial review of decisions regarding their ineligibility to claim refugee protections in Canada after arriving at a land port of entry from the United States — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in refusing to determine the constitutionality of the operative provisions — Whether the gender equality claim under s. 15 of the Charter must be adjudicated — Whether s. 159.3 of the Regulations is ultra vires — Whether the combined effect of s. 159.3 of the Regulations and s. 101(1)(e) of the Act infringe s. 7 of the Charter and violate the s. 7 rights of refugee claimants — If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter — Whether the combined effect of s. 159.3 of the Regulations and s. 101(1)(e) of the Act infringe s. 15 of the Charter — If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 and 15 — Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 101(1)(e), 102(2) and 102(3) — Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2002-227, s. 159.3. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Publication ban on party) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to th

(PUBLICATION BAN) At trial, the respondent, Randy William Downes, was convicted of two counts of voyeurism contrary to s. 162(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. He was found to have surreptitiously taken photographs of adolescent male hockey players in stages of undress in a dressing room while he was coaching. A majority of the Court of Appeal (per Willcock J.A. with Grauer J.A. concurring), allowed Mr. Downes’ appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. The majority explained that, while it was open to the trial judge to find nudity was expected in the dressing room in which the offences were found to have occurred, the conflicts in evidence regarding whether nudity was expected at the time the photos were taken were not addressed. In dissent, Dickson J.A. would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the characterization of “a place” under s. 162(1) does not include a temporal use component. In her view, the relevant inquiry was whether the place in which the impugned conduct occurred is a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude, regardless of the expected use of that place specifically when the conduct occurred. Argued Date 2022-10-13 Keywords Criminal law - Elements of offence, Evidence - Criminal law — Voyeurism — Elements of the offence — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether nudity was reasonably expected at the place and at the time where the offence was alleged to have occurred — Whether s. 162(1)(a) of the Criminal Code infringes s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? — If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 162(1)(a). Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC) The respondents were found guilty of six counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. The respondents filed applications for stays of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging abuses of process due to police misconduct during the investigation, and also because of their conditions while in pre-trial custody. The Crown applied for summary dismissal of the applications. Finding that the serious nature of the offences committed by the respondents could not justify a stay of proceedings, the trial judge allowed the Crown’s applications for summary dismissal, dismissed the respondents’ applications for stays of proceedings, and entered convictions. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the respondents’ ground of appeal relating to non-disclosure of evidence, but allowed the respondents’ appeal in part, quashed the convictions but affirmed the verdicts of guilt, and ordered that the matter be remitted to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the respondents’ applications for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process. Argued Date 2022-10-04 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Abuse of process - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Stay of proceedings — Abuse of process — Summary dismissal of applications — Whether, and to what extent, a judge is permitted to assess or weigh an applicant’s proposed evidence when determining whether to permit a full evidentiary hearing on an application for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process — Whether the Court of Appeal applied too low a threshold for determining whether a full evidentiary hearing is required on an application for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration that exceeded eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred milliliters of blood. The appellant was released from custody on an undertaking, a condition of which was that she would not operate a motor vehicle. The appellant spent the 21 months that elapsed between her initial appearance and sentencing under a driving prohibition as a condition of her release. The Provincial Court sentencing judge imposed a $1,000 fine and decided a fit punishment in the circumstances was the one-year minimum driving prohibition. He then addressed whether he could take into account her 21-month presentence driving prohibition. Deciding he could, the appellant was not subjected to any further driving prohibition. The Crown’s appeal of that decision was dismissed by the summary conviction appeal judge. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, varied the Provincial Court decision to include a one-year driving prohibition, and stayed the execution of prohibition order. The dissenting justice would have dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2022-11-08 Keywords Criminal law - Sentencing - Criminal law – Sentencing – Mandatory minimum sentences – Did the sentencing judge commit an error of law by granting time served on a mandatory driving prohibition order – Is time served on a driving prohibition pursuant to an accused’s interim release deductible from a mandatory minimum driving prohibition on sentence that would leave the remaining time to be served on sentence below the mandatory minimum – Does this Court’s direction on the issue in Lacasse that dealt with a discretionary order on sentence which said pre-trial driving suspension must be deducted from the time on sentence apply to mandatory minimum prohibition orders? Notes (New Brunswick) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants, Yves Des Groseillers and BMTC Group Inc., appealed assessments made by the respondent, the Agence du revenu du Québec (“ARQ”). In the course of tax audits, the ARQ added amounts to Mr. Des Groseillers’s taxable income as additional employment income. Those amounts represented the total value of the stock options donated by Mr. Des Groseillers to registered charities, for which he had claimed tax credits. The ARQ therefore added the amounts to BMTC’s payroll as well. The Court of Québec allowed Mr. Des Groseillers’s application and vacated the notices of assessment. It allowed BMTC’s application in part and referred the notices of assessment to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment. In the court’s view, although the transactions were subject to the special rules on the issuance of securities to employees, it would find that Mr. Des Groseillers had not received any benefit, because the evidence showed that he had not received any consideration for the donation and that he had not paid anything to acquire the options. The ARQ could not rely on the presumption set out in another division of the statute to the effect that the disposition of property is deemed to be made at its fair market value, because the special rules form a complete code. The Court of Appeal allowed the ARQ’s appeal, set aside the Court of Québec’s judgment and rendered the decision that ought to have been rendered, that is, it dismissed the appeals brought by Mr. Des Groseillers and BMTC from the notices of assessment. It held that the special rules do not exclude the application of the presumption. Argued Date 2022-11-03 Keywords Taxation - Income tax, Assessment - Taxation — Income tax — Assessment — Stock options — Charitable donation — Whether donation of stock options by individual to registered charity gives rise to taxable employment benefit where donor receives no actual consideration — Taxation Act, CQLR, c. I-3, ss. 48, 50, 54, 422. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Prior to the transactions at issue, the appellant, Deans Knight Income Corporation, was a Canadian public corporation that had approximately $90 million of unused non-capital losses and other deductions. It sought to realize the value of these tax attributes and entered into an agreement with a corporation that had expertise in arranging such transactions. From 2009 to 2012, the appellant deducted a majority of its tax attributes to reduce its tax liability. Following the issuance of reassessments to deny the deductions, the appellant successfully appealed to the Tax Court, but the decision was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal. Argued Date 2022-11-02 Keywords Taxation - Taxation — Corporate restart transaction — Deductible losses — Non-capital losses — General anti-avoidance rule — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in relying on the GAAR to conclude that “actual control” was Parliament’s intended test under ss. 37(6.1), 111(5) and 127(9.1) of the ITA — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in concluding, contrary to the trial judge’s findings, that the avoidance transactions resulted in an abuse of ss. 37(6.1), 111(5) and 127(9.1) of the ITA — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), ss. 37(6.1), 111(5) and 127(9.1). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).